Friday, 30 October 2026

Language, Politics & Propaganda

 

1. The Linguistic Roots of our Current Political Confusion

One can think of language as a set of railway tracks along which we think and from which its is very difficult for us to stray. In ‘Four Quartets’, T. S. Eliot described such departures from existing lines of thought as raids upon the inarticulate: the finding of ways to say something one had not been able to say before. In the ‘Critique of Judgement’, Immanuel Kant called this the essence of genius. How we do it, of course, we don’t know. For no one has yet created a language for talking about it. To those who think of language as akin to a computer program, in fact, this thinking beyond our existing programming to create a new program should not even be possible. And yet we do it all the time, usually when an existing language is found to be either incoherent, containing inconsistencies which produce contradictions, or at odds with reality. Either way, we are invariably resistant to the linguistic changes needed in order to think in a different way, either because we do not like to admit that our previous way of thinking was wrong or, more profoundly, because we do not like to think that what we previously thought of as real was just a linguistic construct, a way of thinking about the world which was imposed on us by language.

As a result, any major change in the way we think and talk is nearly always revolutionary and is often violent, especially when the subject of the way we think and talk is the way we live our lives, a subject which can be even more hotly contested when the language of politics, one of the languages we use to talk about the way in which we live our lives, is itself part of the problem, being incoherent and in need of change, as it is today.

As an example of this incoherence, take, for instance, the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ as they are used in political discourse, which, as I have explained elsewhere, is derived from the seating arrangements in the French National Assembly during the French revolution, when, during debates on the future form of government in France, those who favoured a constitutional monarchy of the kind we already had in England sat on the right of the aisle in front of the Speaker’s chair, while those who favoured a republic of the kind recently established in the United States sat on the left. This arrangement, however, was entirely accidental and arbitrary. The constitutional monarchists could have congregated on the left while the republicans could have congregated on the right. What’s more, there is nothing intrinsically ‘leftish’ about being a republican, any more than there is anything intrinsically ‘rightish’ about being a constitutional monarchist.

One may of course argue that there is something intrinsically conservative about being a constitutional monarchist, especially in the 1790s when the English constitutional monarchy had already been in existence for around a century and was therefore tried and tested, while the American republic was little more than fifteen years old and still experimental. What’s more, a change in France from being an absolute monarchy to being a constitutional monarchy was more of an evolutionary step than a revolutionary transformation, while a change to being a republic was a far more radical departure from what had gone before, which is what we tend to associate with the left. While thus reflecting different human character traits, however, such as caution and conservatism on the one hand and a desire for something different on the other, these associations do not necessarily reflect the actual politics involved.

Take, for instance, the principal political division in England during the 18th century, which was between the ‘Tories’ or conservatives on the one hand and the ‘Whigs’ or classical liberals on the other. As I have explained elsewhere, the Conservatives stood for what their name suggests – traditional conservative values – and more especially, traditional conservative institutions, such as the monarchy, the aristocracy and the Church of England, whereas the Liberals stood for a principle of personal liberty based on the philosophy of John Locke, who argued that, as long as one is not hurting anyone else, one should be allowed to live one’s life in the way one choses without the authoritarian constraints traditionally imposed on us by the very same conservative institutions listed above. To balance this, however, Locke also argued that if we want the freedom to live our lives the way we choose, we cannot be dependent on and thus beholden to others and must therefore take responsibility for ourselves: a political philosophy which was very appealing to the 18th century’s emerging middle class, who, whether they made their money in manufacturing or trade, were eager to throw off the yoke of traditional social structures and embrace the modern world. While they were consequently revolutionaries, the last thing one could call them, therefore, was ‘left wing’ in the way we think of this term today. They were entrepreneurs and business men, who, while they may have shared a common human character trait with other revolutionaries, namely an enthusiasm for change, certainly did not share a common political philosophy with most of the revolutionaries who succeeded them.

The real problem here, however, is not just that, having associated the seating arrangements in the French National Assembly with certain character traits, we then confused these character traits with political philosophies, but that we thought that all political philosophies could be mapped onto this particular seating arrangement, placing all political philosophies somewhere on a one-dimensional spectrum from left to right.

Not only does this only work if there are only two distinct and opposing political philosophies, however, forming the two poles of a spectrum, but it also assumes that everything in between is some sort of gradually sliding compromise between the two. This then leads us to think of the two poles as the far right pole and the far left pole, with something between the two which we call the middle ground and something on each side of this political centre which we call the centre right and the centre left. The problem with this, however, is that, while this way of structuring the world of politics is logically dictated by the discursive formation we have now created, I strongly doubt whether it actually corresponds to anything in reality beyond what the language itself has spawned.

To make matters worse, this acceptance of the idea of a polarised political spectrum, along with the assumption that those of a conservative disposition must sit somewhere on the right, led American English speakers in particular to conclude that anyone who opposed conservatism as a political philosophy, including liberals, must sit somewhere on the left. Even this, however, was not the end of the linguistic chaos to which the adoption of this left/right dichotomy gave rise. For to make matters even worse, we then compounded the original error by committing the logical fallacy of concluding that, because liberals sit on the left of the spectrum, everyone on the left must be a liberal, which is akin to saying that, because all apples are berries, having pips or seeds at their core – which is the botanical definition of a berry – all berries are apples.

By this point, the language of politics had thus become so incoherent and dysfunctional that we actually had to create a new word to refer to classical liberals, whom we now call libertarians, to distinguish them from those whom many conservatives call liberals simply as a term of abuse. Indeed, one of the most pernicious consequences of the left/right dichotomy in politics and the linguistic chaos to which it has given rise is the creation of political hostilities based far more on misunderstanding and emotion than on reasoned argument and facts. For while John Locke was clearly correct in his assumption that most people value the right to live their lives the way they chose, few people fully understand that exercising this right entails taking responsibility for one’s choices, which, if they really understood it, many people would find challenging.

That’s not to say, of course, that people knowingly choose irresponsibility. Indeed, most people think that they are taking responsibility for themselves even when they live off the state, which is precisely the kind of dependency on those in power against which Locke warned us. The real problem with not taking full responsibility for ourselves, however, is not just that this leads to dependency but that it leads to a kind of infantilisation, to people never really growing up and remaining permanent Peter Pans, which, to some, may seem quite attractive – indeed, it may be what they think ‘being free to live their lives as they choose’ really means – but it is choice on which most responsible adults look down with a certain degree of contempt, causing those so regarded to feel a similar level of hatred towards those who would impose values and a way of life on them they have chosen to reject.

Since the manifest failure of communism in the 20th century, in fact, this polarisation – between contempt for those who fail to grow up and take responsibility for themselves on one hand and hatred for those who would force responsibility on them on the other – has probably become the most dominant political axis in the western world, most fully expressing what we now mean by ‘left’ and ‘right’. The problem is that those who prefer to remain children and see it as their right to do so then feel the need to justify their choice by grounding it in a genuine political philosophy. Because they think of themselves as left wing, moreover, they think that this political philosophy also has to be left wing, which, today, does not mean classical liberalism but some form socialism or communism. Because they have no more understanding of communism than they have of classical liberalism, however, they do not understand just how incompatible with their own form of freedom loving liberalism communism is, with the result that they are once again tricked by language into believing something that doesn’t make any sense.

Instead of thinking in terms of ‘left’ and ‘right’, therefore, it would be far better if we tried to actually understand political philosophies as they really are, which, as briefly as possible, I shall now attempt to do.

2. Communism, Globalism, Nationalism & Fascism

One of the biggest mistakes people make when thinking about communism is to assume that it stems from – and is thus legitimised by – Karl Marx’s mostly valid critique of capitalism in ‘Das Kapital’, where he argues that capitalism is based on the difference between the commodity and usage value of labour, which is to say the price at which labour is purchased and the price at which the goods and services produced by labour can be sold. This produces a profit which leads to the accumulation of capital, which can then be used to develop technologies which reduce the amount of labour needed to produce the same quantities of goods and services, thereby creating pools of unused labour which force the price of labour down still further. This is then further exacerbated if capital is exported to places where labour is cheap or if cheap labour is imported into the country in which the capital resides, both of which are happening in the current global economy.

Indeed, it is one of the main reasons why the West is currently undergoing an economic crisis. For it has not only failed to prevent or control the free movement of capital and people, but it has positively encouraged technological innovation – such as the building of massive AI data centres – so as to reduce the need for high value labour and thus remain globally competitive.

The main reason we have made these catastrophic choices, however, is because, once again, we have imposed our left/right dichotomy on our policy decisions, thereby failing, once again, to properly understand political reality. We think, for instance, that supporting mass immigration is good, not only because it offers people from poorer countries a new and better life, but because it is ‘internationalist’ and therefore ‘left wing’. At the same time, we think that opposing mass immigration is bad, not only because it is uncharitable, but because it stems from nationalism and is therefore ‘right wing’. What we don’t realise, of course, is what Marx tried to teach us: that mass immigration is a tool of global capitalism, designed to make labour cheap. Nor do we understand that liberal or socialist governments in the West have been unwittingly supporting global capitalism for decades. For by not tackling the causes of low priced labour and choosing, instead, to mitigate its effects by providing extensive welfare support, we have been effectively subsidising global capitalism’s labour costs. Worse still, low income employment does not generate the tax revenues required to support this subsidy, which therefore has to be paid for by borrowing and printing money, leading to inflation, which has not only eroded the commodity value of labour still further but has now actually brought us to the point of economic collapse.

Indeed, it is why many young people today are once again turning to communism. The problem, however, is that while Marx correctly identified many of capitalism’s problems, his alternative solution is not entirely based on this analysis and actually stems from a much older tradition, dating back at least to the German Anabaptists of the 16th century, who believed that money is the root of all evil, giving rise to such negative human emotions as envy and avarice, and that all wealth and property should therefore be held in common.

There are, however, a number of problems with this political and economic model, many of which stem from the fact that most Anabaptist communities were led by charismatic preachers who allocated the community’s resources to its members, not just on the basis of need but on the basis of spiritual purity and obedience, which, in many cases, led to abuses: a problem which is even more acute in communist societies, in which the power to allocate resources is no longer vested in just one man but distributed across a hierarchical network of bureaucrats who are allocated resources according to their place within the hierarchy and then allocate resources to others in return for favours.

This makes rising within the hierarchy – by demonstrating both revolutionary zeal and obedience to the party – the principal aim of most people in the society, both so that they can be officially allocated more resources and so that they can request greater favours for the resources they themselves allocate.

This has two main consequences. The first is that corruption becomes systemic. Having visited the Soviet Union a number of times in the 1970s, I not only witnessed this corruption first hand but actually participated in it, firstly by selling currency and ‘luxury’ goods on the black market and then by using some of the proceeds to bribe doormen in order to obtain tables at some of the best restaurants in St. Petersburg.

The second and even more important consequence of this system, however, is that rising within the party and gaming the system become the only two ways to make a better life for oneself, with the result that it is into these activities that people invest most of their energy, rather than the production of goods and services which the economy needs but which produce very little reward for those engaged in actually producing them. The economic collapse which the Soviet Union suffered in the 1990s was thus baked into the system from the outset, as it has now also become in the West.

This is because, in its own way, the West has become just as corrupt as the Soviet Union. For by allowing global capitalism to suppress the commodity value of labour and transfer its capital to safe havens within the global financial system, the West has created a billionaire class which, through its ownership of the media, has the power to both make and break governments, forcing politicians of whatever nominal political persuasion they avow to dance to the globalist tune, both in order to stay in power and to join the ranks of their globalist paymasters when they finally leave it. Not only do all western governments consequently implement domestic policies, such as the free movement of people, which constantly suppress the commodity value of labour, but they also pursue geopolitical policies, such as support for the war in Ukraine, which directly benefit multinational corporations, such as arms manufacturers, which global capitalism owns.

Not, of course, that any western leader would ever admit this, especially not in Europe. For that would be to admit that the war which Europe has been supporting for over four years and which has cost European countries an estimated €2 trillion in lost GDP, has not been for the benefit of Europe’s population, but for the benefit of the globalists behind the entire European project, which, ever since the creation of the single market, has been about creating the perfect environment for globalised capitalism, in which national borders have been effectively removed and the power of national governments to prevent the free movement of people and capital ended.

It is also why nationalism, itself, has had to be demonised, with parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) being labelled ‘far right’ in what has got to be one of the most corrupt manipulations of an already corrupted language in history. For the two most important policies advocated by the AfD are, of course, the restoration of good relations with Russia, so as to restore the flow of cheap Russian energy, and stricter controls on immigration, so as preserve German culture and social cohesion, both of which are clearly in the best interests of Germany and the German people. For this, however, the AfD is compared to the Nazi party, while it is the party of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the CDU, which actually wants to invade Russia.

In fact, the demonisation of nationalism in Europe, including Britain, has reached a point at which it is no longer just absurd but has actually become an existential threat, both to Europe, itself, and the nation states of which it is comprised. For as I have argued elsewhere, it is having a common background and cultural identity that binds people together. Without it, countries, provinces, cities and even villages may not only fail to cohere but can actually tear themselves apart. By demonising nationalism, therefore, Europe is now deliberately engineering a loss of cohesion at the national level, which could cause nation states, the cornerstones of democracy, to collapse.

This is not, of course, to justify or excuse historical regimes – such as those of Mussolini in Italy and Hitler in Germany – which incited nationalist feelings in their populations in pursuit of aims which were ultimately catastrophic, not just for Italy and Germany, but for the whole of Europe. It would be equally wrong, however, to confuse ‘nationalism’ with ‘fascism’, by assuming that, just because the two fascist regimes of which we are most aware were also nationalist, all nationalists must be fascists, which would constitute another example of the logical fallacy I highlighted earlier. After all, Irish nationalists may have committed terrorist acts against the British during and after the first world war in their fight to obtain independence but, as far as I know, they never invaded another country with the aim of asserting dominion over it. For that’s not nationalism; that’s imperialism.

Indeed, nationalism is far more associated with defensive wars than offensive ones, one of the best examples being the Soviet Union during the second world war – or the Great Patriotic War as the Russians call it – during which 20 million Russians gave their lives in defence of Mother Russia. More to the point, nationalism is not actually a political philosophy. For while appealing to a population’s sense of national and cultural identity may be a powerful way of getting people to rally behind the flag, it doesn’t actually tell them how they should live their lives or how society should be organised. Fascism, on the other hand, as first expressed by Marxist Hegelian philosopher Giovanni Gentile in his 1925 ‘Manifesto of the Fascist Intellectuals’, attempts to do precisely that. For having read ’Das Kapital’, Gentile knew that, if a nation state wanted to maintain the commodity value of labour – which he believed was in the best interests of any nation’s population and therefore of the nation itself – it had to control the movement of people and capital, which meant that, as a philosophy designed to defend the nation state against globalised capitalism, Marxism, itself, entailed a form of nationalism.

The question this raises, therefore, is how fascism, as conceived by Gentile, went from being a form of Marxism to being a form of imperialism. The answer, however, is actually very simple. For while Mussolini greatly admired Gentile and co-authored a book with him called ‘The Doctrine of Fascism’ in 1932, he believed that Gentile’s arguments in favour of nationalism – and of the powers the nation state had to accrue to itself in order to control the movement of people and capital – were too dry and academic to appeal to the people to whom he needed to appeal. Not only did he need some other cause or national aim with which ordinary working people could identify, therefore, he also needed a different language in which to express it; he needed the language of cinema.

3. Fascism & The Cinema

It is no coincidence, therefore, that fascism developed in Italy in the 1920s, at a time when the cinema was not only giving a largely illiterate working class population access to information they had never had before but was also allowing them to share in a visual and emotional experience which literally no one had ever had before, making it, at that time, the most powerful medium in history, which Mussolini was among the first to recognise. What’s more, he was quite open about how he intended to use it. At the grand opening of the Italian film corporation, Istituto Luce, in 1924, for instance, he had photographs of himself taken standing behind a camera which were then displayed behind the podium, beneath which was a caption proclaiming that ‘Cinematography is the strongest weapon’.

His most effective use of this new weapon, however, began in 1927, when he not only launched Italy’s first weekly newsreel, ‘Giornale LUCE’, editions of which he personally approved before they were distributed, but commissioned a fleet of mobile projector vans to take them around the countryside, where they were shown in village squares along with documentaries on just about every aspect of Italian life, from land reclamation to advances in medicine, which Mussolini encouraged film studios throughout Italy to produce, not just in order to show people how much progress Italy was making under his leadership, but to make them feel proud of both their country and themselves.

It was through Italian feature films of the period, however, that the most powerful, if often subliminal messages were sent. These concentrated on modern realism, which ordinary Italians greatly appreciated, being sceptical of anything that didn’t reflect real life as they experienced it, and history, especially the history of ancient Rome, with which the Italian National Fascist Party had associated itself from the very beginning, the word ‘fascist’ being derived from ‘fascio littorio’, the Italian name for the bound bundles of wooden rods surrounding an axe which were carried by lictors in both the Roman Republic and later Empire to signify the authority of the magistrates whom they guarded.

Whether this association was born of some genuine affinity with ancient Rome or was manufactured – either to remind Italians of their glorious past or to enhance the image of the Fascist Party by drawing a parallel with that past – is hard to say. But I suspect that it was a mixture of all three. For while it was certainly Mussolini’s ambition to make Italy great again, with imperial Rome representing the pinnacle of that greatness, he clearly wanted to glorify himself and his party by reflecting the spectacle of ancient Rome – as depicted in Italian cinema – in fascist pageants and parades, with their flags and banners and soldiers in sharp black uniforms. And the fact is that it worked. For while Mussolini certainly had his opponents, especially in Italy’s industrial north, at the height of his power, most Italians not only approved of his modernising reforms but supported his attempt to rebuild the Roman Empire in North Africa, an imperialist fantasy created first on film and then projected onto reality in an imperialist adventure which was to prove such a disaster.

If fascist Italy pioneered the use of cinema to promote an imperialist dream, however, in many ways Nazi Germany did the exact opposite. For while the Nazis made films of their rallies, which, with their burning torches and huge swastika banners, were even more spectacular than Mussolini’s, and while they also had their newsreels and documentaries documenting Germany’s industrial and technological progress since the depression of the 1920s, Joseph Goebbels, who was in charge of Nazi Germany’s cinema industry, had two objectives which he deemed far more important than merely showcasing Nazi achievements. The first was to maintain public morale, which he felt Germany had neglected during the first world war and which he believed had significantly contributed to its defeat. The second and even more important objective, however, was to distract people, not only from their still often hard lives but from what the Nazis, themselves, were actually doing. To this end, he therefore set about building a German film industry which produced films which were, above all else, glamorous and entertaining.

The glamour he provided through a star system which he largely modelled on Hollywood, to which the German film industry had lost both Greta Garbo and Marlene Dietrich in the 1920s, forcing Goebbels to create a new stable of stars who would actually owe their careers to the Nazis and to Goebbels, himself, making them far more pliable than Garbo and Dietrich would ever have been. The best-known of these was Swedish actress Zarah Leander who was hired by Universum Film Aktiengesellschaft GmbH (UFA) in 1937 and quickly became the most prominent and highest-paid German film star of the period.

It wasn’t just for their work in film, however, that Goebbels hired so many beautiful actresses; it was also to add glamour to the rather unglamorous and male-dominated Nazi party. Even if they hadn’t taken pleasure in it and believed it their right, Hitler, Göring and Goebbels, himself, would have all felt it their duty, therefore, to regularly appear in public with some of the most beautiful women on the planet. Hitler's preferred dinner dates were the actresses Olga Chekhova and Lil Dagover, Hermann Göring was actually married to the popular actress Emmy Sonnemann, while Goebbels had affairs with so many actresses that his wife, Magda, found it impossible to keep track of them. Just as important to Goebbels, however, was the image this gave the party. For there were always, of course, photographers on hand to take pictures of party leaders getting out of slick Mercedes limousines and entering the most fashionable restaurants and nightclubs in Berlin with their chosen dates for the evening on their arms. It was the celebrity culture of the era and audiences lapped it up as much as they lapped up the films. And that was the point.

For unlike Mussolini’s propaganda, which was intended to garner support for his strategic political aims, Goebbels’ propaganda was largely intended to distract people from what he didn’t want them to see: not just the concentration camps and the extermination of the Jews, but Hitler’s plans to renew the war in Europe and eventually invade Russia, preparations for which were clear for everybody to see, if only they looked. It was Goebbels’ job, therefore, to ensure that they didn’t. Instead of giving them the time and opportunity to look at the frightening and often very ugly things going on behind the barbed wire fences, therefore, he constantly put beautiful things in front of them, principally by having those beautiful things appear in dozens of feature films each year, but also by having their photographs printed in newspapers and magazines almost every day.

It was pure misdirection of the kind magicians use when they have their beautiful and scantily clad assistants distract the audience from what they are actually doing. And it is more or less what is happening in the western media today, not just with its superficial and misleading coverage of our dire economic predicament and endless wars and its infantile love of celebrity game shows, but with its labelling of anyone who points out what is actually going on as ‘far right’.

4.Imperialism & Globalism

The idea that we are being deliberately distracted by trivia so as to not see what is important is not, of course, new. What’s more, I suspect that we are all, to some extent, aware of it. After all, we are all being constantly bombarded by media content of one form or another, most of which is intended to entertain rather than inform, while that which is informational tends towards the trivial, which, in Britain, means that much of it concerns the royal family, especially Meghan and Harry. Anything that is happening of importance in the world is either completely ignored or reported in a way that is diametrically opposed to the truth.

Not, of course, that the truth is easy to discover. After all, hiding it is the entire purpose of the exercise. On the other hand, it is very hard to keep the truth hidden completely or forever. One way or another it tends to come out, either because it is difficult to keep false narratives consistent or because serious problems tend to have serious consequences which it is very difficult to just sweep under the carpet.

In the latter category, for instance, we shall soon be feeling the effects of what is probably best described as the death of the US Empire, which no one is yet willing to talk about primarily because we don’t want to admit that the USA is, indeed, an imperial power. The fact that it has between 750 and 800 military bases distributed across 80 countries, however, and that since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the publication of the Wolfowitz doctrine in 1992, its has been fighting almost continuous wars to preserve its global hegemony – either directly, as in the case of Iraq, Afghanistan and now Iran, or through proxies, as in the case of Syria and now Ukraine – would clearly indicate that, while Mussolini’s empire was largely a fantasy, the American Empire is all too real.

Even those who accept that the USA is an imperial power, however, seldom want to admit that it is now in decline, not least because that would entail talking about why this is so, which is something we certainly don’t want to do. For the answer, of course, is that it failed to maintain the commodity value of US labour. It allowed its large corporations to take their capital abroad where labour was cheap and then import goods back into the USA, undercutting US produced goods and reducing the number of high paid US jobs. At the same time, it allowed low cost immigrants into the country to fill mostly menial jobs which did not pay enough to produce the level of tax revenues necessary to fund the welfare benefits it had to provide in order to subsidise the low pay. The result has been that, for the last thirty-odd years, the US Treasury has consistently run a deficit and now owes over $40 trillion, on which it has to pay $2 trillion a year just in interest. Needless to say, this is not going to end well.

To make matters worse, many of the same multinational corporations that have eroded the commodity value of US labour have further diminished its imperial power by selling it weapon systems that are either too expensive to be used in anything but very short wars against vastly inferior opponents, too complicated to be easily maintained or too out of touch with the modern battlefield to be effective.

Take, for instance, the MI Abrams battle tank, produced by General Dynamics Land Systems at a price of $10 million each. It weighs 73.6 tons, is propelled by a jet engine and can travel at speeds up to 43 mph, which all sounds very impressive. The trouble is that the jet engine not only sucks in air but, when travelling over rough ground rather than paved roads, it also sucks in debris, clogging up the engine which has to be taken apart, cleaned and rebuilt each time it is used. The result is that, depending on the terrain, it can require up to eight hours of maintenance for every hour of usage.

Then there is the F-35, produced by Lockheed Martin at a price of $92 million for the most basic model, rising to $121 million for the top of the range. With a top speed of 1,220 mph, there is no doubt that it is an impressive aircraft with a wide range of capabilities. The problem again, however, is maintenance and availability, which can be as low as 20%, meaning that, for 80% of the time, an F-35 is likely to be having work done on it.

In fact, there is a general principle at work here which is demonstrated by so many US arms manufacturers. For while most weapon systems are greatly improved by the addition of more sophisticated capabilities in the early stages of their development, as they become more complicated, there comes a point at which their lack of availability due to maintenance outweighs any improvement in capability. In fact, there is a similar problem in the commercial automotive industry, where greater sophistication and complexity of components, particularly a vehicle’s electronics, leads to more expensive replacements and repairs, which can lead to a car being written off as too expensive to repair at just four or five years old.

This problem is compounded by the fact that manufacturers of both weapon systems and motor vehicles either don’t see the disutility in overly complex systems or do not want to see it, in that the latest gadgetry is what sells both cars and planes and allows the manufacturers to charge higher prices.

With respect to the F-35, the enormous complexity of the systems also causes problems with respect to the integration of the human component, the pilot. This is especially the case with respect to the plane’s avionics and sensors which are designed to improve the pilot's situational awareness and command-and-control capabilities. Not only does it take a lot of time to train a pilot to use these systems, however, but pilots trained on other aircraft often find them counter-intuitive and cannot adapt to them. Given their $121 million price tag, their 20% availability, and the difficulties pilots have in flying then, one has really got to wonder, therefore, whether the F-35 is really fit for purpose.

The weapon system that wins first prize for its almost unbelievable level of unfitness for purpose, however, is the Patriot air defence system, which comprises a mobile radar system and a mobile launch vehicle with 16 launch tubes, which means that it is capable of firing 16 PAC-3 interceptor missiles before it has to be reloaded. This in itself, however, is a problem. Because, for safety reasons, the missiles cannot be stored with the launcher. This means that the launcher has to be driven somewhere else for reloading, which requires a crane to lift each missile into its launch tube where it then has to be connected up to the launch control system, all of which takes at least two hours even for well trained crews, during which time the launcher is out of action.

When the system was first brought into service in 1981, this of course was not a problem. For it was designed to shoot down manned aircraft, which attacked in limited numbers. A battery of three launch vehicles with a total of forty-eight missiles could therefore see off most attacks without having to be reloaded. In June 2025, however, when Iran responded to Israel’s attack by launching drone and missile strikes against Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, it did so by first sending in hundreds of low cost drones which simply overwhelmed Israel’s so-called ‘iron dome’, which largely consists of Patriot missile batteries. Only when these batteries were exhausted did it then send in its ballistic missiles which did the real damage.

What makes the Patriot air defence system even more unfit for purpose, however, is the fact that each PAC-3 interceptor costs $4 million, while the average cost of the Shahed drones the Iranians were then using was just $40,000. What’s more, it is generally believed that two interceptors are required to shoot down each target, giving the Patriot system a 50% efficiency rating and resulting in the rather staggering statistic that, on average, it cost $8 million to shoot down one $40,000 drone.

This 50% efficiency rating, however, is just a rule of thumb based on the targets being relatively slow manned aircraft. The efficiency rating is much lower when the targets are cruise missiles or the latest jet propelled Russian drones, where it is probably as low as 20%, though Lockheed Martin, which manufactures the missiles, has not actually released any statistics on this. The rate gets even worse, however, when the targets are ballistic missiles, which have a very high arcing trajectory and approach their targets in a steep dive at very high speeds. In this case, the efficiency could be as low as 2%, which would mean that it costs $200 million to shoot down one ballistic missile. The worse case occurs, however, when the targets are hypersonic, flying at seven or eight thousand miles an hour, when the efficiency rate reaches zero, in that no hypersonic missile has ever been shot down by a Patriot interceptor.

Given how useless these missiles are, it makes one wonder, indeed, why President Zelenskyy keeps asking for more of them. The fact is, however, that given the protracted war in Ukraine and the very intensive war against Iran, world stockpiles of Patriot interceptors have almost run out, providing us with even more evidence of US decline. For given the demand, one has to ask why Lockheed Martin hasn’t increased supply. The answer, however, is that it can’t. For to even double production from its current 800 a year – which the Ukrainians would use in a single day if they had enough launchers – it would have to double its production capacity, which would mean building and equipping another factory and hiring a complete new workforce of top engineers and skilled technicians. After decades of deindustrialisation, however, the USA no longer has the industrial base necessary to support such a rapid expansion.

The result is that it is not just individual weapon systems that are unfit for purpose but America’s entire military industrial complex, on which it depends to maintain its global empire. Even if it weren’t on the brink of financial and economic collapse, therefore, that empire cannot survive much longer, especially as defeat against Iran has already shown the rest of the world that the US military is no longer to be feared.

What this means, therefore, is that Giovanni Gentile was absolutely correct: if a nation state wants to prevent globalised capital from eroding the commodity cost of its labour and eventually destroying its economy, it has to defend its borders against the free movement of capital and people and hence embrace some form of nationalism. Mussolini, however, made the mistake of trying to garner support for nationalism by turning it into imperialism, which eventually led to his overthrow and execution. The USA, in contrast, made the slightly different mistake of opting for imperialism without being sufficiently nationalist, which is to say Marxist. For while it projected imperialist military power abroad, it did not defend its own borders against the free movement of capital and people, which has now so eroded its economic base and military power that its empire cannot last much longer.

5. A Lack of Critical Thinking & Cognitive Dissonance

Not that any American politician would ever admit this, of course, not only because it would be tantamount to treason but because it would entail doing the kind of analysis I have just been doing, which I don’t think modern politicians see as part of their job. For they attain whatever position they reach, not through critical thinking, but through the support of a like-minded group, which collectively shapes the thinking of its members far more than any single member shapes the thinking of the group itself.

What is slightly more interesting, therefore, is the fact that no one in Europe is admitting to the demise of the American empire either, which is largely due to the fact that having handed over their sovereignty to a group of globalist bureaucrats, whose principal aim it has been to prevent nation states from erecting barriers to the free movement of people and capital and hence put an end to nation states and nationalism altogether, those nominal nation states which remain are in an even worse position, both economically and militarily, than the USA.

Both Britain and France, for instance, are effectively bankrupt and even though Germany’s debt to GDP ratio is still comfortably below 100%, its industrial decline is so steep that this state of affairs cannot last much longer. As for Europe’s military, it hardly even exists. It has depended on the USA for its defence for so long that its armed forces have dwindled to almost nothing. As of April 2026, for instance, the British army comprised just 74,360 men and would be hard pressed to deploy a single division to Ukraine if asked.

Indeed, it makes one wonder why European leaders are so bellicose towards Russia. For they have to know that they wouldn’t stand a chance against a battle hardened Russian army of 1.36 million. And yet it seems that they have developed a kind of reality blindness, which partly stems, I suspect, from the fact that they originally supported America’s engineering of the war in Ukraine because, as vassals of the USA, they didn’t really have a choice. Because they couldn’t admit this, however, they therefore concocted this narrative about having to stop Putin in Ukraine or he would take the whole of Europe. At the same time, however, they were also saying that the Russian army was so poorly equipped and led that it couldn’t even beat little Ukraine and that the Russian economy was so weak and brittle that another round of sanctions would surely cause it to collapse, both of which claims clearly contradict the narrative that the Russians are a threat to the whole of Europe.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how our leaders could not see the obvious contradiction themselves, which initially led me to believe that they were cynically maintaining what they knew to be untrue because they couldn’t go back on it without admitting that they had been wrong. Then, however, they started acting even more belligerently towards Russia, providing Ukraine with drones and missiles to strike deep inside Russian territory while actively preparing for war themselves, which, given their weakness and Russia’s strength, defies all reason. At this point, therefore, I started to think that they were only pretending to prepare for war in order to distract their populations from the economic problems at home: another classic case of misdirection.

None of these explanations, however, ever seemed quite right. And that’s when it occurred to me that if one repeats a fictional narrative often enough, it is not just other people who may come to believe it; one can also come to believe it oneself. It is not quite the same as believing that ‘left’ and ‘right’ in politics denote real position, because these terms have actually become part of the language and determine the way we think, whereas the contradiction in the claims that Russia is both weak and a threat to Europe is not actually built into the meaning of the terms used. The two phenomena are nevertheless very similar, however, in that the idea that the ‘left’ and ‘right’ in politics are real entities and the belief that, at one and the same time, Russia can be both weak and a threat to Europe are propositions which most people just accept without asking whether they actually make any sense. It is just that, in the first case, we are being tricked by language, itself, while, in the second case, we are being fooled by our own lack of critical thinking.

Nor do I think that this is unusual. In fact, I rather suspect that we do it all the time, especially when the language in which a false narrative is expressed is cinematic rather than verbal. For as Mussolini clearly understood, we believe what we see, even when a moment’s thought might make us think again.

The first time I realised this was not the first time I saw ‘Star Trek’ and accepted that a suspension of disbelief was required in order to enjoy a scientific series in which a spacecraft was required to travel at six times the speed of light, but the first time I saw a film in which a 50kg woman defeated a 100kg man in unarmed combat, something which the audience seemed to think was perfectly possible but which, all other things being equal, actually isn’t. This is because ‘force’ – technically in this case ‘momentum’ – can be defined as mass times velocity. This means that for a 50kg woman to punch a 100kg man with the same force as he could punch her, her fist would have to be travelling at twice the speed of his, which, even if it were possible, would probably break or dislocate a number of fingers in her own hand.

Of course, there are martial arts techniques designed to compensate for a difference in mass between opponents. But one also has to take into account the fact that a 100kg man hitting a 50kg woman with twice the force of that with which she can hit him is also hitting a much more fragile object, with lighter bones etc. Whereas her 50kg fist hitting his thick skull is unlikely to do very much damage, therefore, his 100kg fist striking her much thinner skull would probably break her jaw, smash her cheek bone and cause concussive brain damage.

In this feminist era, however, we see 50kg women beating up 100kg men in just about every action film we watch. And not only do we believe it but we transfer this belief into real life by allowing biological men to compete in women’s sports, where their greater mass, strength and speed not only give them an unfair advantage – ruining the sport for many women – but can pose a real threat of bodily harm.

Nor is this the only example of the way in which we believe what we see in the cinema even though a moment’s thought might make us think again. In nearly every action film one sees, for instance, there will usually be someone who walks away from an horrendous car crash or is shot in the arm or leg but carries on as if nothing has happened. Any surgeon will tell you, however, that a bullet striking the shoulder will probably shatter the scapula, break two or three other bones and make it impossible to use the entire arm for months. A single stab wound to the abdomen can take over a year to heal and can still leave one wincing in pain every time one twists or stretches one’s torso. If we really understood what such violence does to the human body, in fact, I like to think that there would be a lot less of it. But we believe what we see in the cinema instead.

It is also why the flip side of propaganda is censorship. For if one wants others to believe things that are not real, one cannot allow them to actually see the truth, whether that be the real effects of violence or the true character of someone one wants them to fear or hate.

During this year’s question and answer session at Valdai, for instance, President Putin took a question from a former CNN journalist, who prefaced his question by praising Putin for actually taking questions from Americans, to which Putin responded by joking that, unlike President Trump, who had recently banned CNN from the White House, he was always happy to talk to CNN, thus not only demonstrating his quick wit and sense of humour but making it clear that he knew exactly for whom the journalist had previously worked. To the best of my knowledge, however, this has never been shown on British television, the reason for which is fairly obvious. For it would have revealed the man most British people believe to be a monster as both witty and intelligent, which cannot, of course, be allowed.

Of course, it may be argued that this, in itself, disproves the suggestion that European leaders have talked themselves into believing their own propaganda. For if they or their associated media really did decide not to show this exchange to European audiences because it made Putin look too warm and human, this would suggest that they secretly know that he isn’t actually a monster. This is to suppose, however, that our leaders think in well-constructed logical arguments of the type I have just demonstrated. This, however, is almost certainly not the case. For like the rest of us, they mostly think along the lines which language or a frequently repeated but contradictory narrative has laid down for them. Just as they are consequently able to believe that Russia is a threat to all of Europe while at the same time believing that it is too weak and backward to conquer Ukraine, so they are also able to believe that Putin is a monster while simultaneously believing that he should not be shown on television sharing a joke with an American journalist because this would give the wrong impression.

We call this ‘cognitive dissonance’ and it is almost certainly the biggest threat to the world today: not the propagandist who knowingly fabricates a false narrative to get people to do what his government wants them to do; nor the censor who knowingly prevents a story from being published or aired because it would compromise his political masters; but the politician who holds contradictory beliefs without realising or understanding that they are contradictory and so acts on them as if they were true.

I recently listened to a speech by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who stated that he was not concerned about the German economy, the cost of living or Germany’s rapid deindustrialisation. He said that he was only concerned about Ukraine, which, he told his audience, he would not allow to surrender to the Russians on any terms, making it sound as if Russia were not just an existential threat to Ukraine, but to the whole of Europe.

It was one of the most chilling speeches I have ever heard, not only because it was so out of touch with reality, but because the last German Chancellor who thought he was fighting an existential war against Russia was, of course, Adolf Hitler. And we all know how that ended.

6.Conclusion

So what have we learnt from all this?

Firstly, that globalism, which advocates the free movement of capital and people, destroys the economies of nation states.

So why do nation states allow it?

Partly, one suspects, because the people in power do not understand this, but mostly because politicians and political parties need financial support from people with money, including multinational corporations and financial institutions, which benefit from globalisation and label anyone who opposes it as a far right nationalist.

But why do we think that nationalism is bad? After all, most nationalist movements are focused on national independence not imperialism.

Most people who support globalisation, however, draw our attention away from independence parties such as the Scottish Nationalist and focus on nationalists who were also imperialists, such as the fascists in Italy and the Nazis in Germany.

But why doesn’t anyone point out this fairly obvious piece of misdirection?

Because anyone who does so is also labelled ‘far right’ and is thus effectively censored, even though the terms ‘right’ and ‘left’ in politics are actually meaningless.

But given how economically destructive globalism is, why don’t our political elites object to it?

Partly because they don’t understand this basic fact, having never been taught to think critically, but mostly because they are implicated. For having taken the globalist’s silver and ruined their economies as a result, they cannot now address the root cause of the problem without admitting that they are, themselves, to blame. So they stay silent on the problems they have caused while pointing the finger at external actors like Russia, using propaganda techniques ironically pioneered by Mussolini and Goebbels.

So how do we get ourselves out of this mess?

We can’t. For not only can our politicians not admit to the mistakes they have made, but those who have benefitted from them are too rich and powerful to allow those mistakes to be rectified, which means that there is nothing we can do but wait until the entire system collapses and then start again, hopefully having learnt our lesson.

The real question, therefore, is that, if we do get to start again, what do we have to do differently next time to avoid making the same mistakes? And that will be the topic of my next essay.



Friday, 11 September 2026

The Case For Political Realism

 

1. Language and Reality

Reality is what is. Everything else is an abstraction, construction or projection, which are all products of our own minds. For this is the way our minds work. We observe reality and think we recognise certain abstract patterns within it. We then construct theories, stories or narratives to explain these patterns which we then project back onto reality. This means that we subsequently perceive reality through these projections, which, while sometimes being very helpful, no doubt contributing significantly to our success as a species, can also cause us problems. For the way we perceive reality naturally effects our behaviour, which other people observe without necessarily understanding the theoretical or narrative construct which has informed our perception and hence determined that behaviour, which they may consequently see as odd or even unhinged. As a result, they may conclude that we are in some sense mentally defective or even mentally ill.

At the time of writing, for instance, many people have observed Donald Trump’s erratic behaviour over the last few months and concluded that he is either suffering from dementia or some form of mental illness. I, on the other hand, am not so sure. For given the narrative about Iran he had either constructed for himself or more likely been fed, his incomprehension and probable frustration at the failure of the Iranian people to rise up and remove a tyrannical and oppressive regime after the assassination of its leader were entirely predictable. Of course, at that point, a wiser man might have looked more closely at the reality of Iran and questioned whether the narrative he had constructed or been given was correct. A truly wise man might even have questioned his entire decision making process and resolved to address all issues with a little more care and attention in future. Not only would this have meant admitting a mistake, however, but it would have undermined his entire view of himself as an astute and skilful deal maker. So he doubled down on his original strategy and further intensified the military campaign, having been told that the US military was the greatest military in the world and could bring any regime to its knees. When this failed and the greatest military in the world actually began running out of munitions, he was therefore left with an insoluble problem from which he could not extricate himself without suffering a catastrophic humiliation. His earlier incomprehension and frustration therefore turned quite naturally into annoyance and even anger, both at the Iranians for not giving in and at those around him for failing to do what they said they could do and leaving him with no good options. The fact that he then seemed to change his mind about what to do next on an almost hourly basis was not therefore symptomatic of a mind in melt down but of one behaving in an entirely normal and predictable way.

That we do not see this is because we make the same mistake about the human mind that Donald Trump and those around him made about Iran. In order to explain Iran’s antagonism towards the West in general and the USA in particular, they constructed a narrative in which a theocratic and dictatorial regime was ideologically opposed to freedom and democracy, which is how they genuinely perceived Iran’s government as being. Similarly, in diagnosing Donald Trump’s erratic behaviour, his opponents didn’t so much construct as adopt a pre-existing theory about mental illness through which they then then perceived all his actions. The problem with this, however, is that calling someone a ‘delusional narcissist’, as I have heard Donald Trump described on a number of occasions in recent weeks, doesn’t actually explain anything unless one unpacks the entire psychological theory behind it and agrees with that theory.

We, however, do not even get that far. For instead of thinking of ‘delusional narcissism’ as a term which only has meaning within a theoretical construct created to explain a pattern of behaviour we have observed, we actually think that it is something ‘real’. That is to say that we fail to make this fundamental distinction between reality on the one hand and a theoretical or narrative construct on the other, which rather raises the question as to how otherwise seemingly intelligent people can so consistently make this mistake.

Part of the answer, of course, is that most of us don’t really understand the relationship between reality and language at all, don’t have the linguistic resources necessary to distinguish between reality and a theoretical construct and do not realise that all natural languages, such as English, contain sublanguages, such as the language of psychology, for instance, which are more or less self-contained, with the result that, as long as they are internally consistent and do not flatly contradict what we observe, it is impossible to tell whether or not they actually correspond to reality.

In fact, so little is understood about this issue that very few people have ever even addressed it. Two of those who have are the French philosopher Michel Foucault, who, in ‘The Order of Things’, characterised these self-contained pockets of language as ‘discursive formations’, and the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, in his ‘Philosophical Investigations’, drew an analogy between what he called ‘language games’ and games like chess, which is especially helpful in that chess, itself, can be thought of simply as a language. After all, it has both its own semantic objects and syntax, the semantic objects being the six different types of piece and the eight by eight board on which they move, the syntax being the rules by which they move. It even has its own standard notation, which is used to record individual games but which can also be used to play the game itself. Without a physical representation, using only the standard notation to play a game makes it very difficult to visualise the state of the game at any one point, but it is not impossible.

Thus, one can say that chess is essentially just a language. The main supposed difference between the language of chess and other discursive formations, such as the language of psychology, is that the language of chess does not refer to anything beyond itself – it is entirely self-contained – whereas we assume that the language of psychology refers to real things, i.e. people, in the real world. But is this assumption always correct?

To obtain a clearer understanding of just how epistemologically shattering this question is, consider, for instance, the language of particle physics, which, like the language of chess has its own semantic objects, which include six types of quark, and its own syntax, which defines how each type of quark behaves. As in the case of standard chess notation, one can thus compose sentences about quarks which are syntactically or grammatically correct and make sense to those who understand the subject, and sentences which are syntactically or grammatically incorrect and are total nonsense. Even when a sentence about quarks is grammatically correct, however, one can still ask whether quarks are real or just theoretical constructs within an internally consistent discursive formation.

Of course, particle physicists and, indeed, most scientists will be utterly outraged by the suggestion that quarks are not real. For if one has spent one’s entire career working in a field of science in which someone now suggests that the objects of one’s study are merely theoretical constructs invented to explain a particular aspect of the universe, one is likely to feel somewhat miffed. In fact, most people would simply refuse to accept that this was the case. For more than three hundred years, however, up until the late 18th century, in fact, nearly all scientists believed that all matter contained something called phlogiston, which most substances gave off when they were heated, thereby accounting for their loss of weight. In fact, the history of science is littered with examples of similar theories which have since been abandoned. For this is the nature of the relationship between language and reality. We continually invent new language games or discursive informations to explain reality, which reality continually shows us are wrong.

The question you are probably asking, however, is what this has to do with political realism. The way in which this kind of discursive formation relates to reality, however, does not just apply to science; it applies to everything. In fact, the world of science is probably the least problematic domain in which this relationship holds. For the world of particle physics is as self-contained as the language in which particle physicists talk to each other. As a result, it doesn’t affect the rest of us, for whom it doesn’t really matter whether quarks are real or not. In geopolitics, however, the adoption of a false narrative or theory about the nature of a foreign government can be disastrous, as we have seen in the case of Iran.

This then raises the question as to why we never seem to learn from this almost habitual mistake. For while it is all well and good to say that, ultimately, it is because we do not understand the relationship between language and reality, when the consequences of this lack of understanding are so serious, one would have thought that we would have taken the time to investigate the problem more closely. The answer, however, almost certainly lies in a number of rather unattractive human character traits, the first of which is the pride we take in status.

2. Status, Power and Pretence

As stated earlier, theoretical terms only have meaning as part a theory as a whole. In modern as opposed to classical usage, the term ‘narcissist’, for instance, only has meaning within the theory that deals with Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD), which can manifest itself in many different ways and can have many different causes. Understanding NPD thus involves first learning how recognise or diagnose it and then how to track its aetiology. More than anything else, however, it means learning a substantial part if not all of the language of psychology, which, in Britain, can take up to seven years of formal education: three years for a Bachelor’s degree, one year for a Master’s and three more years for a Ph.D. It is hardly any wonder, therefore, that people who have spent all this time and effort learning this language like to use it, even when it’s not necessary.

I say this because in the paragraph above in which I described how Donald Trump very probably got himself into his current predicament with respect to Iran, I didn’t use a single ‘psychological’ term. I did use terms like ‘incomprehension’, ‘frustration’, ‘annoyance’ and ‘anger’, but these terms are closer to being observational than theoretical. That is to say that the behaviour through which these emotions are expressed is so closely associated with the emotions themselves that one cannot really separate the two. More to the point, I felt that my description of how Donald Trump very probably got himself into this mess made perfect sense without further theoretical explanation.

In contrast, I recently watched a discussion between Professor Jeffrey Sachs and two psychologists, who used I whole plethora of psychological terms to explain Donald Trump’s current mental condition, most of which I do not remember because they held very little meaning for me and, in my view, did more to obfuscate the subject of the discussion than illuminate it. For given that we cannot fully understand theoretical terms without – to some extent – understanding the theory behind them, and given that most of us don’t understand clinical psychology to any great extent at all, all most people will have taken away from this discussion is the impression that the three participants seemed to know what they were talking about and that, if they thought that Donald Trump was suffering from one of the many possible mental illnesses they discussed, then the chances are that he actually is mentally ill.

Indeed, this was almost certainly the conclusion that the three participants wanted their audience to draw. For the discussion, of course, was not primarily about clinical psychology at all but politics, the aim being to convince the audience that Donald Trump is unfit for office and should therefore be removed. The way it achieved this aim, however, was also one of its principal objectives. For by showcasing the participants’ erudition while making the audience aware of their own lack of knowledge on this subject, it conferred on the participants a certain status, giving them the power not just to play a part in removing a President of the United States but in influencing society in general. And it is for this reason, of course, that they each spent seven years in formal education, learning a language which they have probably spent even more years teaching, gaining acolytes and disciples, through whom they have exercised even more power and influence. What’s more, it is precisely why their students have followed them on this journey: not to increase the sum of all knowledge or pass on that knowledge to others, but because they have witnessed the status their professors enjoy and want to share in the power and influence they consequently wield.

Not, of course, that anyone who has ever played this game has ever thought of it in this way. For one of the conditions of being allowed to play the game at all is that one actually believe in the academic or scientific discipline in which one is being trained, which further entails that one cannot think of that discipline as a discursive formation or language game in which the objects are merely theoretical constructs. In fact, anyone who questions the reality of the objects which populate their chosen discursive formation will be branded a heretic and expelled from the society which speaks this particular language. The status, power and influence one gains by knowing one’s way around a particular discursive formation thus actually prohibits one from looking too closely into the relationship between language and reality.

What is even more depressing, however, is the way in which those who aspire to join the inner circle of a particular discipline pretend to be able to speak its language even before they can. Having taught in a university, myself, I have seen it many times: students who throw around technical terms with no idea what they are actually saying or talking about. Indeed, I’m fairly sure I did it myself. The problem is that many people never get beyond this shallow pretence, partly because they never discover a metalanguage that would enable them to escape the discursive formation in which they have been trapped, but also, I think, because they lack the moral and emotional strength to recognise the sterility of their incarceration. So they go on writing variations on the same empty academic papers on which they have built their careers, not to communicate any new ideas to anyone but simply to add another publication to their CV.

It’s why between 3.3 million and 5.2 million academic papers are published globally every year, depending on what one includes in this category, most of which, according to the old joke, only ever get three readers: the authors, themselves, the editor of the publishing journal and the peer reviewer, who merely gives the paper a cursory glance in order to ensure that it is written in the right language and conforms to the current consensus. In fact, the reviewer doesn’t even have to check the author’s data, which, at best, will have been statistically manipulated to reach the required conclusion and, sometimes, may not actually exist at all. For why risk a carefully constructed and internally coherent narrative by chucking the spanner of real world data into the works?

Nor do I expect this situation to be improved by the introduction of AI. For what does AI do other than trawl the internet, reading and digesting papers before regurgitation them in a properly digested form, all inside a bubble of language which never actually touches reality. As a result, it is very possible that AI will be the final nail in the coffin of real scientific research.

And something similar is almost certainly happening in our system of government, which, throughout the West, has already reached a level of dysfunctionality that will surely result in failed states, very possibly starting with the United States, itself, where there must have been at least some people within its seventeen intelligence agencies who knew before the current war that, far from being ruled by a dictatorial and tyrannical regime, Iran is a highly democratic constitutional republic with robust institutions that would continue to function no matter how many of the country’s leaders were assassinated. Similarly, there must also have been some competent military analysts in the Pentagon who knew that Iran is a vast country with a mountainous terrain totally unsuited to conventional ground operations and that an air campaign would not be able to penetrate its numerous and well distributed underground military facilities. One can only assume, therefore, that when they submitted their reports to their superiors, they were universally told to ‘get with the program’ or get another job: a suspicion which would seem to be confirmed by the fact that more than twenty senior generals and admirals have been fired from the US military in the last twelve months, including Army Chief of Staff, Randy George, Navy Chief of Staff, John Harrison, and Air Force Chief of Staff, David Allvin, all of whom almost certainly questioned the wisdom of going to war with Iran.

The trouble with such a truly tyrannical approach to government, however, is that, if one gets rid of all one’s independent critical thinkers, sooner or later all one has left are the unquestioning inhabitants of the government’s group think, who filter all information being passed up the chain of command to ensure that it conforms with the administration’s current policy.

An even bigger problem with this selective approach to framing one’s world view, however, is that, eventually, reality reasserts itself, as it almost certainly will do in the case Iran. Nor is this eventual collision with reality confined to geopolitics. In fact, the consequences of projecting a faulty theoretical construct onto reality in domestic politics can be just as serious as underestimating a foreign adversary and starting a war one cannot win.

Consider, for instance, Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), which tells us that governments can stimulate demand by borrowing money to spend on government programmes which expand the economy and increases tax revenues, out of which the money can then be repaid. Governments throughout the western world love this theory because it means that they don’t have to make the hard and often unpopular decisions necessary to balance their budgets. There is also no shortage of economists who have developed computer models which prove that the theory works. The only problem is that, in reality, it doesn’t. It never has worked and never will. All it does is increase the money supply, drive up inflation and increase government debt, which in most western countries now stands at more than 100% of GDP and will soon trigger the biggest financial and economic crash in history.

While politicians use MMT to avoid facing political reality, MMT, of course, is not actually a political theory; it is an economic one. There are, however, actual political theories which are even more dangerous than MMT. This is because political theories are not constructs projected onto the world through which the world is then perceived. In fact, they seldom tell us anything about world at all, either as it is in reality or as it is perceived; they tell us how it ought to be and, by implication, how we should therefore change it to make it conform to this ideal. The problem is that this ideal is usually completely unrealistic.

3. Political Theories & Political Realism

This is because human beings and the societies they form are always more complicated and ‘messy’ than any political theory is capable of truly representing. This is not only because we human beings seldom behave in the essentially rational way most political theories think we do, it is also because the world in which we live constantly presents us with new problems and issues with which we need to deal, with the result that even when a theory makes sense and has a certain attraction it is such an oversimplification of life that this, in itself, puts it at odds with reality.

Take John Locke’s Classical Liberalism, or instance, which has two main principles. The first is that, as long as we are not hurting anyone else, we should be allowed to live the way we choose. This, however, is then modified or circumscribed by the fact that, in order to enjoy this freedom and not be beholden to anyone else, we must also take responsibility for ourselves, freedom and responsibility thereby constituting two sides of the same coin.

Personally, I have always admired both the simplicity and the coherence of Locke’s political philosophy and, as far as possible, I have always tried to adhere to it. I also think that his two main principles should be incorporated into any well thought out constitution, as in many case they have been. Locke, himself, helped write the constitution of Carolina, for instance, which, in turn, greatly influenced the Constitution of the USA. The fact is, however, that while, as an ideal, his principles are something to live up to, in reality they are completely unrealistic.

This is because we human beings are social animals and are constrained in the way we live by the societies of which we are a part. One cannot simply live in whatever way one likes if it offends one’s neighbours, for instance, or even makes them feel uncomfortable, not least because there may come a day when one needs them. For while taking responsibility for oneself is an admirable principle and one that should be adhered to as far as possible – not least so as not to be burden on our neighbours – all of us need help at some time, especially as we get older. Even more importantly, as social animals, we are sociable and enjoy chatting with our neighbours, having a drink with them and even sharing a meal, none of which is possible if we do not share common values, similar backgrounds and a common culture. While a certain amount of personal freedom to live one’s life the way one chooses is thus desirable, it therefore has to be balanced by the kind of restraint required to foster a harmonious and cohesive society.

The problem, however, is that it is more or less impossible to formulate a general principle specifying what this level of balance should be, which is at least partly determined by the size of the community in which one lives. Small, tight knit communities, for instance, tend to be inherently conservative. They have their own way of doing things and can be easily offended by anyone who does not conform to common practices and traditions. As such, they can even seem oppressive to anyone who wants to do things differently and whose overwhelming desire may be to get away and move to a large city where their sheer anonymity will give them the freedom to live their lives as they please.

Large cities, however, tend to have the opposite problem. For while they may afford people more personal liberty, they may well lack social cohesion, especially if their populations are drawn from diverse backgrounds and cultures. The result is often a form of ghettoization, in which different areas of the city become home to different communities which are often distrustful of each other, leading to social tensions and even violence. Alternatively, an unfragmented city, without distinct neighbourhoods, may be just too large and anonymous for newcomers to form adequate support networks, leading to loneliness and depression.

My point, however, is not that one of these problems is preferable to the other but that there is no one simple solution with respect to how a society should be organised. In fact, finding the right balance between personal freedom and social cohesion is often a dynamic process, in which, at one time or another, most societies throughout their history have made some dreadful choices, not least because they foolishly adopt some political theory which, for a while, seems to make sense but which ends up with millions of people being murdered in concentration camps. Even when, by happy accident, they do happen to find a perfect solution, in fact, they often then mess it up, often by trying so hard to preserve what they have that this, in itself, becomes oppressive.

Of course, it may be argued that this balancing of personal freedom and social cohesion is not what we think of as ‘politics’ today. But from the early 18th to the mid 20th century in Britain, when the two main political parties were the Conservatives, who favoured more traditional structures and ways of living, and the Liberals, who favoured more personal freedom, especially in economic life, this was precisely what politics was about. It was only when the industrial revolution led to more urbanisation and people lost the support structures on which they had depended in tradition rural environments that a new political movement called socialism began advocating that the network of family and neighbours on which people had previously depended be supplemented or even supplanted by the state.

What’s more the issue of social cohesion is still at the centre of politics today. For at some point during the last thirty years, without any reference to human nature and political reality, someone decided that in order to solve the problems associated with an ageing population and a falling birth rate, foreigners from different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds should be imported into Europe, creating precisely the kind of diverse and incohesive populations which lead to the social tensions and violence we now see in our inner cities. Of course, it is the conservative native populations, who want to preserve their traditional way of life, who are blamed for this and who are consequently called hard right extremists, fascists, and white supremacists. But anyone who visited a tight knit village community in the 18th or 19th century would have witnessed exactly the same reaction to an influx of outsiders. For this is the reality of human nature and anyone who ignores it will soon discover that reality does not treat fools kindly.

This is not, of course, a justification of xenophobia or a lack of charity. But, again, it is a matter of balance. When Jews from Spain arrived in Britain in the 16th century and Huguenots from France arrived here in the 17th century, their numbers were small, they integrated into British society fairly quickly and they were soon accepted. Official figures for current net immigration into Britain, however, stand at around 200,000 per year, which most people think is a massive underestimation. Instead of examining historical reality, however, which demonstrates unequivocally that social cohesion is invariably rooted in a common cultural identity, those in power have unaccountably adopted a clearly contradictory political ideology which both celebrates diversity while simultaneously claiming that everyone is the same and interchangeable.

Indeed, it is difficult to decide which projection of a faulty construct onto reality is the most egregious: Donald Trump’s acceptance of a narrative with regard to Iran which said that the Iranian regime was both thoroughly evil and easily defeated, or the British government’s delusional belief that multiculturalism could be a source of strength. In both cases, a whole lot of trouble could have been avoided simply by taking the time to look at the facts and form a judgement based on reality rather than theory, which is something I highly recommend.

Thursday, 20 August 2026

Why Does Europe Want War With Russia?

 

1.Poking the Bear

As Head of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, Sergei Alexandrovitch Karaganov is one of the most influential men in Russia. During his long and distinguished career, he has served as an advisor to both President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin and was one of the leaders of a group of hawks within the Kremlin who convinced President Putin to invade Ukraine in 2022, arguing that Russia had a moral duty to defend the human rights of Russians living outside the Russian Federation. As such, he is someone to whom the West should listen whenever he speaks, especially now. For he is currently saying that Russia should mount retaliatory strikes against factories in European countries that are supplying Ukraine with missiles and drones to strike deep inside Russia.

His argument is that President Putin’s patience and restraint with respect to NATO’s support for Ukraine is a mistake, in that the West has seen it as weakness, with the result that it has continually increased its support, believing that Russia will never retaliate because it fears an all out war with NATO. In fact, Karaganov goes even further in his criticism, arguing that, by allowing NATO to escalate its support for Ukraine, President Putin has actually made a pan-European war more likely. For when he is finally forced to say ‘enough’, which, at some point, Karaganov argues, he surely will be, Europe will be too far up the escalation ladder to turn back. He therefore advocates launching retaliatory strikes against factories in Britain and Germany now, when European leaders would have to be insane to risk precipitating a war which, in their current state of readiness, they could not possibly win.

In this regard, consider the British army, for instance, which, as of April 2026, comprised just 74,370 men, only about half of whom were actually combat troops, the rest being cooks, drivers, mechanics, medics and so on. Admittedly, the Russian army has about the same proportion of combat troops to others, but it currently stands at around 1,350,000 men. True, only about 750,000 of them are deployed in the Ukrainian theatre of operations at any one time, but this is largely because the Russians have a policy of regularly rotating units in and out of the front line so as to avoid burn out, something which would be far more difficult for any expeditionary force assembled by the European coalition of the willing, which would also have to contend with much longer supply lines, Kiev being 1,362 miles from London.

More to the point, the Russians know how to fight the kind of war currently being fought in Ukraine, where drones and satellite based ISR systems (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) have made tanks and other armoured vehicles more or less obsolete and where the largest assault unit one can safely assemble consists of just three men. For contrary to what is often reported in the western media, the Russians don’t fight in mass wave formations, which would be suicidal. They fight slowly and methodically in three man teams, backed up by six man support units, which mostly consists of drone operators: one surveilling the target of the assault, another looking out for enemy drones, and another searching for enemy drone operators. It is why it has taken them so long to capture each of the fortified cities to which they have laid siege. For by the time the assault teams move in, after months of shelling, most of these cities have been reduced to piles of rubble, with no trees left standing to provide the assault units with cover from enemy drones.

Of course it will be argued that most NATO countries have observers embedded inside Ukrainian units precisely to learn these latest battlefield tactics. But this is not the same as having full tactical teams working together to learn from actual experience.

Another argument one might hear is that the Europeans would not necessarily have to use ground troops to respond to Russian retaliatory assaults on European factories but could, instead, rely on an ariel response. Given the fact that no European country has any hypersonic missiles, however, or many ballistic missiles of any type capable of inflicting significant damage on Russia, and that France and Britain have already given most of their SCALP and Storm Shadow cruise missiles to Ukraine, it is hard to see Europe winning any kind of missile exchange.

Karaganov is therefore perfectly correct when he says that European leaders would have to be insane to respond militarily to Russian retaliatory strikes against them. What’s more, most European leaders clearly know this. It’s why most of them have pledged to increase their defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, although most of them will not achieve this target for the simple reason that many of them, including Britain and France, are already bankrupt. The question this raises, therefore, is why President Putin is so reluctant to pursue the course of action Karaganov advocates.

One possible answer, of course, is that he fears that this would trigger Article 5 of the NATO treaty, thereby dragging the USA into the conflict. While almost certainly influencing his calculations to some extent, however, there are at least two good reasons why this consideration might not be the decisive factor. For not only are Europe’s NATO members supplying Ukraine with drones to strike deep inside Russia, but some of them are even flying planes over the Baltic and Baltic States to detect holes in Russia’s mobile radar defence network and guide the Ukrainian drones through them, making them co-belligerents under the UN Charter, against whom Russia is perfectly entitled to defend itself. With Europe thus technically being the aggressors in any conflict between itself and Russia, this therefore raises the question as to whether retaliatory strikes against European targets by Russia would actually trigger Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and whether, even if it did, the USA would feel obliged to come to Europe’s aid and risk precipitating World War III.

A more convincing argument as to why Putin has so far resisted Karaganov’s advice, therefore, is that he simply believes that keeping the war contained within Ukraine’s borders is in Russia’s best interest, especially as it is currently entering its final phase. I say this because there are now only two fortress cities in the Donbas left to be captured, Slovyansk and Kramatorsk. Once these fall, which, like Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka, they surely will, there will then be nothing but open grassland between the Russians and the Dnieper River, at which point the Ukrainian government will have no choice but to sue for peace on Russia’s terms or risk losing everything. The last thing Putin wants to do at this stage, therefore, is draw the Europeans into the conflict, which, in all probability, would not only delay a final negotiated settlement, but would very probably entitle them to a seat at the negotiating table where they would almost certainly muddy the waters with their own agenda.

The problem he has, however, is that, while the war on the ground is thus progressing as planned, Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes inside Russia are clearly causing him a political headache, not with the Russian people as a whole, with whom he still has an approval rating of over 70% – even after four and a half years of war – but with people like Karaganov and possibly others inside the Kremlin, which ought to make European leaders review their strategy at the very least least.

I say this because one of the main reasons Putin has managed to stay in power for over twenty-six years is his very collegial style of leadership. Although the final decision is always his, he often has over twenty meetings a day, not just to make sure that he is properly briefed, but to gather other people’s opinions and build a consensus. It’s why his closest colleagues, such as Sergei Lavrov and Dmitri Medvedev, have stayed with him so long: because they feel part of a team. If Putin feels that the mood in the Kremlin is swinging in Karaganov’s direction, therefore, especially if long time supporters like Lavrov and Medvedev start leaning in that direction – as some people say they already are – it will be very difficult for him not to go along with them.

The question this raises, therefore, is whether European leaders are fully aware of this. For while they may believe that Russia will not retaliate against their aggression for fear of triggering a broader conflict, by continuing to provoke the Russians the way they have been doing, they may well be driving Putin into Karaganov’s camp, which, given that they have no adequate military response to Russian retaliatory strikes is an enormous risk.

This then raises the further question as to why they are actually indulging in this nonsense at all. And the most obvious answer, of course, is that they simply believe their own propaganda. They really do believe that Russia is weak: that the Russian economy is about to collapse, that the Russian army has lost more than a million men and that if Ukraine can just apply a little more pressure, the Russian people will rise up and either remove Putin from office or force him to settle on Europe’s terms. The problem with this answer, however, is that, while Russia’s claimed economic weakness and military losses may be the official line coming out of most European governments, unless their intelligence services are merely telling them what they want hear, there must be at least some people in these governments who are aware of the truth and of the risk they are therefore running.

If they are aware of the risk, however, this would then imply that they think it worth taking, which would further imply that they still actually believe that Ukrainian drone strikes will have the desired effect, which not only betrays a certain cognitive dissonance but demonstrates a complete lack of understanding of Russia, the Russian people and, indeed, of Vladimir Putin himself.

2.The West’s Most Common Misconceptions about Russia

This lack of understanding of all things Russian is partly, one suspects, the result of sheer ignorance, which partly stems from the fact that very few of our politicians have ever actually been to Russia and have apparently never read the reports of those who have. What makes this even worse, however, is the fact that, when it comes to Russia, the West seems totally unable to rid itself of a number of common prejudices or misconceptions, the first of which is the belief that today’s Russian Federation is really no different from the Soviet Union and that Vladimir Putin is as much a tyrannical dictator as Stalin, ruling Russia through fear and the FSB.

In fact, the story we constantly tell ourselves about Russia is more or less the same as the narrative which the Americans have been spinning about Iran for the last forty-seven years, in which the Iranian leadership is portrayed as a despotic theocracy which rules Iran through the ruthless oppression of the IRGC, and in which the Iranian people, if given the chance, would rise up, remove this despicable regime and embrace western style democracy. The only difference between the two narratives is that, in the case of Iran, the popular uprising was supposed to take place as soon as the regime’s leadership had been assassinated, whereas, in the case of Russia, it is believed that the revolution can be precipitated by making the Russian people more angry with Putin for the daily drone strikes against apartment buildings, buses and schools than they are with the West.

Of course, neither of these uprisings has or will ever occur, not only because neither of the governments concerned are the evil regimes which the West depicts them as being, but because their respective leaders are actually much loved. In fact, most Russians regard Vladimir Putin as something of a saviour, having turned Russia around after the economic collapse of the 1990s, in which a small number of oligarchs may have made billions of dollars by buying up former states assets for just 1% of their true worth, but where most ordinary Russians actually struggled to find enough to eat, resulting in millions of premature deaths due to dietary related diseases and a fall of five years in average life expectancy.

If it hadn’t been for President Putin, in fact, the whole country might easily have disintegrated into a patchwork of fiefdoms ruled by the above mentioned oligarchs and a loose network of organised criminal gangs, generally known as the Russian mafia. Not only did he crack down with brutal efficiency on this so-called mafia, however, but by making an example of a man called Mikhail Khordorkovsky, who was thought to be worth $50 billion at the time, he also forced those oligarchs who had not already fled to London to pay back some of their ill-gotten gains or face prosecution and imprisonment. Even more importantly, he cleaned up the corruption that was then endemic within both government and a number of very large corporations such as Gazprom, which were still at least partially owned by the state, enabling him to rebuild Russia’s broken economy around its huge natural resources and take Russia from being an economic basket-case to being one of the richest countries in the world.

Because the rouble fluctuates enormously on international currency markets and is significantly undervalued at best, it is unfortunately very difficult to calculate Russia’s actual GDP with any degree of accuracy. The best way to do it, in fact, is by using Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), which compares how much a rouble will buy in Russia with how much a dollar buys in the USA. This, of course, is only indicative of how wealthy Russians are today but it is generally agreed that, in 2025, Russia had the fourth largest economy in the world with a per capita annual income of $52,479.

Nor has this been significantly affected by sanctions. In fact, Russia’s inability to buy US and European components for its various manufacturing industries has meant that many Russian companies have been able to expand significantly by producing substitute parts inside Russia. Along with increased military expenditure, in fact, this has produced a boom in Russia’s manufacturing sector, to which, at one point, the Russian central bank had to respond by increasing interest rates to over 20% in order to prevent overheating. Even with interests rates still at 14.25%, however, Russians are still immeasurably better off than they were 25 years ago, making it hardly surprising, therefore, that President Putin has won five presidential elections, the latest, in 2024, with 88% of the vote on an 87% turnout.

Of course, people in the West say that this is a sure sign that Russian democracy is a sham and that the elections are rigged. After all, no one wins an honest election with 88% of the vote. But of the five political parties represented in the State Duma – excluding Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party – not one of them has ever complained about election fraud, not even the Russian Communist Party, which is still the second largest party in the country.

Of course, it will be said that this is because they are being censored or silenced in some way. But there is absolutely no evidence of this. Indeed, the fact that Sergei Karaganov can write articles and give interviews on Russian television which are openly critical of President Putin strongly suggests that Russia enjoys a substantial degree of free speech. Recent visitors to Russia all say, in fact, that people openly discuss President Putin’s conduct of the war and that public opinion has been gradually drifting towards Karaganov’s harder line position. This doesn’t mean, however, that anyone is actually suggesting that Putin be removed from office.

More to the point, if he were to be ousted from power, given the current mood in the country, his successor would almost certainly be Dmitri Medvedev, who, while completely loyal to Putin, is very much a hard liner, which rather undermines the second most popular belief the West seems to entertain about the possible effects of drone strikes inside Russia: that even if they do not precipitate a popular uprising, they will heap enough political pressure on Putin that he will be forced to accept Europe’s terms for a peace settlement.

The problem with this argument, however, is that it not only fails reflect the anger most Russians feel with respect to random drone strikes against civilian targets, but it also demonstrates a complete lack of any understanding of the issues for which Russia went to war in the first place and with which the vast majority of Russians totally agree. For, like Karaganov, they not only believe that Russia has a moral duty to defend the human rights of Russians living outside the Russian Federation, especially the 14 million Russians who found themselves trapped inside the borders of Ukraine when it was given its independence in 1991, but they also believe that a NATO aligned Ukraine would be an existential threat to Russia, which no Russian could accept.

This is because, were Ukraine to join NATO, the USA would then be able to install intermediate range cruise and ballistic missiles on its border, just five minutes flying time from Moscow – one minute less than it would have taken a Soviet intermediate range missile to reach Washington from Cuba in 1962 – giving NATO a pre-emptive first strike capability, something which Russia could never allow. Indeed, were this ever to happen, Russia would have no choice but to launch its own pre-emptive first strike against the US missiles bases on the Ukrainian border, thereby very probably precipitating World War III: something which the Russians have been trying to explain to NATO leaders since 2008 without seeming to make them understand.

As a result, the West has consistently refused to include clauses enshrining Ukraine’s neutrality in any proposed peace treaty. Nor does it accept that the desire of most Russians to protect the rights of Russians living within Ukraine’s 1991 borders was a sufficient reason for going to war. For that would be to accept that Russia had just cause for its invasion in 2022, which would undermine the West’s third and most stubborn false belief about Russia and Vladimir Putin, in particular: that the Russian President instigated an entirely unprovoked war against Ukraine in order to extend Russia’s territorial possessions and reconstitute the old Soviet Empire.

Not only is there no evidence for this, however, but it doesn’t make any sense. For geographically, Russia is by far the largest country in the world, covering 17.1 million square kilometres and spanning eleven time zones. Yet it only has a population of 146 million people, making it one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world. Even more importantly, it has the world’s greatest store of natural resources, not only making it more or less self-sufficient in just about everything but the world’s largest exporter of commodities, from oil and gas to wheat and sunflower oil. What this means, therefore, is that it not only does not need more territory to house its population but it does not need anyone else’s natural resources to provide it with things it lacks.

In fact, with respect to Europe, it is the other way round, with Europe having long coveted Russia’s natural resources. It’s why, apart from the first world war, which was fought on the basis of alliances and miscalculations which everyone very quickly realised was a disastrous mistake, all the other wars fought between Europe and Russia in the modern era have either been fought to acquire Russia’s natural resources or to prevent the Russians trading them on world markets, making it hardly surprising, therefore, that tensions first began to arise between Europe and Russia when Catherine the Great captured Crimea from the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century, thereby opening up the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean to Russian trade. For until then, its only trading outlet to the west had been through St. Petersburg on the Baltic, which is ice bound for half the year and thus prevented Russia from seriously competing with the two great mercantilist powers of the period, Britain and France. Catherine the Great’s capture of Crimea and, indeed, all the Black Sea coast up to Romanian border was thus one of the greatest strategic achievements in Russian history and shook both Britain and France to the core.

The first of the two to respond to this was France under Napoleon Bonaparte, who, in 1812, in the middle of what was already a trade war with Britain, mounted the disastrous invasion of Russia which ultimately led to his downfall. This made it somewhat inevitable, therefore, that the next time either of them tried to contain or limit Russia’s trading reach, they actually did it together and stayed well away from Moscow, concentrating their attention instead on the root cause of the problem, Crimea, which they invaded in 1853 with the principal intention of returning it to the Ottomans. While the military campaign was largely successful, however, the strategic objective was entirely thwarted by the fact that, by then, the Ottoman Empire was in steep decline and could never hope to reoccupy let alone rule the territories captured by its allies, not least because, also by then, the population of the whole Black Sea coastline, from Crimea to Odessa, was almost entirely Russian, as it is today.

It was Europe’s third invasion of Russia, however, that was the most disastrous for all concerned. This, of course, was the German invasion of 1941, which was unashamedly undertaken both to provide more ‘living space’ for the German population, and to take control Russia’s oil fields and its vast swathes of agricultural land. In fact, so callously indifferent to the needs and interests of the native population was this invasion that, fearing some kind of moral reckoning, Europeans today have every right to regard a resurgent Russia as an existential threat. For although we may reason that it was only Nazi Germany, not Europe as a whole, which visited such terrors on the Russian people during the 1940s, killing 27 million of them, our fear and hatred of the subhuman eastern hordes which underpinned the Nazi philosophy is almost certainly part of a European collective unconscious which, in turn, is almost certainly one of the root causes of our current Russophobia.

The irony is, of course, that Vladimir Putin, himself, was born and raised in St. Petersburg, in my opinion one of the most beautiful cities in Europe, and spent much of his early career in Germany, which he greatly admired. He then spent his first three presidential terms trying to forge closer ties with Europe and formed a close friendship with Angela Merkel, by whom he felt personally betrayed over the Minsk II agreement.

If Putin’s personal affinity with Europe, Russia’s massive size and its huge store of natural resources were not enough to persuade the Russian President not to expand its territory westward, however, there is one further consideration that is an absolute clincher. This is the fact that Russia already has the most ethnically and culturally diverse population in the world, speaking more than a hundred different languages, twenty-five of which are official languages. Of course, it could be argued that, having so much experience ruling over such a diverse empire is the perfect preparation for ruling over one that is even bigger and more diverse. But the biggest and most difficult job any Russian President has – one might almost say the biggest nightmare any Russian President has – is trying to keep all these ethnically and culturally diverse people happy and happily part of the Russian Federation.

This, of course, is partly achieved through the Russian Federation’s constitution, which gives each of the its 21 republics a substantial degree of autonomy while providing them with the very considerable benefits of being part of a free trade block which not only uses the same currency but is more or less self-sufficient, such that that most of the trade of most of the republics is carried out within the federation. As such, it is more or less what the European Union set out to be, only better. For while both the Russian Federation and the EU combine a free trade area with a common currency, the Russian Federation is far more democratic, with political institutions which significantly help unite its diverse populations. I say this because, while each republic has its own constitution and autonomous assembly, all Russians throughout the Federation vote for the President and the Federal Assembly in Moscow, the lower house of which is the State Duma. In contrast, no one votes for the European Commission or its President and most Europeans do not identify with them, unlike most Russians who most certainly identify with their President and have almost unanimously voted for him on five occasions.

For all its benefits and constitutional coherence, however, keeping the Russian Federation together is still a monumental task, not least because respecting and protecting the rights and interests of the individual republics while governing the Federation for the good of all is always a delicate balancing act. This was demonstrated most starkly in the case of Chechnya, to which President Putin made numerous personal visits in order to rebuild trust and bring about reconciliation after the two Chechen wars. The last thing he now wants to do, therefore, is force millions of Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians to be part of an empire to which they do not wish to belong and which they will resist with endless insurgencies and terrorist attacks, tying up millions of Russian troops for years, if not decades, at enormous cost but absolutely no benefit to Russia.

He doesn’t even want to take the whole of Ukraine, especially not the western part where the majority Ukrainian population absolutely hates Russians. In fact, during Ukraine’s first attempt to gain independence from the Soviet Union – during the second world war – the Ukrainians actually sided with the Germans, forming two whole Waffen SS divisions, which set about ethnically cleansing Ukraine’s non-Ukrainian populations, killing tens of thousands of Poles in and around Lvov in the west and hundreds of thousands of Russians in Luhansk and Donetsk, the very provinces in eastern Ukraine where the current war is being fought, and where the constant bombardment of Russian towns and cities by the Ukrainian army between 2014 and 2021 finally convinced President Putin to intervene in order to prevent history repeating itself.

What’s more, the Russians laid all this out in the peace proposals they put forward in June 2024 and which served as the basis for the peace talks between President Putin and President Trump in Alaska in August 2025. And yet European governments and their associated media still persist in misrepresenting both Russia’s actions and intentions, not just with respect to Ukraine but Europe as whole, which therefore raises the question as to why.

3.The Three Main Reasons Why Europe Misrepresents Russia

Apart from our deep-seated prejudices, I believe that there are also three main political reasons why Europe is currently so intent on grossly misrepresenting Russia, the first of which stems from the fact that, for most of its recent history – stretching back to at least the 15th century – Europe has regarded itself as the centre of the world. Europeans have always known that other countries existed, of course, but they were far away, uncivilised and either constituted a threat, against which they had to defend themselves, or an opportunity which they could exploit. Either way, they were essentially peripheral. It was Europe that really mattered. For it was Europe that was home to the rival powers which contended with each other, not just for European domination but, in an age of imperial expansion and colonisation, for domination of the world.

All this ended, however, in the 20th century, when Europe squandered the accumulated wealth of centuries on two world wars, allowing two new superpowers to emerge: America and the Soviet Union. Not that this was initially a problem of course. For as long as the two were in opposition, the Americans needed allies in Europe to ensure that it was in Europe, rather the USA, that any war would be fought. In fact, it has been said that the Americans intentionally sold Europe on the concept of NATO as a defensive alliance so as to make it seem as if they were helping to defend Europe when what they were actually doing was occupying it and using it as a fortress.

The problems only began when the Soviet Union collapsed, leaving the USA as the sole global hegemon, to which Europe was now more or less attached as a collection of vassal states, a position which European leaders cravenly accepted in the mistaken belief that this new world order would last forever and that it was better to sit at the king’s table, even in a position of subordination, than choose the wrong side of history and be left out in the cold. What they hadn’t counted on, of course, was that, under the stewardship of President Putin, the Russian Federation would not only experience a miraculous resurgence but would be joined by China in a completely new multipolar world. What they also hadn’t anticipated was that, having squandered its own birthright on a succession of endless wars aimed at enforcing its global hegemony, the USA would now also be in terminal decline.

Given that NATO cannot operate as an integrated organisation without US command and control centres, logistical support and its satellite based ISR systems, this therefore places Europe in a new and extremely perilous position, in which it could find itself without a unified defence, leaving each of its national armies to fend for themselves. Worse still, it presents once great powers, such as Britain and France, with the sobering prospect of being alone, small and irrelevant on the world stage, something which European leaders are so desperate to avoid that they are currently banding together in an unprecedented way to form the so-called coalition of the willing, which they hope will become a fourth global superpower.

The problem with this, however, is that the one European institution around which this power centre could coalesce, the EU, was not designed for this purpose. It was designed to make the individual nation states of Europe economically dependent on each other so that they would not start another European war, not to bind them together in a political union of the kind that would allow them to create a European army under a unified command. For that, the EU would have to actually become a federal state, much like the Russian Federation, with a democratically elected government and legislature.

Of course, this is precisely what a lot people in Brussels, as well as quite a few national leaders, would like to see happen. There are others, however, who do not want to see the interests of their own sovereign nation states subordinated to a Federal Europe, not least because they know that their populations identify far more closely with their own countries and fellow countrymen than they do with the far more abstract concept of Europe and expect their democratically elected leaders to prioritise their needs and interests ahead of the geopolitical obsessions of the Brussels elites. Indeed, it is why those elites are currently working tirelessly to remove nationalist politicians like Hungary’s Victor Orban from office or, like Romania’s Călin Georgescu, prevent them from being elected in the first place, demonising them as ‘far right’ and smearing them as ‘Putin’s poodles’ for wanting to continue buying cheap Russian gas. What is truly remarkable about this campaign, however, is the way in which it completely inverts reality by making it seem as if it is nationalist Russia that is the real threat to the nation states of Europe, not the European Federalist project itself.

The main reason why so many European heads of government go along with deceit, however, is not just the way in which it elevates them onto the world stage and makes them feel relevant, but the way in which it helps them avoid their own domestic problems, which, in the current political climate, can seem almost insoluble.

Take, for instance, the problem of falling birth rates, which may not seem that serious but is actually the problem from which many other problems stem. This is because most, if not all European state pensions and public sector pension schemes are not what most people think they are. For most people think they are like private pensions: funds into which they pay part of their earnings throughout their working lives and which slowly accumulate, earning interest, to provide them with a pot of money from which they can draw down a pension when they retire. But state pensions are not like this at all. They are actually Ponzi schemes, in which the pensions of current pensioners are paid directly out of the contributions of current workers, with no money being saved or accumulated. This means that they are dependent on there being more people paying contributions into the scheme than pensioners taking money out of it. When people are living longer, however, and fewer people are being born to join the work force, the whole pyramid gets turned on its head and is unsustainable.

Importantly, the problem of declining birthrates is not intrinsically insoluble. Russia, in fact, has an even bigger problem in this regard than Europe. For when the Russian economy collapsed in the 1990s, as I mentioned earlier, people more or less stopped having children. This means that there are now fewer people in their 30s – the decade in most people’s lives when they would normally be having families – than would otherwise be the case, thus threatening to repeat the cycle. In fact, President Putin regards the problem as so grave that he has been personally involved in trying to solve it, not only by restructuring the tax system so as to give more tax allowances to families with more children but by providing grants to families so that women can take more time off work to have more children. He has also been working with the Russian Orthodox Church to promote a more family oriented culture, which, given that most Russians are Church members, has had a very positive effect.

In Europe, however, especially in countries like Britain, where the number of practising Christians is at an all time low and is largely confined to older people – a demographic that is not going to help very much – trying to change the culture in order to promote family life is a much more difficult prospect. Even more significantly, paying women to stay at home to have children would be seen as anti-feminist and any politician who suggested it would be labelled as a far right dinosaur if not an outright fascist, a bit like Vladimir Putin in fact.

So what do we do instead to solve our Ponzi pension scheme problem? We encourage more immigration, of course! The problem with this, however, is that most immigrants coming to Europe do so because they are fleeing war-torn Africa or the Middle East and do not have the education or training necessary to contribute very much to the economy. Most do not even speak the language of their destination countries. While they do not therefore contribute significantly to the funds available for paying pensions, they do, however, place a massive strain on the destination country’s resources and infrastructure.

Take, for instance, the water industry, which, in Britain, is constantly under attack in the media for its lack of investment, both in the supply fresh water and in sewage plants. The problem, however, is not underinvestment, but the rate of population growth and the physical limits to the speed at which investments can be made. In Britain, for instance, the population is currently growing by around a million people every year, for whom around 250,000 additional homes are needed, each of which consumes an extra 550 litres of water per day. This means that, every year, an extra 50 billion litres of fresh water is required, which is more or less the same as the amount of water contained in the average size reservoir. Because reservoirs are constantly refilled as water is pumped out them, this doesn’t mean, of course, that one has to build a new reservoir every year. One also has to take into account the rate of throughput. But if the population of a country is constantly growing, one does have to constantly build new reservoirs, which, in a country like Britain, is not that easy.

First, one has to find a suitable location, which should ideally be a valley with a river running through it. Then one has to overcome environmental objections to radically transforming a large area of countryside, acquire the land and build a dam. Because most of the most suitable locations for reservoirs are in upland regions, far away from built up areas, dozens if not hundreds of miles of mains pipes then have to be laid in order to transport the water to where it is needed. Building a new reservoir, therefore, is not just a multi-billion pound investment; it is a massive engineering project which, from planning to completion, can take more than ten years. Instead of blaming our water companies for any inadequacies in our water supply, therefore, we should be blaming the government for not limiting immigration to that which the country’s infrastructure can support.

Water supply, moreover, is only one part of that infrastructure. In Britain, for instance, our roads are not just noticeably more congested than they have ever been before but are visibly crumbling due to all the heavy goods vehicles using them, while both our schools and hospitals are overcrowded and understaffed. Nor is this again simply due to a lack of capital investment. For whether it be road repair or health care, it takes time to increase the capacity of almost any service. The number of staff required has to be projected on the basis of estimated future need and budgets for their remuneration agreed, often against stiff opposition. The staff then have to be recruited and trained which can take years, by which time, with uncontrolled immigration, it will be realised that the numbers needed were originally grossly underestimated, forcing politicians to throw even more money at the problem in an attempt to play catch-uptake. Faced with such seemingly intractable problems, it is hardly any wonder, therefore, that instead of even trying to deal with them, our leaders prefer to take on the role of international statesmen and immerse themselves in foreign policy issues, which, in contrast, seem that much simpler and easier to solve, especially if one can narrow the issues down to a single external threat.

What’s more, blaming Russia for all our problems has the additional advantage of potentially solving many European countries’ most pressing domestic problem: that of being effectively bankrupt with a stagnant or actually shrinking economy. For by depicting Russia as a threat, both necessitating and justifying greater military expenditure, many European leaders, especially German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, seem to have convinced themselves that this will provide precisely the economic stimulus their economies require. After all, it worked for Nazi Germany, where remilitarisation effectively dragged the economy out of the post-war depression of the 1920s. What European leaders who argue in favour of increase defence spending conveniently forget, however, is that the Nazis funded their military expenditure by demonising a certain section of the German population, herding them into concentration camps and confiscating their wealth.

The irony, of course, is that one of the few European countries that wouldn’t have to do something like this today in order to fund additional military spending is Germany, which has a debt to GDP ratio of just 57.7% and which, unlike the UK, which has a debt to GDP ratio of 110.08%, therefore has plenty of headroom for more borrowing. Indeed, it is how Friedrich Merz is able to argue so strongly for rearmament, his principal motivation being Germany’s current state of rapid deindustrialisation, for which the repurposing of disused Volkswagen plants to produce tanks and armoured cars or even drones and missiles would seem like the perfect solution. The problem, however, is that in order to convince the German public of the necessity of this additional deficit spending he first has to convince them that Russia is a threat, with the danger, of course, that this becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy and that the bandwagon taking us to war becomes unstoppable.

4.Reasons for Optimism

If the desire of European leaders to have relevance on the world stage, avoid insoluble problems at home or solve them through rearmament are thus seemingly driving us to war, there are, however, a number of factors which may act against this.

The first is the very low military base from which most European countries are starting the rearmament process. The well-known military and geopolitical commentator, Col. Douglas MacGregor, has pointed out on more than one occasion that, after Vietnam, it took the US military ten years to rebuild and restructure itself so as to be fit to fight the First Gulf War. More recently, former Ukrainian Chief of Staff, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, has said that, even with US involvement, it would take NATO twelve years to develop the competencies required to take on the current Russian army. The chances of a purely European army being fit to fight the Russians before 2038 are thus very remote and, by then, it is to be hoped that the war in Ukraine will be long over and a peaceful solution for future cohabitation found.

Of course, this doesn’t entirely rule out the possibility of European leaders being so incompetent and ill-informed that they order their military to undertake some gross act of folly. After all, in February this year, Donald Trump ordered the US military to overthrow of the Iranian government when anyone with any knowledge of Iran could have told him that, with the resources available, this was impossible.

Fortunately, there are at least two other reasons why a war with Russia is unlikely. The first is that, for various reasons, most of the people of Europe are unlikely to be willing to fight in it. Europe’s immigrant populations, for instance, who have no real allegiance to their adopted countries, would be particularly unlikely to fight for them, even if they were attacked. After all, they could simply move somewhere else. In contrast, Europe’s indigenous populations would probably fight for their countries in a defensive capacity, but are unlikely to join an offensive war initiated by ‘Europe’, especially if they felt that their governments were putting the interests of this abstract concept ahead of their own nation state. In some instances, one can even imagine them turning on their government in what could end up being a revolution or civil war.

The most important reason why war with Russia is unlikely, however, is that the political tide in Europe might actually be turning. Sir Kier Starmer, who was one of the leaders of the coalition of the willing and who spent more time working on behalf of Ukraine than he ever did on Britain’s domestic problems, was cast out by his own party at least partly for this very reason. What’s more, things are looking just as bad for Emmanuel Macron in France, who is likely to be replaced by Marine Le Pen in next year’s presidential election, and Friedrich Merz, who is unlikely to even make it to the next German election in 2029, the most likely winners of which are the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland), whose leader’s first priority will be to go to Moscow, restore relations with Russia, volunteer to pay to repair the two Nord Stream pipelines and thus get cheap Russian gas flowing again so as to rebuild Germany’s shattered industry.

Indeed, it’s probably the main reason why President Putin has so far resisted taking Sergei Karaganov’s advice to strike European factories building missiles and drones for Ukraine. For he knows that, eventually, the electorates of Europe will get tired of the feckless grifters who are currently in power and replace them with serious, responsible leaders who will put the interests of their nation states and their own people first. And when they do so, what Putin most wants is to be able to do business with these new leaders without the background of war getting in the way. Indeed, this would be the best outcome for both Europe and Russia. We can only hope, therefore, that no one does anything stupid in the meantime.