Why We All have Twice As Many Female Ancestors As Male (Part I): Male Accentuated Natural Selection and the Matriarchal Structure of Hunter-Gatherer Communities

According to two recent studies comparing the genetic diversity of male Y chromosomes with the genetic diversity of men’s mitochondrial DNA – one by the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig, the other by the University of Arizona – all human beings alive today, with some small regional variations, most notably in East Asia, have more or less twice as many female ancestors as male: a finding which, if correct – and coming from two separate institutions, I have no reason to suppose that it is not – I believe to be of far greater import than even some of the researchers themselves seem to appreciate. For while it may seem merely a matter of intellectual curiosity that, historically, roughly twice as many women have reproduced and passed on their genes than men, the whole issue takes on a lot more significance once one discovers the implications this has for the average family tree, as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Family Tree Exhibiting a 2:1 Ratio of Female to Male Ancestors

The first thing you’ll probably notice about this diagram is that it doesn’t look like any family tree you’ve ever seen before. For a start, it’s much narrower. For while it shows the current subject of DNA testing as having two parents, one biological mother and one biological father – something that is biologically inescapable – it doesn’t then expand exponentially, doubling in size with each generation as a result of the fact that the two parents are usually the progeny of four grandparents (two grandfathers and two grandmothers), who, in turn, are usually the offspring of eight great-grandparents (four great-grandfathers and four great-grandmothers): an arrangement which, as you would expect, gives rise to what we now regard as the more usual ratio of female to male ancestors, that of 1:1. In order to produce a cumulative ratio of 2:1, however, not only does the subject at the base of the tree need to have had a single grandfather who married and had children with both of his grandmothers, but in order to offset the inescapable 1:1 ratio of his parents, he also needs to have had at least one male ancestor – in this case I have made it a great-grandfather – who married and had children with at least three of his female ancestors, in this case all of his great-grandmothers, only three of whom are now actually required.

Not, of course, that this is unimaginable. After all, I’ve just imagined it. What you have to remember, however, is that this ratio of 2:1 is an average or cumulative ratio covering our entire genetic history, stretching back more than 70,000 years since homo sapiens first walked out of Africa, during which time there would have had to have been periods in which the ratio was significantly higher than 2:1 in order to offset the fact that for the last two or three thousand years, many if not most societies throughout the world have adopted the institution of monogamous marriage, thereby bringing the ratio down. Indeed, a second, even more recent study from the University of Arizona has graphically mapped variations in the ratio over time which seem to indicate that at one point, for a short period around 8,000 years ago, soon after human beings ceased being hunter-gatherers and adopted a settled, agrarian way of life, the ratio may even have been as high as seventeen to one.

Unfortunately, this has led many scientific journalists and other commentators to concentrate their attention on the kind of social and economic conditions which could have possibly given rise to such an extreme anomaly, thereby actually drawing attention away from what would otherwise appear to be a consistent underlying pattern in human reproductive behaviour: one which may well have been acted upon by fluctuating socio-economic factors, but which can hardly be explained by them. For what such a strong underlying pattern indicates is something far more fundamental, something inherent in human nature itself: an underlying genetic factor which would also imply that the resultant behavioural characteristic must, at some time, have had an important evolutionary value.

Nor is it particularly difficult to determine what this evolutionary value may have been. For while it is to the advantage of any species which reproduces sexually to have as many of its females reproduce and bear children as possible, thereby ensuring that the next generation is as well populated as it can be, there is no such advantage to be gained from having all the males reproduce. On the contrary, there is actually a distinct evolutionary benefit to be had from restricting the number of males who become fathers, so that only the strongest, fittest and best adapted pass on their genes, thereby using this otherwise largely superfluous male side of the mating equation to weed out genetic weaknesses.

Moreover, the primary mechanisms by which this evolutionary principle may be instantiated are also fairly obvious, the most commonplace and straightforward being to simply have the males of a species fight each other for the right to mate: a strategy which works particularly well in species in which the breeding males do not need to play any significant role in either rearing their multiple offspring or in providing for their offspring’s mothers. Thus grazing herbivores, such as deer, cattle, buffalo and antelope – species in which the females suckle their young and where their own food is both plentiful and easily obtained – are all well represented in this category.

This strategy does not work so well, however, in species in which the females do not suckle their young and where the food for both themselves and their offspring has to be caught. The most obvious examples here are birds, where almost the entire class falls under this heading, though even among birds there are some exceptions. Chickens and other flightless, ground-feeding foul, for instance, tend to behave more or less in the same way as ruminants, with the male birds fighting and often even killing each other for control of a female flock. In most avian species, however, the need for both parents to work all day in order to feed the gaping mouths of their ever-demanding brood – whether it be with insects, torn up pieces of rabbit or regurgitated fish – means that an alternative method of male selection is required. Instead of fighting each other, therefore, the cocks of most species compete to win the hens’ affections by demonstrating their genetic superiority, usually by singing, dancing and displaying their extravagant plumage, but sometimes also by demonstrating a skill. The male bowerbird, for instance, of which there are actually twenty different species, builds an elaborate structure to which he attaches brightly coloured objects in an attempt to attract a mate, presumably to show her that he could also build a nest.

Because most birds mate for an entire breeding season – and sometimes even for life – and because every rejected male also results in an unpaired female, this alternative mode of selection does not, of course, produce a disparity in the breeding ratio between males and females. However, it does achieve the primary objective of what, for the purposes of this essay, I have called the principle of Male Accentuated Natural Selection, or MANS: that of weeding out genetic weaknesses on the male side. The most significant feature of this second mode of MANS instantiation, however, is that it effectively passes the power of selection to the female: something we also see in a number of other mainly predatory species.

Other examples of this female-determined form of selection can be found, for instance, in various species of wild dog, nearly all of which are relatively small in size and often require two or three individuals to bring down larger prey. As a consequence, they nearly all hunt in packs: a fact which not only obliges them to work together tactically – mounting attacks from different directions, for instance – but very often requires them to take considerable individual risks for the sake of the greater good, thereby also requiring them possess the rather peculiar evolutionary attribute of loyalty, both to each other and to the group as a whole. The last thing a pack of wild dogs therefore needs is for the males to be fighting and potentially wounding each other for the right to mate the females.

Once again, therefore, it is up to the females to ‘select’ which dogs they will mate with, not this time by judging the quality of their plumage, but by literally fighting off any dog that doesn’t make the grade, the sheer ferocity of the female’s self-defense putting most males quite firmly in their place and ensuring that only those males with the courage and self-belief to stare down her snarling rebuffs will eventually be rewarded with her acquiescence.

What all these examples most compellingly demonstrate, however, is not just the rich diversity with which nature instantiates the MANS principle, but its consequent usefulness as a predictive tool. For knowing little more than what a species eats and a few of its other physical characteristics, one can fairly accurately predict, not only which mode of MANS instantiation is likely to dominate, but the kind of social structure to which it is also likely to give rise.

Take, for instance, lions, which, like dogs, also hunt together in groups, tactically driving their quarry in one direction while separating out targeted individuals. There is, however, one major difference between a pride of lions and a pack of wolves, in that being much larger and stronger than any canine species, it only takes a single lioness to bring down almost any prey. This means that a pride of lions does not need to be as large as a wolf pack. In particular, it does not need to support more than one hungry male, who having gained his position by fighting off all the competition, doesn’t actually take part in any of the hunts, but merely stands vigil on the side-lines, protecting his pride from other males.

So what about human beings? What can we deduce from our own physical characteristics that would dictate how we might have been expected to have instantiated MANS?

Well, the first thing to note, of course, is that we too are essentially pack animals. For being carnivorous by preference – the fat in meat having roughly twice the calorific value of carbohydrate – but lacking the power and strength of larger predators, we too have evolved to work cooperatively in ways that preclude the males of the species constantly fighting each other for the right to mate. Once again, therefore, one would expect the MANS principle to be instantiated through female selection. There are, however, a number of physical differences between human beings and dogs which make the structure of a human tribe very different from that of a canine pack.

The first and most important of these is the size of our brains, which, relative to most other species and the size of our own bodies, are very big: a characteristic which has given us an enormous evolutionary advantage, of course, but which also comes with a number of disadvantages, particularly for the females of the species, especially during pregnancy. Needing time for our big brains to develop, the gestation period of human infants, for instance, is considerably longer than for most other species. Relative to the size of the mother, human babies are also significantly larger at birth, not only making childbirth that much more hazardous, but rendering the pregnancy, itself, that much more of an encumbrance, especially during the third trimester when the weight of the child being carried in the womb and the size of the mother’s abdominal distention make it very difficult for her to move with any agility and almost impossible to run at any speed or for any significant distance.

Given that human babies also take much longer to be weaned than the offspring of almost any other species and that they remain dependent on maternal care for a number of years even after that, one of the main differences between human tribes and canine packs, therefore, is that, during the many thousands of years we spent as hunter-gatherers, our ancestors would have nearly always divided themselves into two groups each day, with only the men going off to hunt while the women and children foraged: a clear separation in the roles of men and women which has been empirically confirmed in studies of Australian aborigines and other hunter-gatherer peoples who survived through to modern times.

What’s more, this social division in itself had further evolutionary consequences. For while, in order to be successful hunters, there was an evolutionary advantage to be gained from the men becoming as large, strong and fast as possible, there was no such advantage to be gained by women being of a similar size and stature. Indeed, the contrary was again the case. For being required to undertake the very specialist task of bearing large-brained children, there was actually an evolutionary benefit to be had from hunter-gatherer women remaining smaller and less muscular than their men, in that they didn’t therefore need as many calories per day to maintain their own metabolism, thereby allowing them to use more of their calorific intake to feed their large-brained babies.

What this all meant, however, was that unlike the females of most canine species, who hunt alongside the males and sometimes even lead their packs, not only did hunter-gatherer women not directly earn their own share of the meat produced by a successful hunt, but being smaller, weaker and less athletic than the men, they weren’t in a position to fight for a share either – at least, not against the males. Worse still, this physical disadvantage also left them with only limited defenses against unwanted sexual advances. Thus, they not only needed the males to provide for them, but to protect them as well: a combination of requirements which meant that this whole evolutionary path would not have been possible without a simultaneous development in the social rules governing the behaviour of men towards women.

Indeed, one might almost be tempted to say that we could not have developed as the big-brained, highly intelligent species we became without the males of the species becoming gentlemen. And, indeed, I like to think that most men do, in fact, have an instinctive urge to both protect and provide for their women. The less flattering but far more probable reality, however, is that men only evolved in this way because of MANS, as part of a successful evolutionary strategy which consistently resulted in a certain type of man being selected by women: women naturally preferring to mate with men who looked after them rather than brutes who simply raped them.

The problem, however, is that such an evolutionary development in men could only have occurred in the context of a society in which the right of women to choose was already establish and protected: that is to say a context in which men already behaved in the way that women required of them. This means, therefore, that the societal development had to have come first, and had to have done so on the basis of reasons and motives which, to begin with at least, would have had less to do with male protectiveness than male self-interest and whatever social dynamics were inherent in the structure of hunter-gatherer communities at that time. It is in male self-interest and the structure of these communities, therefore, that we must look to find the origin, not just of the unique relationship between human men and women which allowed our species to evolve in such a remarkable way, but also, in all likelihood, the 2:1 breeding ratio to which this unique relationship also gave rise.

Starting with the structure of hunter-gatherer tribes, therefore – or what we know of such communities from those that survived into the modern era – most of them would have been organised along two orthogonal lines, the first and most fundamental of which would have been the matriarchal family or clan: the term ‘matriarchal’ here being used in a narrow, strictly technical sense, in which it merely denotes a society in which fatherhood is not recognised.

This doesn’t mean, of course, that hunter-gatherers didn’t recognise or understand the causal relationship between sexual intercourse and procreation. After all, it’s fairly hard not to notice that the one tends to lead to the other. It was rather that the fathers of children had no status as such. Nor did they have any responsibility for rearing their offspring. According to the Polish anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who studied the native people of the Trobriand Islands during the first world war and was thus able to observe first-hand one of the few remaining matriarchal societies to make it into the 20^th century, that role fell to the mother’s male relatives on the matrilineal line. These would have been her brothers born to the same mother – as distinct from any offspring her father may have produced with other women, who would not have been recognised as siblings at all – and her mother’s brothers born to the same mother – her maternal uncles – all of whom, collectively, would have also been responsible for the woman herself, along with every other female relative within the matrilineal clan.

By only including matrilineal forebears, this again represents a much narrower family tree than we are used to, the absence of fathers preventing any lateral reach into other familial lines. Just as important as the absence of fathers, however, is the absence of husbands, these two roles not only being closely related but logically connected. For although a society can have a concept of fatherhood without a concept of marriage, the traditional concept of marriage – in which a man and a woman cohabit in a long term relationship and have children together for whom they share a joint responsibility of care – more or less entails the concept of fatherhood. The absence of this latter concept, therefore, more or less entails the absence of the former.

Without the concept of marriage, sexual relations in hunter-gatherer communities would thus have been far more fluid than in most post-matriarchal societies, with most women having multiple sexual partners during their lifetime. Given the otherwise largely unstructured nature of a nomadic way of life, what this also meant, therefore – as again borne out by Malinowski – is that, even in a long term sexual relationship, women did not ‘move in’ with their sexual partners – whatever that might have meant in a nomadic encampment – but remained instead within their own matrilineal clan, where their male relatives – their brothers and maternal uncles – continued to provide for their material needs – while their female relatives – their mothers, aunts and sisters – not only provided them with support during pregnancy and childbirth, but with the freedom they needed to renew or commence a new sexual relationship whenever they eventually felt inclined to do so: the children of the entire matrilineal family being cared for communally.

By thus supporting women’s sexual freedom, at this point one might therefore suppose that a matriarchal social structure of this kind would have actually worked against a breeding ratio of 2:1 and tended, rather, towards parity. And, indeed, taken on its own, that would have been the case. In addition to the genetically encoded selectivity in a woman’s choice of mate, however, there are two other important factors in the mating equation which would have swung the breeding ratio back the other way again.

The first of these is the fact that, during the later stages of pregnancy and early months of motherhood – before a child is weaned – a large number of women would have been effectively taken out of the mating pool, which, as a result, would always have been somewhat smaller than the overall size of the adult female population, thus reducing the number of women available to men looking for a mate: an imbalance which would have greatly increased the threat of sexual violence against women and again reduced the breeding ratio if it had not been for the second organisational structure within a hunter-gatherer tribe: the leadership of the tribe itself, which, if for no other reason, would have come into being quite naturally as a result of the hunter-gatherers’ preferred source of nutrition, and which, in contrast to the matrilineal clan, would have therefore had an entirely male, hierarchical structure. 

This is because hunting large wild animals with the limited weapons hunter-gatherers had available to them was an essentially communal enterprise, a joint venture which therefore had to be directed and coordinated by someone ‘in charge’: a leader whose orders the others would have followed, partly, one assumes, because he had the experience and tactical astuteness to ensure that the hunt was a success, but also, in all likelihood, because he had the strength, speed and courage to lead from the front, actually doing, himself, what he demanded of others.

The position of any leader, however, is always precarious. And in the very violent world in which hunter-gatherers lived, this would have been especially true. For even though hunter-gatherer men may have needed to work together in order to mount a successful hunt and could not, therefore, be always at each other’s throats, this didn’t mean that contention did not exist, or that this contention wasn’t occasionally resolved through violence. For rivalry and competitiveness are as vital to our success as a species as loyalty and faithfulness. In addition to experience, tactical astuteness and physical prowess, therefore, what any leader in such a position would have also needed was the political skill to stave off disaffection while engendering loyalty, thereby establishing an unquestioned order which, then as now, would have best been achieved, not by the leader jealously garnering all power and authority to himself, but by actually delegating some it to those around him – especially those of comparable strength and ability – thereby turning potential rivals into trusted lieutenants and creating a cadre of high status males who, in their own self-interest, would have had reason to uphold and reinforce the position of their chief, in that, in doing so, they would also have been upholding and reinforcing their own position as well.

Indeed, it is in this way that almost any stable hierarchy is formed and maintained. And it would have been this hierarchy, arbitrating and deciding issues between the different matriarchal families, each with their own interests and loyalties, that would have provided the underlying stability for the tribe as a whole, making and enforcing rules that would have been particularly beneficial to the women of the tribe, not least because one of the rules this hierarchy would have been particularly keen to enforce would have been a general prohibition against rape.

I say this because, in addition to preventing the tribe from very possibly tearing itself apart – with the brothers and maternal uncles of the rape victim feeling themselves obliged to take revenge on the perpetrator for their sister’s or niece’s violation – prohibiting rape was actually in the interest of the higher status males, who, being among the strongest, fittest and therefore very probably the most physically attractive of the men in the tribe, were also, quite naturally, the preferred choice of mate for the limited number of women who, at any one time, would have been looking to begin a new sexual relationship. In fact, by imposing this general prohibition against rape and showing themselves both willing and able to enforce it, the men at the top of the hierarchy, would have actually made themselves even more attractive to the women who lived under their protection.  Thus, by defending a woman’s right to choose, these high status males not only ensured that they would always be the ones chosen, but that whatever genetic predisposition men had to be protective of women was thus passed on and reinforced.

Indeed, one could arguably say that it was the relative physical weakness of women, along with the  instantiation of MANS through female choice, that bred into the human species, especially its males, some of our best, most noble qualities, giving rise to the kind of heroic ideal we find in the mythology and folklore of just about every human culture.

Take, for instance, the story of Perseus, who, in order to win the hand of the beautiful princess, Andromeda, not only has to prove himself both courageous and tactically astute by fashioning a mirror so that he can defeat the gorgon, Medusa, but then has to face the ultimate challenge of using her head as a weapon against the sea monster, Cetus, so that he can free Andromeda from the rock to which she is chained. All in all, Perseus thus demonstrates more or less all the ‘heroic’ characteristics required of a man if he is to be successful in finding a mate under the MANS principle as instantiated through female choice. Not only is he brave and resourceful, thereby showing himself to be a capable provider, but his ultimate goal is the rescue and protection of the female, thereby revealing himself to be both virtuous and worthy of her hand.

The problem, of course, is that, if the MANS principle – as instantiated by the selective choices of women who are inherently weaker than their male counterparts – brought out the hero in some men, it also, somewhat inevitably, brought out the villain in others. For the fact that women in sexually unfettered matriarchal societies consistently chose to mate with only the best of men, would quite naturally have produced a significant level of disaffection among those men who, due to their lack of physical prowess, perhaps, or their less than noble characters, were consistently shunned and rejected. For not only would they have felt themselves denied something to which they may also have felt they had a natural right, but they would have resented both the lowly status to which their inability to obtain a mate would have consigned them, and the contempt with which others – particularly women – may have consequently regarded them. Indeed, they would have likely experienced all three of the cognitive conditions I set out in ‘The Phenomenology and Politics of Hatred’ as necessary for inciting hatred:  

1.  the belief – not necessarily true – that one has been ill-used, injured or unfairly disadvantaged in some way;
2. the belief – however much denied – that those responsible for one’s injury are somehow superior to oneself; and
3. the belief that, as a result of one’s relative inferiority, one is being looked down on.

With so many men having so many reasons to be resentful, this, in itself, therefore, would have constituted a serious problem for any tribal chief trying to maintain order, or would have done had it not been for one other aspect of hunter-gatherer life, which, combined with female selectivity and a general prohibition against rape, would ultimately have led to the breeding ratio of 2:1. This was the tendency of hunter-gatherer tribes to prey upon each other, or, more accurately, for the stronger tribes to prey upon the weak: a practice which, from an evolutionary point of view, would, in any case, have been absolutely essential in order to prevent excessive inbreeding – especially in smaller tribes which may only have consisted of a single matrilineal clan – but which would have been used by tribal chiefs, both as a way of channelling aggression away from internal grievances, and as a means of incentivizing and rewarding those of their men whose disaffection might otherwise have boiled over into insurrection.

For the general prohibition against rape, of course, would only have applied within the tribe itself. It would not have applied to the women of other tribes who may occasionally have been encountered while they were out foraging, for instance, and who would only have been protected by old men and boys too young to join their own tribe’s hunt, all of whom would have been quickly despatched by the second tribe’s hunters, along with any other male children and children too young to look after themselves, while the women and girls would then have then been taken into captivity as slaves, where access to them would have been used by the chief as a reward for those of his men who fought well, including many who would have seen this encounter as one of their few chances to have sex, and who would therefore have fought all the harder for it, as the chief, of course, would have known they would.

Of course, it will be argued that, there being no historical records from this period, we cannot actually know that this is how hunter-gatherer tribes treated each other. They could have just as easily hailed each other in friendly terms and join each other in a celebratory meal. In fact, in numerous conversations I have had on this subject, I have often been told that my depiction of our species is far too bleak, completely ignoring our capacity for empathy, our inherent friendliness towards others and the kindness people continually show towards strangers. Like the loyalty genetically programmed into us as pack animals, however, most of these qualities crucially depend on our identification of the ‘other’ as being ‘like us’ or indeed ‘one of us’: an identification which, stimulated by such subliminal messages as the smell of those to whom we are genetically related, does not come naturally to us outside of our own tribal group. Indeed, on encountering strangers – especially those who differ markedly from ourselves in appearance or manner – our far more natural response is one of apprehension, suspicion and even fear.

More to the point, to assume that hunter-gatherer tribes dealt with each other with the respectful cordiality of fellow human beings is to ignore most of the lessons of our subsequent history.

Take for example the siege of Magdeburg during the Thirty Years War, the fall of which, in 1631, led to a bout of behaviour on behalf of the victorious Imperial army which was very similar, if not slightly more extreme, than the imaginary behaviour of the hunter-gatherer tribe outlined above. Because the city had withstood the siege for more than two months, when it eventually fell on 20^th May 1631, the Imperial general in charge of the besieging army, Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, allowed his troops to sack the city for four days, during which time they killed anyone who resisted them, stole whatever property they could lay their hands on and raped every woman they came across. Of the 25,000 civilian inhabitants of the city at the beginning of the siege, only 5,000 survived the massacre, most of them women who were then taken as slaves by the soldiers, who continued to repeatedly rape them until they were eventually traded for food, Germany, at that time, being in the grip of the Little Ice Age and suffering from widespread crop failures and famine, neither of which was helped, of course, by the endless war. The result was that many of the female survivors were so traumatised by their experiences that they either committed suicide or had to be confined to insane asylums for the rest of their lives.

The Sack of Magdeburg is, of course, notorious: one of the worst such atrocities in history. However, it is not unique. In fact, throughout history, such a sacking has been the common fate of any city which chose to withstand a siege rather than surrender at the outset, the threat of such a terrible outcome being almost universally used by besieging generals to encourage a speedy capitulation. As in the case of the hunter-gatherer chief above, it was also used by army commanders to encourage those of their soldiers who would be scaling the walls, incentivizing them with the knowledge that, once inside, they would be allowed to rape and pillage for as long as their general’s displeasure with the city remained unabated.

My point in drawing the reader’s attention to such horrors, however, is not merely to give greater credibility to my view as to how hunter-gatherer tribes most likely interacted, or even to demonstrate how thin the veneer of civilization sits on human nature, but rather to highlight the inherent instability of homo sapiens’ instantiation of MANS by way of female selection. For given the significant disparity between men and women in terms of their size and strength, and women’s consequent need for male protection – whether this be based on the self-interest of the dominant males within a group or the incipient but clearly unreliable instinct among men to be protective of women – women’s security outside the matrilineal family – and even, perhaps, inside it – was always bound to be precarious to say the least.

Indeed, it almost seems as if our entire history as a species has been one long precarious walk along an evolutionary tightrope, in which the many benefits we have gained from our large brains – our ingenuity, resourcefulness, imagination and forward thinking, to name but a few – have been consistently offset by the ever-present threat of social disintegration and species collapse, which the physical disparity between men and women has constantly represented. More than anything else, however, it has been our large brains, and our consequent ability to appreciate the underlying nature of our predicament which has probably saved us. For like no other species, it has allowed us to intervene in our own development, not least through the accumulation and transmission of both wisdom and values preserved in such cultural artefacts as the legend of Perseus and other such myths: stories told around countless hearths and campfires to wide-eyed boys and idealistic young men in order to provide them role-models to follow and standards to which to aspire. For while the veneer of civilization may be thin and, at times, almost non-existent, it is nevertheless what allowed us to rise above our evolutionary programming, especially once a number of environmental factors, along with our ingenuity and resourcefulness began to lessen the demands of our daily existence, thereby giving us the time and opportunity to put the true potential of our big brains to work.

For, of course, our story did not end with us wandering the earth as nomadic hunter-gatherers. For around eleven and a half thousand years ago, after more than one hundred thousand years during which time the earth underwent its most recent period of glaciation, the planet at last began to warm up again, allowing human beings to settle in one place and become farmers for the first time in our history. This, as I shall endeavour to explain in more detail second part of this essay, ‘Male Accentuated Natural Selection and its Social Sexual Expression (Part II): Patriarchal Farmers’, then led to a whole raft of other interconnected social and economic changes. Farming, for instance, quite naturally gave rise to the idea of  inheritance and the recognition of fatherhood, which, in turn, led to the patrilineal family and the end of the matriarchal order.

At the centre of all these social changes, however, was the institution of marriage, which, for a while at least, not only formalised the instantiation of MANS through female selection – the rituals of courtship and the actual ceremony of the wedding bestowing a new kind social recognition on a man and woman’s union – but civilized it, the very nature of monogamous marriage allowing more men to secure a mate than ever before, which, in turn, not only reduced the breeding ratio between women and men to something approaching parity, but brought far more men in from the margins of society than the matriarchal order had ever allowed, enabling them to enjoy the kind full and meaningful life previously restricted to an elite few and rendering them, as a consequence, far more at peace with the world.

Indeed, it could be said that, to date, marriage has been our most successful solution to the instability problem inherent in our instantiation of MANS through female selection. Despite the fact that it curtailed women’s sexual freedom and tied couples together for life in a way that did not always end in happiness, it nevertheless provided a social structure through which women could safely make their choice of mate and a stable economic environment in which they could then bring up their children.

Marriage, however, is now in decline. For reasons I partially explained in ‘Women’s Liberation and the Monetarisation of the Economy’, not only are we no longer marrying – or, at least, not in the numbers we were even twenty years ago – but we are actually forming fewer long term relationships, with more and more of us living alone. The result is that the intrinsic instability in our instantiation of MANS by female selection is once again becoming apparent, with involuntary male celibacy on an ever-steepening rise, accompanied by a similar increase in the reported incidence of rape. The question we all have to answer, therefore, is where we want to go from here. And while I have no obvious answer to this question, it is the question, itself, which, more than anything else, I have set out to frame in this two part essay, the second segment of which I hope will still yet further clarify both the problem and our choices.

Women’s Liberation and the Monetarisation of the Economy

For three years in the mid-1980s I taught at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland, where I therefore had the good fortune to witness at first hand a still only partially monetarised economy, the experience made all the more tangible and real by the fact that, at that time, my wife’s parents still ran a small, mixed farm on the island of Himalansaari on Lake Saima, Finland’s largest lake. 

They did, in fact, have two cash crops: milk from a small herd of dairy cows which they sold to the local dairy – receiving butter, cheese and yoghurt in return as part payment – and timber from a sizeable area of forest, sections of which they felled whenever they needed to make a significant capital purchase, such as a new car or tractor. Apart from the petrol and diesel to put into these capital purchases, however, it was often difficult to see what they otherwise needed money for.

There was certainly very little cash input into the farm itself. Keeping a dairy herd in Finland, where the cows have to be kept indoors for six months of the year, they naturally had to produce a huge amount of winter feed, which meant that most of their non-forested land was devoted to growing grass, for which no seed had to be bought and no fertiliser was required beyond that naturally provided by the cows themselves. Admittedly, they also had two small fields of wheat and rye. But any monetary outlay these crops required was more than compensated for by the fact that most of the milled flour produced was used by my mother-in-law to make her own bread, which she baked in the large brick oven which stands at the centre of most traditional Finnish homes. 

They also grew a large quantity of potatoes, both for winter feed and for human consumption, along with a host of other storable vegetables, including carrots, cabbages and beetroots, which would also have required some cash outlay. The result, however, was that, except in late spring and early summer, before their own new crop of vegetables was ready for harvesting, they hardly ever had to buy food from the local market.

This was particularly true with respect to meat. For having a small dairy herd, they usually had at least the two or three male carves which they slaughtered each year, sharing the meat with the abattoir and butcher in return for their services, but retaining a large amount for their own freezer. To top this up, my father-in-law was also a member of a consortium of local farmers which usually obtained permits to shoot three or four elk each autumn, the meat from which was then shared between the hunt participants, including the many beaters who always turned out on such occasions.

Then, of course, there was the fish. Living on an island on a lake, one of my father-in-law’s favourite summer evening occupations was trawling for ‘muikku’, a small sardine-like fish which we regularly caught in quite considerable quantities – sometimes up to 100kg in a single evening – along with salmon and a few other fish caught in the net.

Summer also brought with it a vast cornucopia of berries for the picking. Wherever trees had been logged the previous winter, wild strawberries would somehow magically appear. All along the edges of the fields, where unearthed rocks had been stacked for generations, huge numbers of raspberries grew. And in the forest itself, large areas of the forest floor would be carpeted in blueberries, which my mother-in-law would pick by the bucketful, along with numerous varieties of mushrooms, including my own favourite, chanterelle.

Nor was it only people with continuing family connections to the countryside, such as my wife and I, who benefitted from nature’s largesse in this way. Most Finns at that time either owned or had access to a lakeshore summer cottage, where they not only spent their summer vacations but most weekends throughout the summer and autumn for as long as the weather held. There, they would lay static nets which they would check each morning for salmon, before spending their days foraging for berries and mushrooms and their evenings going to sauna, barbequing sausages and swimming in the lake.

During haymaking, which, at that time, was extremely labour-intensive, friends and family would also come out to the farm to help with the work. One family from Helsinki, whose precise connection to my father-in-law I never actually discovered, used to take their summer vacation on the island every year, cheerfully working long days in the fields in return for their board and lodging and long summer evenings out on the lake, as well as a bag or two of frozen meat and fish to take home with them at the end of their stay.

My father-in-law also used some of the of muikku he caught as a kind of good-will currency. Whenever we had a particularly good catch, the following morning he would take trays of the fish around to various people he knew, one of whom, I discovered, was the local car dealer who, through my father-in-law’s agency, had given me a very good deal on a used Saab when I had first landed the job in Jyväskylä. 

Thus it was that this non-monetarised economy reached out into almost every corner of Finnish life, not just by virtue of the outdoor culture which the country’s natural environment quite naturally encouraged more or less everyone to participate in, but as a concomitant result of the kind of relationships to which the unexpected bounty of such participation so often gave rise. For when one has caught, grown or picked more than one needs, one has two options. One can either hire a stall in the local market and sell one’s surplus into the monetarised economy – which, of course, some people did – or, with far less effort, one can simply share. 

The thing about sharing, however, is that when you share, you quite naturally expect others to share too. In fact, most people get pretty annoyed when others fail to live up to this expectation, which then has two further consequences. Firstly, those who are delinquent in this regard tend to be shunned  and cast out of the network of friends, family and neighbours who remain, while in this latter group a community of trust and mutual obligation is almost unconsciously created, which, in rural Finland, as I then knew it, was not just a natural and normal part of everyday life but was, in many ways, a matter of practical necessity. 

I say this because while the picture I have so far painted of Finland probably makes it seem idyllic – which, in summer, it can be – in winter its can also be a very hard and daunting place to live, especially if the life you have chosen for yourself is that of a small farmer living on a mostly forested island in the middle of nowhere, where, should anything go wrong, being able to depend upon your neighbours is absolutely essential.

Living in such a daunting environment, what is even more essential, however, is that you cherish the life, itself, and are therefore prepared to accept the numerous demands and obligations it places on you. For getting up at four o’clock in the morning to milk your cows when a metre of snow has fallen overnight and the temperature outside is -30°C is certainly not for the faint-hearted. While living such an independent life bestows on those who have chosen or been bequeathed it an enormous amount of freedom, it also, therefore, lays on them a huge amount of responsibility. For the cows simply have to be milked, whether you like it or not. And while you may be able call upon a neighbour for assistance if you have slipped on some ice and broken your leg, he’s not going to come and milk your cows for you if all you want is a lie-in in the morning.

And the same is true of all the other jobs that have to be done on a largely self-sufficient farm. If you don’t plough your fields, plant your seeds or harvest your crop, it’s not just that you go out of business, but that you literally don’t eat. And yet for my wife’s parents, and I suspect most of their generation, it was precisely this – both the freedom it gave them and the responsibility it entailed, along with the mutual respect and sense of community which such autonomy inspires among those who embrace it – that made it a life worth living and ensured that, by its completion, it had therefore been a life fully lived. 

My purpose in providing this snapshot of rural Finland in the mid-1980s, however, is not merely to eulogise about a way of life which I suspect has now largely disappeared, but rather to prompt, through its more starkly drawn example, a recognition that, until quite recently, many of the essential features of this way of life were not exclusive to Finland, but were to be found throughout most of Europe and the western world. What’s more, these features – common to all non-monetarised economies – were not confined merely to rural areas and an agrarian way of life, but could be found just as commonly in towns and cities, albeit in a slightly different form. For throughout the industrialised world, what traditionally marked the boundary between monetarised and non-monetarised work was not the separation of town and country, but rather the division of labour between men and women, with men going out to work in the monetarised economy, while women worked at home, filling a role in society which, today, is often derided and dismissed, but in which they very often contributed as much to their family’s standard of living through their unmonetarised labour as their husbands contributed through their pay packets, thereby making it possible for families – often with three, four or even five children – not just to live on the income of a single wage earner, but to live well: something which would be more or less impossible for most families today and which many people probably now find it almost impossible to comprehend.

This is because the changes that occurred in our economy during the 1960s and 70s, as more and more women went out to work, while gradual and incremental, were structurally fundamental to our entire way of life, with the result that to many people today, the world we inhabited before this transformation – even if they could fully envisage it – would almost certainly seem as alien as the life lived by a self-sufficient Finnish farmer in the 1980s, and equally as daunting, especially to women, many of whom very likely shake their heads in disbelief, not only at how their grandmothers could have submitted themselves to such a circumscribed existence, but at how they could have coped with all the seemingly endless demands this existence placed upon them, not just in terms of the number of roles they were required to fulfil – and hence the range of skills they had to acquire – but, even more significantly, in terms of the sheer amount of work involved in producing ‘homemade’ what they can now simply go out and buy.

Take, for instance, the preparation of food. Back in the 1950s, when I was growing up, there was virtually no industrially produced food and no supermarkets from which to buy it. The raw ingredients for producing a meal therefore had to be bought from each of the specialist retailers which then lined most high streets: butchers for meat, fishmongers for fish, bakers for bread and greengrocers for fruit and vegetable. Even the general grocers which then existed far more closely resembled today’s delicatessens than modern supermarkets, having counters from behind which men in white coats and aprons weighed out and served their customers with the requested quantities of cheese, bacon and other cured meats which were among the few processed foods that were then available. Apart from bacon and eggs for breakfast and the occasional ham salad for a Sunday tea, every other meal which women prepared – along with the numerous cakes and other confections which they regularly baked – required a huge amount of ‘value-added’ labour in order to turn the basic ingredients involved into the home-cooked favourites which their families enjoyed: value labour which, today, is worth billions of pounds each year to the UK food industry. 

Nor was food production the only sector of manufacturing which was then mostly carried out in the home. Every year millions of ‘homemade’ items of clothing were also produced there. Most women, for instance – or, at least, most of the women with whom I came in contact in the largely working class area in which I grew up – not only knitted but carried their knitting around with them, to be taken out whenever they had an otherwise idle moment, often while minding children – either their own or those of a neighbour or other family member – for whom they knitted a continual supply of sweaters and cardigans, alongside a constant flow of baby clothes, in pastel blues and pinks, for the soon to be born or recently arrived siblings of the children currently being minded. This was, after all, the era of the ‘baby-boom’ generation.

Many women also made their own skirts and dresses, cut out from patterns bought in haberdashery shops: Aladdin’s caves of multi-coloured treasures, whose shelves were lined with skeins of wool, bolts of cloth, coils of silk, and all manner of pins and needles and other dress-making tools and accoutrements. Even today, I can remember wandering round such establishments as a small boy, fascinated not only by all the mysterious paraphernalia on display, but by the multifarious sensory delights of these essentially female domains, which were as wondrously impenetrable to me as the workings of the sewing machine which I watched my foster mother use to stitch together the cut-out pieces of a new dress. 

Of even greater importance than the value-added goods which women produced in the home, however, were the unpaid services which they also rendered, the most important of which, of course, was the care of children. For in those days, there were no paid child minders or commercially run day-care centres, the very idea of which would have probably struck most women as wonderful, but as also totally fanciful and slightly worrying. After all, unless she was the queen or otherwise inordinately wealthy, it was, by definition, the role and responsibility of a mother to look after her children. If she didn’t do that, then what was she? What was her role? Did she even have a role at all?

Amid all the cooking and cleaning, making and mending, most women therefore instinctively and unquestioningly accepted that their first priority was not just to attend to their children’s many disparate needs, but to keep them beneficially occupied: a task which, back in 1950s Britain, was made all the more difficult by the fact that our two television channels only broadcast for limited periods each day prior to 5.00 pm, and only offered fifteen minutes of programming dedicated to the under-fives. Including such classics as ‘The Wooden Tops’ and ‘Bill and Ben the Flowerpot Men’, far from serving as a distraction for children, however – and therefore as a welcome break for busy mums – these programmes were specifically designed to be watched by children in their mothers’ company, so that, as part of their children’s early education, mothers could reinforce the programmes’ overt moral and practical lessons. Indeed, this was actually given in guidance to mothers by the BBC. For as if they didn’t already have enough on their plates, pre-school education was yet another of the responsibilities women, at that time, were expected to fulfil, the minimum requirement being that their children should be able to count, recite the alphabet and understand the basic rudiments of reading before they arrived at school. 

Nor did women’s role in caring for others end there. For with few old people’s homes, and no home support provided by social services – such support being regarded as the responsibility of the family – the task of looking after elderly parents, or at least making sure that they were all right, also quite naturally fell to their daughters, who would ‘look in’ on mum or dad at least twice a week, to see if they needed any shopping done, to take round something for their tea, or to help with some of the more physically demanding jobs around the house. 

With so many different responsibilities and demands upon their time, it could thus truly be said that a woman’s work was never done, making it wholly unsurprising, therefore, that from time to time many women may have wished that they could change places with their husbands, whose only responsibility was to go out to work each day and do the job for which they were paid, before coming home each evening to a clean and tidy house, a home-cooked meal and the prospect of a peaceful hour or two in front of the fire with the evening paper and a pipe. Indeed, to many women, it must have seemed as if they had drawn the short straw. For while, unlike their husbands, they may have been free to organise their working week in whatever way they chose, like the Finnish farmer who has no choice but to get up at four o’clock in the morning to milk his cows, they were not free to simply abandon their duties altogether. For if they didn’t do the laundry, then their children went to school in dirty clothes; if they didn’t cook the family’s supper, then they all went to bed hungry: outcomes which were not just unthinkable but the potential cause of considerable shame. 

For just like the otherwise self-sufficient farmers of rural Finland, women at that time were also partially dependent on the communities of which they were a part: networks of friends, family and neighbours, all of whom were in exactly the same position as themselves, and who would therefore offer their help and support whenever necessary, looking after each other’s children in emergencies, and even shopping and cooking meals for another woman’s family if the circumstances required. However, they would not do any of these things for women who simply shirked their responsibilities. Indeed, as I remember it, most women at that time could be extremely censorious of other women who failed to perform their required duties, especially if this involved neglecting their children. Even more significantly, it was women, themselves, who set these standards and defined the rules, and it was women who enforced them by shaming any of their sisters who failed to live up to them. 

As a result, many of the women who, prior to the 1960s, chose paid employment rather than marriage as their preferred option in life, almost certainly did so as much in rebellion against what they regarded as the small-minded tyranny of this matriarchal order as to escape the limitations of a life spent of domestic drudgery: these two prominent features of many women’s seemingly inevitable fate being merely two sides of the same constrictive coin, which any woman with the necessary education and aptitude might therefore quite reasonably choose to decline.

The fact is, however, that for every woman who took this course, staying on in the careers that were then available to them, as secretaries, nurses and teachers etc., there were many more women for whom marriage and a family were still their primary aspiration, not least because of the financial security marriage brought with it.

To many readers, of course, this may sound rather counter-intuitive, in that a desire for financial independence is generally assumed to have been one of the primary incentives for women to eschew their traditional role. While this may well have been a factor in the decision-making of some well-educated middle class women who could command a higher salary, however, for most working class women, what financial independence actually meant was either destitution or domestic drudgery without any of the benefits which marriage bestowed, not the least of which was a significant amount of control over their husbands’ monetary income.

This was because most working people, at that time, were paid in cash and didn’t even have bank accounts. This meant that women not only controlled and carried around in their purses all the money they needed for the family shopping, but were also responsible for paying most of the regular household bills. Without a bank account, for instance, the weekly rent was not magically collected by direct debit, but by a rent collector, who called at the house during the day while only women were at home. In a similar vein, gas and electricity bills were not paid monthly through the bank, but through coin operated meters which had to be continually fed with shillings as the energy was used. The upshot was that just about all of a family’s regular outgoings were handled by women, with the result that in most working class households – at least all those of which I was aware when I was growing up – the men simply handed over their pay packets at the end of each week and allowed their wives to look after the weekly budget.

Yes, one reads tales of abusive husbands drinking away most of their weekly pay even before they got home on a Friday evening, leaving their wives to manage the household costs on virtually nothing. And I’m sure that such dysfunctional marriages occurred, especially in cases where the marriage had already ceased to be congenial to either or both parties. But if this had been the norm, then the traditional marriage as it then existed would have very quickly died out. For no woman who had ever watched her mother go through such trials and believed them to be inherent in the institution, itself, would ever have ever agreed to get married. The fact is, however, that women in those days had a lot more power than they are now often represented as having, not least due to the fact that while women may have been financially dependent upon their husbands, their husbands were dependent upon them for just about everything else.

Not being trained in any domestic skills, few men, for instance, could even boil an egg, let alone cook their own dinner. Unmarried men who did not still live ‘at home’ consequently tended to live in boarding houses: establishments usually owned and run by widows – or otherwise unmarried women – who happened to own a property but had no other income, and who therefore chose to make use of their single asset by taking in lodgers, providing them with room and board for a weekly rent. For a man to have a home of his own, he either had to be wealthy enough to employ a housekeeper or he simply had to get married. Marriage was thus a partnership of both mutual dependency and reciprocal obligation, in which men were obliged to go out to work – often doing jobs that were both dirty and dangerous and which they didn’t want to do, but which they disciplined themselves to do anyway for the sake of their families – while women, in return, provided their husbands with comfortable and welcoming abodes to which come home, which they wouldn’t otherwise have had.

It is one of the reasons why divorce was so rare. It wasn’t just that the existing divorce laws made divorce very difficult; it was equally as much that, economically speaking – in the broadest sense of this term,  combining a married couple’s monetary and non-monetary contributions to their shared prosperity – men and women simply could not live without each other. And although there may well have been some form of power struggle at some point during many married couples’ lives together, eventually all couples had to come to a some kind of accommodation: an arrangement acceptable to both sides which both sides regarded as equitable, even though in many cases – especially in those parts of the country dominated by mining and heavy industry – many working class women would have almost certainly accepted that they had the better part of the deal. For watching their husbands come home each evening physically exhausted, running a hot bath for them and helping them wash the coal dust or foundry grime out of their skins, it is hard to imagine that many women would have really wished their roles reversed. 

It therefore took a lot more than just the siren calls of a few middle class academic feminists to lure these women out of their matriarchically ordered homes, where they not only made most of the rules but were more or less free to organise their time in whatever way best suited them, and persuade them, instead, to follow their husbands into the male-oriented world of paid employment, which was not only rigidly structured and strictly disciplined in a very masculine way, but was also inherently hierarchical, meaning that women joining the work force would inevitably do so in subordinate positions, where they would remain for many decades to come. Indeed, looked at in this way, it is hard to understand why any woman, except those with higher career aspirations, would have voluntarily chosen to take this course: an assessment which, over the years, has led me to doubt whether quite so many of them would have done so, had it not been in tune with the wishes of the two most powerful forces in the post-war world, government and big business, neither of which, of course, had any intrinsic interest in women’s liberation, but both of which had much to gain from getting women out of the unmonetarised regime of the home and into the monetarised economy of the factory.

This is not to say, of course, that this was ever on anyone’s explicit agenda, or that those fighting for women’s rights, such as the then Labour government’s Minister for Trade and Industry, Barbara Castle, had any other motive but to see women achieve equality with men in the wider world. Least of all am I suggesting some kind of conspiracy. It is just that history tends to flow along channels of least resistance, especially where the interests of those with power and influence coincide, as here in the case of women producing billions of pounds worth of value-added goods and services each year, in an unmonetarised environment in which neither the goods and services, themselves, nor the benefits which women and their families derived from this homemade source of wealth could be taxed, and on which business could make no profit.

Worse still, from the point of view government, was the fact that while all this home-based economic activity remained unmonetarised, it could not be measured. And while it could not be measured, it could not be included in the nation’s GDP figures: an impediment to political usefulness made all the more galling by the fact that, by the 1960s, electoral campaigns were becoming increasingly focused on economic growth and the increased standard of living politicians claimed their policies would produce, claims which could only be quantified and substantiated in terms of GDP. Potentially, therefore, there were massive political gains to be made by taking as much of the work that women did in the home as they possibly could and putting it into a factory, where it could then be monetarised, measured and included in GDP figures, while the women recruited to work in these factories could also be taxed on their income, thereby killing two birds with one stone. 

For big business, the issues were even simpler. For while production remained in the home, not only could business make no profit on it, but women themselves had very limited potential as consumers. They may have been the managers of their family’s budgets, but while they had no monetary income of their own, their purchasing choices were severely constrained by the responsibility this placed upon them. By luring them into paid employment, business could therefore obtain two major benefits. Not only would it force women to buy readymade what they had previously made themselves – no longer having the time to do so – but it would also provide them with additional income of their own with which to treat themselves to goods and services which they may have previously regarded as a selfish misuse of their family’s limited funds.

And if all this wasn’t enough for businesses to put maximum effort into inducing women to join the monetarised workforce, then there was one final clincher: the fact that, at a time of low unemployment, when male wages were correspondingly high, women also represented a pool of very cheap labour. For shocking as it will seem to most women today, back in the 1950s women largely accepted the fact that they would be paid less than men. In fact, on both sides of the Atlantic, there were even women who campaigned to maintain this pay differential. For they feared what indeed has since come to pass, that once women started entering the workforce in any significant numbers, they would begin to compete with men for ‘men’s’ jobs and undercut them, thereby lowering wages across the board, with the result that while, initially, two wage-earner families might be better off, eventually the real value of their combined monetary income would begin to decline, thereby making it a matter of necessity rather than a question of choice as to whether a married woman should go out to work or not. 

In addition to increasing the supply of labour and therefore bringing down its value, there were also a number of other reasons for this. The first and probably most important of these was that monetarising a woman’s production didn’t necessarily mean that she produced more. In some cases and some industries, such as the garment industry, for instance, production, as it happens, did increase. This was because making a single dress by hand, at home, took a lot of time, which, because women were having to fit this work in between other jobs, also meant that they had to spread it over several days, if not weeks, thereby further adding to the inefficiency of this way of working. Moving production into a factory, where multiple dresses could be cut out at the same time and seamstresses could sew together dozens of dresses per day, therefore vastly increased productivity. This consequently brought down the price of new ready-to-wear garments, which in turn created a boom in retail, especially in the early 60s, when fashion, which had previously be confined to the realm of haute-couture, became accessible to everyone.

This, however, was not the case in all of the industries that women joined, the food industry, in particular, being a case in point. For while the industrialisation of food production certainly improved productivity, increases in overall production were strictly limited by consumption. And while, in the 1960s, the population of Britain may have started to consume more food in certain categories, such as cakes and biscuits, for instance, which, when baked in the home, were largely luxuries for high days and holidays, but which now became everyday snacks – much to the detriment of the nation’s bulging waistlines – there was nevertheless an overall limit to how much more food an already well-fed nation could eat. The result was that most of the additional money that women earned as a result of the industrialisation and monetarisation of food preparation simply added to the amount money in circulation without a concomitant increase in the amount of goods and services being produced. And, as any economist will tell you, when you increase the amount of money in people’s pockets without increasing the amount of goods and services which that money can buy, what happens is inflation.

Nor will it come as any surprise that it was almost certainly in the food industry or, rather, that part of a family’s budget dedicated to the purchase of food, where this inflation would have first occurred. For while in the past, women only had to buy the ingredients from which they made their families’ meals, they now also had to pay for the labour and other manufacturing costs that went into producing these meals ready-made. And while manufactures would have naturally forced down the cost of ingredients to compensate for these additional costs, both by buying wholesale and by using poorer quality ingredients than one would use at home – usually disguising this drop in quality with artificial flavourings and colourings – it’s hard to imagine that they could have forced down ingredient costs enough to fully offset, not just their own manufacturing costs and the profit which their shareholders required them to make, but the distribution and retail costs which this new form of food preparation also entailed.

What is surprising, in fact, is that food manufacturers actually managed to get away with it. For what this all amounted to, in effect, was a simultaneous reduction in quality combined with an increase in price, the public’s acceptance of which can only be explained, I think, by the fact that it happened very slowly, with women initially only buying readymade food when they absolutely had to, when they were rushing home from work to get a meal ready for their families, for instance. The inferiority of the product and its increased toll upon the family’s budget were consequently accepted as the price one had to pay for convenience. Besides which, two wage-earner families could now afford the luxury of a ‘take-away’ or a ‘ready meal’ now and again, the gradual increase in the cost of living which this represented being lost in the overall changes to the family’s spending patterns, especially as this increase did not actually show up in official inflation figures.

This was because the official inflation figures, as represented by the Retail Price Index (RPI), only chart changes over time in the price of a selected set of items. They do not chart changes in the overall cost of living which result from changes in our purchasing behaviour. And yet this was precisely what was happening as working women went from purchasing the ingredients for a steak and kidney pie and then making it at home, to purchasing a steak and kidney pie ready-made. 

Moreover, because this kind of transformational inflation was neither measured nor recorded, officially it did not exist, thereby creating a lacuna in our collective economic consciousness which had two further consequences. 

The first of these was that it wasn’t reflected in wage negotiations, which, during the 1960s and 70s, when official inflation in the UK was already at record highs – reaching an astronomical 28% in 1974 – only ever referenced the RPI. The result was that, ignoring transformational inflation, real earnings inevitably failed to keep pace with the true cost of living, which was only made affordable because more and more households had two wage earners. 

What this also meant was that, throughout this period, without people being properly aware of it, the real value of money, itself, was actually declining, though by how much it now is almost impossible to tell. If one uses the RPI to calculate the comparative value of a pound today against its value in 1960, for instance, the answer is £22.62. This, however, is almost certainly an undervaluation of the  pound in 1960 which, using other forms of comparison, such as commodity prices, for instance, could have been worth as much £79.99 in today’s money. Thus when governments tell us that, based on comparative median pay, we are all much better off than we were in 1960, they are being more than a little disingenuous.

That’s not to say, of course, that all of this hidden inflation was purely due to the monetarisation of the previously unmonetarised work done by women in the home. For women joining the monetarised economy and increasing the amount of money in circulation also had many beneficial effects upon the economy, stimulating the demand for goods and services all across the board, especially white goods and consumer electronics, which were now being bought in ever increasing quantities by the increasing number of two-wage-earner families. As the economy expanded, moreover, and more and more goods and services were produced at lower cost, this further induced more and more women to join the workforce so that their families could benefit from the higher standard of living which this new ‘consumer’ society represented. From the individual’s perspective, it may have cost more to live in this new modern Britain, but not only were there opportunities to earn more, there was also much more to buy.

By drawing more women into the monetarised economy, however, this led to even more of the work which women used to do at home being outsourced and monetarised, some of it through the creation of whole new industries.

Take, for instance, the child care industry, which burgeoned in the 1980s when working parents discovered that, after a decade or so of relying on their own parents to look after their children when at work, this older generation was no longer willing to shoulder the burden of a second generation of child rearing. The result was the creation of an industry which is now worth £5.5 billion per annum, and which successive governments have been happy to tax and add to the annual GDP figures, demonstrating just how magnificently the economy has performed under their stewardship. The problem, however, is that this industry has merely replaced the unmonetarised work which women used to do at home with a monetarised version of the same. No more work is being done because no more children are actually being cared for. It is just that whereas, in 1960 say, children were cared for by their mothers without financial reward, this work is now being done by strangers for monetary payment, thereby adding £5.5 billion to the nation’s cost of living without any additional goods or services being produced. 

Of course, it will be argued that professional child carers free up mothers to pursue their own productive careers, thereby adding to national output indirectly. The fallacy of this argument becomes immediately apparent, however, as soon as one realises that the converse is also true: that mothers could simply stay at home and looked after their children, thereby freeing up the professional child carers, themselves, to do something more productive.

Indeed, the negative and wholly inflationary effect which this whole way of looking after children has had upon the economy is evidenced by the fact while governments have been happy to see the creation of this additional taxable GDP, they are themselves now having to cover some of the cost. For with part time nursery places costing an average of £6,600 per annum, full time places costing nearly double this, and even after school clubs costing around £3,000 per year, looking after children in the UK has now become so expensive that, despite having two wage-earners, it is still beyond what many families can afford, leading to more and more demands on government to provide more child care funding, as if this is not going to be paid for out of additional taxation, therefore further adding to a family’s cost of living. 

Nor is this the only area in our lives in which the added cost of participating in the new consumer society has brought little in the way of additional tangible wealth. For in order to keep all our two-wage-earner families in work, consumers have to continue consuming. This means that, unlike our grandparents, who had far less money to spend on consumer goods, and who consequently based most of their purchasing decisions on quality, in the hope and belief that their purchases would therefore last longer, we, in contrast, have become what is undoubtedly the most wasteful society in history. Driven by fashion and the latest technology, from clothes to consumer electronics, we throw away and replace perfectly serviceable items long before they have come to the end of their useful lives, adding untold billions of pounds to our cost of living each year and depleting the planet’s finite  natural resources in ways our grandparents would have considered insane and, quite frankly, immoral.

Worse still is our attitude to food. When women shopped each day and planned meals to get the most out of their weekly budgets, almost nothing was wasted, least of all left-overs. The steak and kidney pie I mentioned earlier, for instance, was typically made using the diced up left-over roast beef from Sunday lunch, bulked out with cheap offal – in this case pig’s kidney – and cooked in Sunday’s left-over roast beef gravy inside a homemade shortcrust pastry case. With food shopping in many households now being undertaken just once a week, however, and most of the food items bought being at least partially prepared, not only is it impossible to build such integrated efficiency into our meal planning, but it is very difficult to plans meals with any precision at all. Indeed, one suspects that many household’s food shopping is largely undertaken on the basis of repetition and contingency, which is to say that we mostly buy what we bought last week, only varying this on the basis of what we think we might want or need: an approach which more or less ensures that a certain amount of food will be wasted. 

In 2015, in fact, the latest year for which I have found figures, households in the UK threw away a total of £13 billion worth of food, not including that which was dumped by supermarkets for being past its sell-by date: £13 billion which is again added to our collective cost of living without providing us with any tangible gain. 

The result is that far from being able to live on the income of just one wage earner, many families toady – even with only one child – struggle to survive on the combined salaries of both parents and are forced, therefore, to rely on borrowing, either on credit cards or overdrafts or, worse still, pay-day loans. The result is that average, unsecured debt, not including mortgages, has now reached £15,400 per household, with many households, of course, owing significantly more than this.

However, it is not just the economic consequences of this transformation in our way of life with which we are now having to deal. There are also societal consequences, many of which stem from the sheer increase in workload which both women and men now have to bear. 

I say this because, in the 1950s, a husband and wife had just two full time jobs between them. The husband went out to work to earn the money his family needed in order to live; his wife looked after that family and provided them all with a comfortable and welcoming place to live. When the husband came home in the evening, he did not therefore have to worry about domestic issues: they were all taken care of. Yes, he had certain jobs to do around the house and garden – looking after general maintenance, for instance, mowing the lawn and tending the vegetable garden – but these were all jobs he did at the weekend and did not add to the burden of his working week. Similarly, his wife had all day to schedule the work she needed to do around the house, with the result that once the children had been fed and washed and put to bed, she too could relax and spend the evening with her husband, very possibly even choosing to have an early night, with all that that euphemistically implied.

Not so for many of today’s couples. For while we now have many labour saving devices that weren’t around sixty years ago, household tasks still have to be done. Someone still has to do the shopping. The laundry still has to be put in the washing machine. The ready-made food still has to be heated in the oven or the microwave. On top of which, the children have to be taken to school or collected from the child minder, with the result that while a modern couple may not have three full time jobs, they certainly have more than two, balancing dozens of different home and family-related tasks with their paid employment, which quite naturally takes priority, leading to the inevitable marital tensions that arise when a promise to pick up the dry cleaning remains unfulfilled.

Is it any wonder, therefore, that both men and women look at marriage today and wonder whether it’s really worth it, often putting it off until well into their 30s when their career is a little more advanced and they’ve managed to save enough for a deposit on a house. Even then, with a mortgage to pay, they still need two incomes simply to get by, with the result that few couples are able to step off the economic treadmill for long enough to have more than one child or even any children at all. The result is that fertility rates in Europe have fallen to just 1.59 live births per woman, far below the 2.1 required for population replacement. 

Worse still, with all the economic pressures now placed on marriage, and little to hold couples together, 42% of all marriages now end in divorce, with the further consequence that, in the UK today, there are over 2.6 million people over the age of 45 who live alone. From the extended family of the 19^th century, through the nuclear family of the post war era, we are rapidly becoming what has been dubbed the atomised society, in which most of us live die alone, not in the care of a loving family, but in an under-funded, state run old people’s home, under the not so gentle ministrations of a professional care giver.

In fact, both of the two most fundamental ‘caring’ relationships which women used to carry out in the unmonetarised setting of the home and family – the care of children and the care of the elderly – have now very largely been moved into the monetarised economy, much, I believe, to society’s detriment. For the elderly, of course, this merely means a sad, lonely end; for our children, however, it could be far worse. For with rates of drug abuse, mental illness and suicide all rising, and the general sense of hopeless nihilism which many young people now evince, one cannot help but think that the societal transformation we have brought about in the last half century has not been to their benefit. Or, indeed, to ours.

And what of Finland? When I first went to Finland in 1976, it produced 95% of its own food, largely on small farms like that of my wife’s parents, which were protected from foreign competition by massive tariffs on imported food. In fact, when I first arrived and saw the price of food in the shops, I didn’t know how anyone could afford to live there. What I didn’t understand, of course – ignorant foreigner that I was – was the huge amount ‘free’ food to which most Finns had access in the unmonetarised economy. 

In 1995, however, Finland joined the EU and could no longer impose tariffs on food imported from other member states, most of which, of course, had far lower farming costs. For a while, subsidies were provided to help Finnish farmers manage the ‘transition’. As the subsidies decreased over time, however, it was very quickly realised by most farmers that the transition in question was their own transition into no longer being farmers. The result is that, today, most of the small farms have disappeared – returned to forest – and with them a whole way of life and culture.

Older people of my wife’s generation still of course go into the forest to pick blueberries and mushrooms. And I’m told that even some young people try to keep the traditions alive. But most Finns now buy their blueberries from supermarkets in little plastic punnets, picked by seasonal migrant workers from the Baltic states: the ultimate symbol, not just of paradise lost, but of something far worse, of paradise monetarised.

In the immortal words of Joni Mitchell:

‘Don’t it always seem to go

That you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone

The day Paradise put up a parking lot.’