Friday, 24 January 2020

Women’s Liberation and the Monetarisation of the Economy


For three years in the mid-1980s I taught at the University of Jyväskylä in Finland, where I therefore had the good fortune to witness at first hand a still only partially monetarised economy, the experience made all the more tangible and real by the fact that, at that time, my wife’s parents still ran a small, mixed farm on the island of Himalansaari on Lake Saima, Finland’s largest lake. 

They did, in fact, have two cash crops: milk from a small herd of dairy cows which they sold to the local dairy – receiving butter, cheese and yoghurt in return as part payment – and timber from a sizeable area of forest, sections of which they felled whenever they needed to make a significant capital purchase, such as a new car or tractor. Apart from the petrol and diesel to put into these capital purchases, however, it was often difficult to see what they otherwise needed money for.

There was certainly very little cash input into the farm itself. Keeping a dairy herd in Finland, where the cows have to be kept indoors for six months of the year, they naturally had to produce a huge amount of winter feed, which meant that most of their non-forested land was devoted to growing grass, for which no seed had to be bought and no fertiliser was required beyond that naturally provided by the cows themselves. Admittedly, they also had two small fields of wheat and rye. But any monetary outlay these crops required was more than compensated for by the fact that most of the milled flour produced was used by my mother-in-law to make her own bread, which she baked in the large brick oven which stands at the centre of most traditional Finnish homes. 

They also grew a large quantity of potatoes, both for winter feed and for human consumption, along with a host of other storable vegetables, including carrots, cabbages and beetroots, which would also have required some cash outlay. The result, however, was that, except in late spring and early summer, before their own new crop of vegetables was ready for harvesting, they hardly ever had to buy food from the local market.

This was particularly true with respect to meat. For having a small dairy herd, they usually had at least the two or three male carves which they slaughtered each year, sharing the meat with the abattoir and butcher in return for their services, but retaining a large amount for their own freezer. To top this up, my father-in-law was also a member of a consortium of local farmers which usually obtained permits to shoot three or four elk each autumn, the meat from which was then shared between the hunt participants, including the many beaters who always turned out on such occasions.

Then, of course, there was the fish. Living on an island on a lake, one of my father-in-law’s favourite summer evening occupations was trawling for ‘muikku’, a small sardine-like fish which we regularly caught in quite considerable quantities – sometimes up to 100kg in a single evening – along with salmon and a few other fish caught in the net.

Summer also brought with it a vast cornucopia of berries for the picking. Wherever trees had been logged the previous winter, wild strawberries would somehow magically appear. All along the edges of the fields, where unearthed rocks had been stacked for generations, huge numbers of raspberries grew. And in the forest itself, large areas of the forest floor would be carpeted in blueberries, which my mother-in-law would pick by the bucketful, along with numerous varieties of mushrooms, including my own favourite, chanterelle.

Nor was it only people with continuing family connections to the countryside, such as my wife and I, who benefitted from nature’s largesse in this way. Most Finns at that time either owned or had access to a lakeshore summer cottage, where they not only spent their summer vacations but most weekends throughout the summer and autumn for as long as the weather held. There, they would lay static nets which they would check each morning for salmon, before spending their days foraging for berries and mushrooms and their evenings going to sauna, barbequing sausages and swimming in the lake.

During haymaking, which, at that time, was extremely labour-intensive, friends and family would also come out to the farm to help with the work. One family from Helsinki, whose precise connection to my father-in-law I never actually discovered, used to take their summer vacation on the island every year, cheerfully working long days in the fields in return for their board and lodging and long summer evenings out on the lake, as well as a bag or two of frozen meat and fish to take home with them at the end of their stay.

My father-in-law also used some of the of muikku he caught as a kind of good-will currency. Whenever we had a particularly good catch, the following morning he would take trays of the fish around to various people he knew, one of whom, I discovered, was the local car dealer who, through my father-in-law’s agency, had given me a very good deal on a used Saab when I had first landed the job in Jyväskylä. 

Thus it was that this non-monetarised economy reached out into almost every corner of Finnish life, not just by virtue of the outdoor culture which the country’s natural environment quite naturally encouraged more or less everyone to participate in, but as a concomitant result of the kind of relationships to which the unexpected bounty of such participation so often gave rise. For when one has caught, grown or picked more than one needs, one has two options. One can either hire a stall in the local market and sell one’s surplus into the monetarised economy – which, of course, some people did – or, with far less effort, one can simply share. 

The thing about sharing, however, is that when you share, you quite naturally expect others to share too. In fact, most people get pretty annoyed when others fail to live up to this expectation, which then has two further consequences. Firstly, those who are delinquent in this regard tend to be shunned  and cast out of the network of friends, family and neighbours who remain, while in this latter group a community of trust and mutual obligation is almost unconsciously created, which, in rural Finland, as I then knew it, was not just a natural and normal part of everyday life but was, in many ways, a matter of practical necessity. 

I say this because while the picture I have so far painted of Finland probably makes it seem idyllic – which, in summer, it can be – in winter its can also be a very hard and daunting place to live, especially if the life you have chosen for yourself is that of a small farmer living on a mostly forested island in the middle of nowhere, where, should anything go wrong, being able to depend upon your neighbours is absolutely essential.

Living in such a daunting environment, what is even more essential, however, is that you cherish the life, itself, and are therefore prepared to accept the numerous demands and obligations it places on you. For getting up at four o’clock in the morning to milk your cows when a metre of snow has fallen overnight and the temperature outside is -30°C is certainly not for the faint-hearted. While living such an independent life bestows on those who have chosen or been bequeathed it an enormous amount of freedom, it also, therefore, lays on them a huge amount of responsibility. For the cows simply have to be milked, whether you like it or not. And while you may be able call upon a neighbour for assistance if you have slipped on some ice and broken your leg, he’s not going to come and milk your cows for you if all you want is a lie-in in the morning.

And the same is true of all the other jobs that have to be done on a largely self-sufficient farm. If you don’t plough your fields, plant your seeds or harvest your crop, it’s not just that you go out of business, but that you literally don’t eat. And yet for my wife’s parents, and I suspect most of their generation, it was precisely this – both the freedom it gave them and the responsibility it entailed, along with the mutual respect and sense of community which such autonomy inspires among those who embrace it – that made it a life worth living and ensured that, by its completion, it had therefore been a life fully lived. 

My purpose in providing this snapshot of rural Finland in the mid-1980s, however, is not merely to eulogise about a way of life which I suspect has now largely disappeared, but rather to prompt, through its more starkly drawn example, a recognition that, until quite recently, many of the essential features of this way of life were not exclusive to Finland, but were to be found throughout most of Europe and the western world. What’s more, these features – common to all non-monetarised economies – were not confined merely to rural areas and an agrarian way of life, but could be found just as commonly in towns and cities, albeit in a slightly different form. For throughout the industrialised world, what traditionally marked the boundary between monetarised and non-monetarised work was not the separation of town and country, but rather the division of labour between men and women, with men going out to work in the monetarised economy, while women worked at home, filling a role in society which, today, is often derided and dismissed, but in which they very often contributed as much to their family’s standard of living through their unmonetarised labour as their husbands contributed through their pay packets, thereby making it possible for families – often with three, four or even five children – not just to live on the income of a single wage earner, but to live well: something which would be more or less impossible for most families today and which many people probably now find it almost impossible to comprehend.

This is because the changes that occurred in our economy during the 1960s and 70s, as more and more women went out to work, while gradual and incremental, were structurally fundamental to our entire way of life, with the result that to many people today, the world we inhabited before this transformation – even if they could fully envisage it – would almost certainly seem as alien as the life lived by a self-sufficient Finnish farmer in the 1980s, and equally as daunting, especially to women, many of whom very likely shake their heads in disbelief, not only at how their grandmothers could have submitted themselves to such a circumscribed existence, but at how they could have coped with all the seemingly endless demands this existence placed upon them, not just in terms of the number of roles they were required to fulfil – and hence the range of skills they had to acquire – but, even more significantly, in terms of the sheer amount of work involved in producing ‘homemade’ what they can now simply go out and buy.

Take, for instance, the preparation of food. Back in the 1950s, when I was growing up, there was virtually no industrially produced food and no supermarkets from which to buy it. The raw ingredients for producing a meal therefore had to be bought from each of the specialist retailers which then lined most high streets: butchers for meat, fishmongers for fish, bakers for bread and greengrocers for fruit and vegetable. Even the general grocers which then existed far more closely resembled today’s delicatessens than modern supermarkets, having counters from behind which men in white coats and aprons weighed out and served their customers with the requested quantities of cheese, bacon and other cured meats which were among the few processed foods that were then available. Apart from bacon and eggs for breakfast and the occasional ham salad for a Sunday tea, every other meal which women prepared – along with the numerous cakes and other confections which they regularly baked – required a huge amount of ‘value-added’ labour in order to turn the basic ingredients involved into the home-cooked favourites which their families enjoyed: value labour which, today, is worth billions of pounds each year to the UK food industry. 

Nor was food production the only sector of manufacturing which was then mostly carried out in the home. Every year millions of ‘homemade’ items of clothing were also produced there. Most women, for instance – or, at least, most of the women with whom I came in contact in the largely working class area in which I grew up – not only knitted but carried their knitting around with them, to be taken out whenever they had an otherwise idle moment, often while minding children – either their own or those of a neighbour or other family member – for whom they knitted a continual supply of sweaters and cardigans, alongside a constant flow of baby clothes, in pastel blues and pinks, for the soon to be born or recently arrived siblings of the children currently being minded. This was, after all, the era of the ‘baby-boom’ generation.

Many women also made their own skirts and dresses, cut out from patterns bought in haberdashery shops: Aladdin’s caves of multi-coloured treasures, whose shelves were lined with skeins of wool, bolts of cloth, coils of silk, and all manner of pins and needles and other dress-making tools and accoutrements. Even today, I can remember wandering round such establishments as a small boy, fascinated not only by all the mysterious paraphernalia on display, but by the multifarious sensory delights of these essentially female domains, which were as wondrously impenetrable to me as the workings of the sewing machine which I watched my foster mother use to stitch together the cut-out pieces of a new dress. 

Of even greater importance than the value-added goods which women produced in the home, however, were the unpaid services which they also rendered, the most important of which, of course, was the care of children. For in those days, there were no paid child minders or commercially run day-care centres, the very idea of which would have probably struck most women as wonderful, but as also totally fanciful and slightly worrying. After all, unless she was the queen or otherwise inordinately wealthy, it was, by definition, the role and responsibility of a mother to look after her children. If she didn’t do that, then what was she? What was her role? Did she even have a role at all?

Amid all the cooking and cleaning, making and mending, most women therefore instinctively and unquestioningly accepted that their first priority was not just to attend to their children’s many disparate needs, but to keep them beneficially occupied: a task which, back in 1950s Britain, was made all the more difficult by the fact that our two television channels only broadcast for limited periods each day prior to 5.00 pm, and only offered fifteen minutes of programming dedicated to the under-fives. Including such classics as ‘The Wooden Tops’ and ‘Bill and Ben the Flowerpot Men’, far from serving as a distraction for children, however – and therefore as a welcome break for busy mums – these programmes were specifically designed to be watched by children in their mothers’ company, so that, as part of their children’s early education, mothers could reinforce the programmes’ overt moral and practical lessons. Indeed, this was actually given in guidance to mothers by the BBC. For as if they didn’t already have enough on their plates, pre-school education was yet another of the responsibilities women, at that time, were expected to fulfil, the minimum requirement being that their children should be able to count, recite the alphabet and understand the basic rudiments of reading before they arrived at school. 

Nor did women’s role in caring for others end there. For with few old people’s homes, and no home support provided by social services – such support being regarded as the responsibility of the family – the task of looking after elderly parents, or at least making sure that they were all right, also quite naturally fell to their daughters, who would ‘look in’ on mum or dad at least twice a week, to see if they needed any shopping done, to take round something for their tea, or to help with some of the more physically demanding jobs around the house. 

With so many different responsibilities and demands upon their time, it could thus truly be said that a woman’s work was never done, making it wholly unsurprising, therefore, that from time to time many women may have wished that they could change places with their husbands, whose only responsibility was to go out to work each day and do the job for which they were paid, before coming home each evening to a clean and tidy house, a home-cooked meal and the prospect of a peaceful hour or two in front of the fire with the evening paper and a pipe. Indeed, to many women, it must have seemed as if they had drawn the short straw. For while, unlike their husbands, they may have been free to organise their working week in whatever way they chose, like the Finnish farmer who has no choice but to get up at four o’clock in the morning to milk his cows, they were not free to simply abandon their duties altogether. For if they didn’t do the laundry, then their children went to school in dirty clothes; if they didn’t cook the family’s supper, then they all went to bed hungry: outcomes which were not just unthinkable but the potential cause of considerable shame. 

For just like the otherwise self-sufficient farmers of rural Finland, women at that time were also partially dependent on the communities of which they were a part: networks of friends, family and neighbours, all of whom were in exactly the same position as themselves, and who would therefore offer their help and support whenever necessary, looking after each other’s children in emergencies, and even shopping and cooking meals for another woman’s family if the circumstances required. However, they would not do any of these things for women who simply shirked their responsibilities. Indeed, as I remember it, most women at that time could be extremely censorious of other women who failed to perform their required duties, especially if this involved neglecting their children. Even more significantly, it was women, themselves, who set these standards and defined the rules, and it was women who enforced them by shaming any of their sisters who failed to live up to them. 

As a result, many of the women who, prior to the 1960s, chose paid employment rather than marriage as their preferred option in life, almost certainly did so as much in rebellion against what they regarded as the small-minded tyranny of this matriarchal order as to escape the limitations of a life spent of domestic drudgery: these two prominent features of many women’s seemingly inevitable fate being merely two sides of the same constrictive coin, which any woman with the necessary education and aptitude might therefore quite reasonably choose to decline.

The fact is, however, that for every woman who took this course, staying on in the careers that were then available to them, as secretaries, nurses and teachers etc., there were many more women for whom marriage and a family were still their primary aspiration, not least because of the financial security marriage brought with it.

To many readers, of course, this may sound rather counter-intuitive, in that a desire for financial independence is generally assumed to have been one of the primary incentives for women to eschew their traditional role. While this may well have been a factor in the decision-making of some well-educated middle class women who could command a higher salary, however, for most working class women, what financial independence actually meant was either destitution or domestic drudgery without any of the benefits which marriage bestowed, not the least of which was a significant amount of control over their husbands’ monetary income.

This was because most working people, at that time, were paid in cash and didn’t even have bank accounts. This meant that women not only controlled and carried around in their purses all the money they needed for the family shopping, but were also responsible for paying most of the regular household bills. Without a bank account, for instance, the weekly rent was not magically collected by direct debit, but by a rent collector, who called at the house during the day while only women were at home. In a similar vein, gas and electricity bills were not paid monthly through the bank, but through coin operated meters which had to be continually fed with shillings as the energy was used. The upshot was that just about all of a family’s regular outgoings were handled by women, with the result that in most working class households – at least all those of which I was aware when I was growing up – the men simply handed over their pay packets at the end of each week and allowed their wives to look after the weekly budget.

Yes, one reads tales of abusive husbands drinking away most of their weekly pay even before they got home on a Friday evening, leaving their wives to manage the household costs on virtually nothing. And I’m sure that such dysfunctional marriages occurred, especially in cases where the marriage had already ceased to be congenial to either or both parties. But if this had been the norm, then the traditional marriage as it then existed would have very quickly died out. For no woman who had ever watched her mother go through such trials and believed them to be inherent in the institution, itself, would ever have ever agreed to get married. The fact is, however, that women in those days had a lot more power than they are now often represented as having, not least due to the fact that while women may have been financially dependent upon their husbands, their husbands were dependent upon them for just about everything else.

Not being trained in any domestic skills, few men, for instance, could even boil an egg, let alone cook their own dinner. Unmarried men who did not still live ‘at home’ consequently tended to live in boarding houses: establishments usually owned and run by widows – or otherwise unmarried women – who happened to own a property but had no other income, and who therefore chose to make use of their single asset by taking in lodgers, providing them with room and board for a weekly rent. For a man to have a home of his own, he either had to be wealthy enough to employ a housekeeper or he simply had to get married. Marriage was thus a partnership of both mutual dependency and reciprocal obligation, in which men were obliged to go out to work – often doing jobs that were both dirty and dangerous and which they didn’t want to do, but which they disciplined themselves to do anyway for the sake of their families – while women, in return, provided their husbands with comfortable and welcoming abodes to which come home, which they wouldn’t otherwise have had.

It is one of the reasons why divorce was so rare. It wasn’t just that the existing divorce laws made divorce very difficult; it was equally as much that, economically speaking – in the broadest sense of this term,  combining a married couple’s monetary and non-monetary contributions to their shared prosperity – men and women simply could not live without each other. And although there may well have been some form of power struggle at some point during many married couples’ lives together, eventually all couples had to come to a some kind of accommodation: an arrangement acceptable to both sides which both sides regarded as equitable, even though in many cases – especially in those parts of the country dominated by mining and heavy industry – many working class women would have almost certainly accepted that they had the better part of the deal. For watching their husbands come home each evening physically exhausted, running a hot bath for them and helping them wash the coal dust or foundry grime out of their skins, it is hard to imagine that many women would have really wished their roles reversed. 

It therefore took a lot more than just the siren calls of a few middle class academic feminists to lure these women out of their matriarchically ordered homes, where they not only made most of the rules but were more or less free to organise their time in whatever way best suited them, and persuade them, instead, to follow their husbands into the male-oriented world of paid employment, which was not only rigidly structured and strictly disciplined in a very masculine way, but was also inherently hierarchical, meaning that women joining the work force would inevitably do so in subordinate positions, where they would remain for many decades to come. Indeed, looked at in this way, it is hard to understand why any woman, except those with higher career aspirations, would have voluntarily chosen to take this course: an assessment which, over the years, has led me to doubt whether quite so many of them would have done so, had it not been in tune with the wishes of the two most powerful forces in the post-war world, government and big business, neither of which, of course, had any intrinsic interest in women’s liberation, but both of which had much to gain from getting women out of the unmonetarised regime of the home and into the monetarised economy of the factory.

This is not to say, of course, that this was ever on anyone’s explicit agenda, or that those fighting for women’s rights, such as the then Labour government’s Minister for Trade and Industry, Barbara Castle, had any other motive but to see women achieve equality with men in the wider world. Least of all am I suggesting some kind of conspiracy. It is just that history tends to flow along channels of least resistance, especially where the interests of those with power and influence coincide, as here in the case of women producing billions of pounds worth of value-added goods and services each year, in an unmonetarised environment in which neither the goods and services, themselves, nor the benefits which women and their families derived from this homemade source of wealth could be taxed, and on which business could make no profit.

Worse still, from the point of view government, was the fact that while all this home-based economic activity remained unmonetarised, it could not be measured. And while it could not be measured, it could not be included in the nation’s GDP figures: an impediment to political usefulness made all the more galling by the fact that, by the 1960s, electoral campaigns were becoming increasingly focused on economic growth and the increased standard of living politicians claimed their policies would produce, claims which could only be quantified and substantiated in terms of GDP. Potentially, therefore, there were massive political gains to be made by taking as much of the work that women did in the home as they possibly could and putting it into a factory, where it could then be monetarised, measured and included in GDP figures, while the women recruited to work in these factories could also be taxed on their income, thereby killing two birds with one stone. 

For big business, the issues were even simpler. For while production remained in the home, not only could business make no profit on it, but women themselves had very limited potential as consumers. They may have been the managers of their family’s budgets, but while they had no monetary income of their own, their purchasing choices were severely constrained by the responsibility this placed upon them. By luring them into paid employment, business could therefore obtain two major benefits. Not only would it force women to buy readymade what they had previously made themselves – no longer having the time to do so – but it would also provide them with additional income of their own with which to treat themselves to goods and services which they may have previously regarded as a selfish misuse of their family’s limited funds.

And if all this wasn’t enough for businesses to put maximum effort into inducing women to join the monetarised workforce, then there was one final clincher: the fact that, at a time of low unemployment, when male wages were correspondingly high, women also represented a pool of very cheap labour. For shocking as it will seem to most women today, back in the 1950s women largely accepted the fact that they would be paid less than men. In fact, on both sides of the Atlantic, there were even women who campaigned to maintain this pay differential. For they feared what indeed has since come to pass, that once women started entering the workforce in any significant numbers, they would begin to compete with men for ‘men’s’ jobs and undercut them, thereby lowering wages across the board, with the result that while, initially, two wage-earner families might be better off, eventually the real value of their combined monetary income would begin to decline, thereby making it a matter of necessity rather than a question of choice as to whether a married woman should go out to work or not. 

In addition to increasing the supply of labour and therefore bringing down its value, there were also a number of other reasons for this. The first and probably most important of these was that monetarising a woman’s production didn’t necessarily mean that she produced more. In some cases and some industries, such as the garment industry, for instance, production, as it happens, did increase. This was because making a single dress by hand, at home, took a lot of time, which, because women were having to fit this work in between other jobs, also meant that they had to spread it over several days, if not weeks, thereby further adding to the inefficiency of this way of working. Moving production into a factory, where multiple dresses could be cut out at the same time and seamstresses could sew together dozens of dresses per day, therefore vastly increased productivity. This consequently brought down the price of new ready-to-wear garments, which in turn created a boom in retail, especially in the early 60s, when fashion, which had previously be confined to the realm of haute-couture, became accessible to everyone.

This, however, was not the case in all of the industries that women joined, the food industry, in particular, being a case in point. For while the industrialisation of food production certainly improved productivity, increases in overall production were strictly limited by consumption. And while, in the 1960s, the population of Britain may have started to consume more food in certain categories, such as cakes and biscuits, for instance, which, when baked in the home, were largely luxuries for high days and holidays, but which now became everyday snacks – much to the detriment of the nation’s bulging waistlines – there was nevertheless an overall limit to how much more food an already well-fed nation could eat. The result was that most of the additional money that women earned as a result of the industrialisation and monetarisation of food preparation simply added to the amount money in circulation without a concomitant increase in the amount of goods and services being produced. And, as any economist will tell you, when you increase the amount of money in people’s pockets without increasing the amount of goods and services which that money can buy, what happens is inflation.

Nor will it come as any surprise that it was almost certainly in the food industry or, rather, that part of a family’s budget dedicated to the purchase of food, where this inflation would have first occurred. For while in the past, women only had to buy the ingredients from which they made their families’ meals, they now also had to pay for the labour and other manufacturing costs that went into producing these meals ready-made. And while manufactures would have naturally forced down the cost of ingredients to compensate for these additional costs, both by buying wholesale and by using poorer quality ingredients than one would use at home – usually disguising this drop in quality with artificial flavourings and colourings – it’s hard to imagine that they could have forced down ingredient costs enough to fully offset, not just their own manufacturing costs and the profit which their shareholders required them to make, but the distribution and retail costs which this new form of food preparation also entailed.

What is surprising, in fact, is that food manufacturers actually managed to get away with it. For what this all amounted to, in effect, was a simultaneous reduction in quality combined with an increase in price, the public’s acceptance of which can only be explained, I think, by the fact that it happened very slowly, with women initially only buying readymade food when they absolutely had to, when they were rushing home from work to get a meal ready for their families, for instance. The inferiority of the product and its increased toll upon the family’s budget were consequently accepted as the price one had to pay for convenience. Besides which, two wage-earner families could now afford the luxury of a ‘take-away’ or a ‘ready meal’ now and again, the gradual increase in the cost of living which this represented being lost in the overall changes to the family’s spending patterns, especially as this increase did not actually show up in official inflation figures.

This was because the official inflation figures, as represented by the Retail Price Index (RPI), only chart changes over time in the price of a selected set of items. They do not chart changes in the overall cost of living which result from changes in our purchasing behaviour. And yet this was precisely what was happening as working women went from purchasing the ingredients for a steak and kidney pie and then making it at home, to purchasing a steak and kidney pie ready-made. 

Moreover, because this kind of transformational inflation was neither measured nor recorded, officially it did not exist, thereby creating a lacuna in our collective economic consciousness which had two further consequences. 

The first of these was that it wasn’t reflected in wage negotiations, which, during the 1960s and 70s, when official inflation in the UK was already at record highs – reaching an astronomical 28% in 1974 – only ever referenced the RPI. The result was that, ignoring transformational inflation, real earnings inevitably failed to keep pace with the true cost of living, which was only made affordable because more and more households had two wage earners. 

What this also meant was that, throughout this period, without people being properly aware of it, the real value of money, itself, was actually declining, though by how much it now is almost impossible to tell. If one uses the RPI to calculate the comparative value of a pound today against its value in 1960, for instance, the answer is £22.62. This, however, is almost certainly an undervaluation of the  pound in 1960 which, using other forms of comparison, such as commodity prices, for instance, could have been worth as much £79.99 in today’s money. Thus when governments tell us that, based on comparative median pay, we are all much better off than we were in 1960, they are being more than a little disingenuous.

That’s not to say, of course, that all of this hidden inflation was purely due to the monetarisation of the previously unmonetarised work done by women in the home. For women joining the monetarised economy and increasing the amount of money in circulation also had many beneficial effects upon the economy, stimulating the demand for goods and services all across the board, especially white goods and consumer electronics, which were now being bought in ever increasing quantities by the increasing number of two-wage-earner families. As the economy expanded, moreover, and more and more goods and services were produced at lower cost, this further induced more and more women to join the workforce so that their families could benefit from the higher standard of living which this new ‘consumer’ society represented. From the individual’s perspective, it may have cost more to live in this new modern Britain, but not only were there opportunities to earn more, there was also much more to buy.

By drawing more women into the monetarised economy, however, this led to even more of the work which women used to do at home being outsourced and monetarised, some of it through the creation of whole new industries.

Take, for instance, the child care industry, which burgeoned in the 1980s when working parents discovered that, after a decade or so of relying on their own parents to look after their children when at work, this older generation was no longer willing to shoulder the burden of a second generation of child rearing. The result was the creation of an industry which is now worth £5.5 billion per annum, and which successive governments have been happy to tax and add to the annual GDP figures, demonstrating just how magnificently the economy has performed under their stewardship. The problem, however, is that this industry has merely replaced the unmonetarised work which women used to do at home with a monetarised version of the same. No more work is being done because no more children are actually being cared for. It is just that whereas, in 1960 say, children were cared for by their mothers without financial reward, this work is now being done by strangers for monetary payment, thereby adding £5.5 billion to the nation’s cost of living without any additional goods or services being produced. 

Of course, it will be argued that professional child carers free up mothers to pursue their own productive careers, thereby adding to national output indirectly. The fallacy of this argument becomes immediately apparent, however, as soon as one realises that the converse is also true: that mothers could simply stay at home and looked after their children, thereby freeing up the professional child carers, themselves, to do something more productive.

Indeed, the negative and wholly inflationary effect which this whole way of looking after children has had upon the economy is evidenced by the fact while governments have been happy to see the creation of this additional taxable GDP, they are themselves now having to cover some of the cost. For with part time nursery places costing an average of £6,600 per annum, full time places costing nearly double this, and even after school clubs costing around £3,000 per year, looking after children in the UK has now become so expensive that, despite having two wage-earners, it is still beyond what many families can afford, leading to more and more demands on government to provide more child care funding, as if this is not going to be paid for out of additional taxation, therefore further adding to a family’s cost of living. 

Nor is this the only area in our lives in which the added cost of participating in the new consumer society has brought little in the way of additional tangible wealth. For in order to keep all our two-wage-earner families in work, consumers have to continue consuming. This means that, unlike our grandparents, who had far less money to spend on consumer goods, and who consequently based most of their purchasing decisions on quality, in the hope and belief that their purchases would therefore last longer, we, in contrast, have become what is undoubtedly the most wasteful society in history. Driven by fashion and the latest technology, from clothes to consumer electronics, we throw away and replace perfectly serviceable items long before they have come to the end of their useful lives, adding untold billions of pounds to our cost of living each year and depleting the planet’s finite  natural resources in ways our grandparents would have considered insane and, quite frankly, immoral.

Worse still is our attitude to food. When women shopped each day and planned meals to get the most out of their weekly budgets, almost nothing was wasted, least of all left-overs. The steak and kidney pie I mentioned earlier, for instance, was typically made using the diced up left-over roast beef from Sunday lunch, bulked out with cheap offal – in this case pig’s kidney – and cooked in Sunday’s left-over roast beef gravy inside a homemade shortcrust pastry case. With food shopping in many households now being undertaken just once a week, however, and most of the food items bought being at least partially prepared, not only is it impossible to build such integrated efficiency into our meal planning, but it is very difficult to plans meals with any precision at all. Indeed, one suspects that many household’s food shopping is largely undertaken on the basis of repetition and contingency, which is to say that we mostly buy what we bought last week, only varying this on the basis of what we think we might want or need: an approach which more or less ensures that a certain amount of food will be wasted. 

In 2015, in fact, the latest year for which I have found figures, households in the UK threw away a total of £13 billion worth of food, not including that which was dumped by supermarkets for being past its sell-by date: £13 billion which is again added to our collective cost of living without providing us with any tangible gain. 

The result is that far from being able to live on the income of just one wage earner, many families toady – even with only one child – struggle to survive on the combined salaries of both parents and are forced, therefore, to rely on borrowing, either on credit cards or overdrafts or, worse still, pay-day loans. The result is that average, unsecured debt, not including mortgages, has now reached £15,400 per household, with many households, of course, owing significantly more than this.

However, it is not just the economic consequences of this transformation in our way of life with which we are now having to deal. There are also societal consequences, many of which stem from the sheer increase in workload which both women and men now have to bear. 

I say this because, in the 1950s, a husband and wife had just two full time jobs between them. The husband went out to work to earn the money his family needed in order to live; his wife looked after that family and provided them all with a comfortable and welcoming place to live. When the husband came home in the evening, he did not therefore have to worry about domestic issues: they were all taken care of. Yes, he had certain jobs to do around the house and garden – looking after general maintenance, for instance, mowing the lawn and tending the vegetable garden – but these were all jobs he did at the weekend and did not add to the burden of his working week. Similarly, his wife had all day to schedule the work she needed to do around the house, with the result that once the children had been fed and washed and put to bed, she too could relax and spend the evening with her husband, very possibly even choosing to have an early night, with all that that euphemistically implied.

Not so for many of today’s couples. For while we now have many labour saving devices that weren’t around sixty years ago, household tasks still have to be done. Someone still has to do the shopping. The laundry still has to be put in the washing machine. The ready-made food still has to be heated in the oven or the microwave. On top of which, the children have to be taken to school or collected from the child minder, with the result that while a modern couple may not have three full time jobs, they certainly have more than two, balancing dozens of different home and family-related tasks with their paid employment, which quite naturally takes priority, leading to the inevitable marital tensions that arise when a promise to pick up the dry cleaning remains unfulfilled.

Is it any wonder, therefore, that both men and women look at marriage today and wonder whether it’s really worth it, often putting it off until well into their 30s when their career is a little more advanced and they’ve managed to save enough for a deposit on a house. Even then, with a mortgage to pay, they still need two incomes simply to get by, with the result that few couples are able to step off the economic treadmill for long enough to have more than one child or even any children at all. The result is that fertility rates in Europe have fallen to just 1.59 live births per woman, far below the 2.1 required for population replacement. 

Worse still, with all the economic pressures now placed on marriage, and little to hold couples together, 42% of all marriages now end in divorce, with the further consequence that, in the UK today, there are over 2.6 million people over the age of 45 who live alone. From the extended family of the 19th century, through the nuclear family of the post war era, we are rapidly becoming what has been dubbed the atomised society, in which most of us live die alone, not in the care of a loving family, but in an under-funded, state run old people’s home, under the not so gentle ministrations of a professional care giver.

In fact, both of the two most fundamental ‘caring’ relationships which women used to carry out in the unmonetarised setting of the home and family – the care of children and the care of the elderly – have now very largely been moved into the monetarised economy, much, I believe, to society’s detriment. For the elderly, of course, this merely means a sad, lonely end; for our children, however, it could be far worse. For with rates of drug abuse, mental illness and suicide all rising, and the general sense of hopeless nihilism which many young people now evince, one cannot help but think that the societal transformation we have brought about in the last half century has not been to their benefit. Or, indeed, to ours.

And what of Finland? When I first went to Finland in 1976, it produced 95% of its own food, largely on small farms like that of my wife’s parents, which were protected from foreign competition by massive tariffs on imported food. In fact, when I first arrived and saw the price of food in the shops, I didn’t know how anyone could afford to live there. What I didn’t understand, of course – ignorant foreigner that I was – was the huge amount ‘free’ food to which most Finns had access in the unmonetarised economy. 

In 1995, however, Finland joined the EU and could no longer impose tariffs on food imported from other member states, most of which, of course, had far lower farming costs. For a while, subsidies were provided to help Finnish farmers manage the ‘transition’. As the subsidies decreased over time, however, it was very quickly realised by most farmers that the transition in question was their own transition into no longer being farmers. The result is that, today, most of the small farms have disappeared – returned to forest – and with them a whole way of life and culture.

Older people of my wife’s generation still of course go into the forest to pick blueberries and mushrooms. And I’m told that even some young people try to keep the traditions alive. But most Finns now buy their blueberries from supermarkets in little plastic punnets, picked by seasonal migrant workers from the Baltic states: the ultimate symbol, not just of paradise lost, but of something far worse, of paradise monetarised.

In the immortal words of Joni Mitchell:

‘Don’t it always seem to go
That you don’t know what you’ve got till it’s gone
The day Paradise put up a parking lot.’

Wednesday, 20 November 2019

Michael Mann and the Climate Change Fraud


On Friday 23rd August this year, the Supreme Court of the Canadian province of British Columbia in Vancouver dismissed with prejudice a libel action brought by Michael Mann, director of the Earth System Science Center at Pennsylvania State University, against retired Canadian climatologist Tim Ball. Despite  receiving almost no attention in the mainstream media, this ruling represents a pivotal development in the climate change debate. For by throwing out Michael Mann’s case, the court effectively vindicated Tim Ball’s claim that the famous ‘hockey stick’ graph, published by Mann and two co-authors in 1998 and prominently cited in the IPCC’s Third Assessment Report in 2001, was a scientific fraud.

To fully appreciate the significance of this, however, one must first understand what the hockey stick graph was intended to achieve. For up until Mann’s publication, it had been generally accepted that our planet’s climate had varied significantly, not just in the distant past when dinosaurs roamed the earth and tropical plants grew in Alaska, but even in the relatively recent history of the last thousand years, which, up until 1998, climatologists had divided into three more or less distinct periods: the Medieval Warm Period, which was believed to have lasted from around 950 CE to around 1250 CE; the Little Ice Age, which was believed to have reached its nadir in the second half of the 17th century, when the Thames froze over each winter, allowing ‘ice fairs’ to be held on the river outside the Palace of Westminster; and the Modern Warm Period which was believed to have started sometime in the middle of the 19th century and is thought to be still in progress. In fact, so widely accepted were these three climatological periods that both the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age were prominently displayed on graphs, both in the presentation given to Congress by James Hansen in 1988 – the event which first brought the theory of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) to the wider public’s attention – and in the IPCC’s First Scientific Assessment published in 1990. 

For proponents of the AGW theory, however, this apparent evidence of a natural variability in the earth’s climate posed a number of serious problems. For if the climate had both warmed and cooled a number of times prior to the industrial revolution, then there had to have been factors other than carbon dioxide at work affecting it. Moreover, this being so, one could legitimately ask whether climate scientists were not therefore obliged, not only to discover what these other factors were, but to investigate whether they were still operative in the climate today and to determine how much they might be contributing to current global warming. As a result, the very existence of the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age not only threatened to undermine the central premise of the AGW theory – that it is man-made carbon dioxide, liberated as a result of burning fossil fuels, that is the primary cause of climate change – but actually risked undermining the science of climatology altogether as it is currently structured. For not only is it unable to answer these fundamental questions, but it is largely ill-equipped to do so, many of the answers almost certainly lying outside its current range of competencies. 

The only solution, therefore, was to erase both the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age from the climatological record. And so that is what Michael Mann did. In what he called ‘a new statistical approach to reconstructing global patterns of annual temperature’, he expunged from history any significant variation in the earth’s climate prior to the 19th century, replacing the graph shown in the lower half of Figure 1 with the new flattened out version in the upper portion, which shows no significant warming of the climate until the 19th century and which consequently looks a bit like a hockey stick.


Figure 1: Michael Mann's Rewriting of History

So how exactly did he achieve this transformation? Good question! The answer, however, is that nobody knows. For despite numerous requests from other scientists for him to release his data and explain his methodology, for twenty years Michael Mann has resolutely refused to do either, claiming that both the data and the methodology were his intellectual property, even though his research was actually funded by Pennsylvania State University and therefore by the taxpayer.
 
The inevitable result, however, was that speculation on these matters very quickly became rife, with a number of scientists trying to generate the same results using different methods, all of them without success, thereby giving rise to a widespread suspicion that the only way in which Mann could have produced such a uniform data series was by splicing together data from different data sets: a suspicion which will probably make more sense once one remembers that even in a country like Great Britain, with a long scientific tradition, recorded temperatures measured using some kind of thermometer only date back a little over three hundred years, and that the temperatures of earlier periods therefore have to be calculated from what is known as proxy data: tree rings, lake bed sediments, ice core samples and the like. The problem with calculating temperatures in this way, however, is that while it may be relatively easy to detect changes in temperature within a single proxy series – wider tree rings, for instance, indicating better growing seasons and therefore higher temperatures – it can be far more difficult to calibrate these relative changes within a series to the absolute temperatures of a standard metric. Even though different data series based on different proxies and using different methods of calculation may all show the same relative changes in temperature over time, it is quite possible, therefore, for them all to translate into slightly different absolute temperatures. To get rid of the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age, all Michael Mann had to do, therefore, was use a data set with a relatively low calibration to measure the former and splice it together with a data set with a slightly higher calibration to measure the latter. And this is what many people believe him to have done.

Not, of course, that anyone was particularly keen to call him out on the matter. For even as early as 2001, the climate science community was already becoming grossly intolerant of anyone who questioned the AGW orthodoxy, with dozens of scientists around the world being denied funding for their research and even hounded from their jobs. Prominent names who have suffered in this way over the years include Roger Pielke, who was forced to resign from his position as Professor of Meteorology at the University of Colorado after a publishing a paper in which he statistically demonstrated that extreme weather events had not become more frequent as a result of global warming, and Judith Curry, who was similarly forced to abandon her position at the Georgia Institute of Technology for daring to suggest what everyone had taken for granted before Michael Mann’s rewriting of history: that our endlessly variable climate is almost certainly determined by many more factors other than just the one currently in vogue. 

The result was that it was largely left to retired climatologists such as Richard Lindzen, Emeritus Professor of Meteorology at MIT, to criticise what he was the first to call the increasing ‘alarmism’ in climate science, and another ex-professor, from the University of Winnipeg, Tim Ball, to challenge Michael Mann directly, famously commenting in a recorded interview that he thought ‘Mann should be in the State Pen, not Penn State’.

Rather than simply letting the comment go, however, Mann decided to sue Tim Ball for libel in the Canadian courts: a move which took just about everybody by surprise, not only because resorting to the law was not generally deemed to be an appropriate way of resolving scientific disputes, but because, to anyone who understood how the law functions, it was immediately obvious that, in order uphold his complaint, the Canadian courts would require Mann to disclose precisely what, by then, he had been refusing to disclose for more than ten years: his data and his methodology. In fact, so extraordinary and apparently misjudged was Mann’s action that it is widely suspected that he didn’t actually realise that this would be the case. Once committed, however, he then had no choice but to spend the next eight years trying to avoid the legal consequences of his impetuous bravado, continually promising to produce his data as the court instructed, but then continually finding reasons not to do so, until on 23rd August 2019, the Supreme Court of the Canadian province of British Columbia finally decided that it had had enough and dismissed the case with prejudice, meaning that Michael Mann could not bring the case again, or at least not in Canada.

Not, of course, that he was in any way embarrassed or fazed by this. In fact, he was back on television within a couple of weeks demanding that all American universities declare a ‘climate emergency’. Nor has it affected the widespread consensus on climate change, either in the media or in the minds of the public at large, not least because, with the entire court case having largely gone unreported, very few people know about it. Thus while you and I and few dozen others may feel justified in regarding Mann’s refusal to disclose his data as a tacit admission of his guilt, for the IPCC, most world governments and the mainstream media, both the Medieval Warm Period and the Little Ice Age continue to have never existed, leaving carbon dioxide as the sole factor affecting climate.

While others may shake their heads in bewilderment and frustration at the seeming impossibility of ever being able to get a politically blinkered establishment to change its mind on this issue, however, my own primary interest is rather in how this state of affairs could have come about. How did it happen? And why? Why did Michael Mann decide to commit scientific fraud rather than simply follow the evidence wherever it took him? After all, that’s what scientists are supposed to do, isn’t it? Especially in a field as young as climatology, with so many unanswered questions and so much still to be discovered.

I say this because a couple of years ago I had the good fortune to stumble upon a lecture – which you can find here – given by Carl-Otto Weiss, a retired professor of physics at the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt in Germany, who, along with a couple of other retired colleagues, came up with the novel idea of subjecting climate data to spectral analysis. 

For those not acquainted with this particular mathematical technique, spectral analysis is what is used to isolate electromagnetic signals of different frequencies from a background of ‘white noise’. However, it can also be used to reveal recurring or cyclical patterns of different periodicities in large data sets: patterns which may otherwise be lost due the fact that, being of different lengths, their effects will sometimes reinforce each other while, at other times, cancel each other out, giving rise to a combined data series in which no overall pattern may be discernible.

Now, of course, a data series with no discernible pattern may be just that: a data series in which the changes to the values are the result of purely random influences with no underlying pattern to them at all. Applying spectral analysis to climate data, therefore, could easily have turned out to have been a total waste of time and effort. Moreover, Professor Weiss and his colleagues had no way of knowing that this was not the case when they first started out. What is quite remarkable, therefore, is not only that it actually worked, but that, by using this technique, they were able to separate out no less than nine distinct cyclical patterns in the data, each one representing a different factor affecting climate, with different periodicities ranging from under twenty years to over two hundred years and with varying effects upon temperature. 

They also made one other extremely important discovery. This was that there were no non-cyclical patterns in the data: no linear or exponential progressions of the kind one would have expected them to have found if a progressive increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide were one of the factors affecting the climate. This, in itself, therefore, would appear to falsify the AGW theory. Even more significantly, however – from the point of view of this new fledgling science of climatology – of the nine different patterns they did find in the data, they were only able to positively correlate the two strongest or most dominant with factors already believed to contribute to overall climate variability.

The first of these was the 65 year oceanic cycle – which includes both the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) – during which ocean temperatures vary by between 0.3°C and 0.5°C above and below the mean, spending around 30 to 35 years warming and then 30 to 35 years cooling down again.

The second was a cycle which has long been associated with changes in the climate but which, on the face of it, would appear to have very little possible connection. This is the 230 to 250 year Grand Solar Cycle, so called in order to distinguish it from the ordinary 11 year solar cycle, during which the sun’s magnetic poles invert, the north pole becoming the south and vice versa, a process which is both regular and continuous and which also produces fluctuations in the strength of the sun’s overall magnetic field. And it is these fluctuations which provide us with our first clue as to how solar cycles in general might possibly affect climate. For just as the earth’s magnetic field protects us from some of the more harmful effects of solar radiation, so the sun’s magnetic field protects us from radiation coming from outside of the solar system – usually referred to as cosmic radiation – which primarily consists of free neutrons thrown out into space by exploding stars.

These have a number of effects on our atmosphere. Colliding with nitrogen atoms, for instance, they strip the nitrogen nuclei of protons, thereby turning nitrogen (atomic number 7) into carbon (atomic number 6). They also break oxygen atoms (atomic number 8) in half, creating beryllium (atomic number 4). With regard to the issue at hand, however, their most significant effect is that they also ionise the atmosphere and act a catalyst for turning water vapour into water droplets, which then form into clouds. The weaker the sun’s magnetic field, therefore, the greater the cloud formation on earth, and the greater the consequent albedo effect – the reflection of the sun’s energy back into space – resulting in a cooling of the climate.

In the case of the ordinary 11 year solar cycle, this effect is, of course, very small. In fact, in the current political climate, its existence at all will be categorically denied. According to a new theory  developed by a team of astrophysicists led by Professor Valentina Zharkova at the University of Northumbria, however, these fluctuations in the sun’s magnetic field, and their consequent effect upon the earth’s climate, are not only replicated in grand solar cycles but are actually amplified by them, the magnetic field first becoming stronger and then weaker again in each of the successive 11 year solar cycles of which the grand solar cycle is comprised, until in the last three to five cycles, the sun enters a stable but significantly weakened magnetic state known as a Grand Solar Minimum, the most obvious manifestation of which is an almost total absence of sun spot activity.

Indeed, it is this lack of sun spots, which otherwise occur as a regular and wholly predictable effect of the sun’s turbulent polar inversions, that has allowed solar astronomers to record grand solar minima for more than four centuries, the most famous example of which being the Maunder Minimum – named after solar astronomers Edward and Annie Maunder – which occurred during the second half of the 17th century, in the middle of what was previously known as the Little Ice Age… until, of course, Michael Mann wrote it out of existence.

Given the absolutely fascinating nature of the science which could potentially explain this once universally accepted period of global cooling, again we have to ask, therefore, why he should have done this, especially as by simply following the science, vast vistas of opportunity would seem to be on offer. 

I say this because it hardly requires a huge amount of imagination to see that one could quite easily build a whole career simply by following the path which Professor Weiss and his colleagues have already laid out: firstly by verifying the results of the group’s spectral analysis, preferably with a larger data set, the Weiss group having only had access to European data; then by identifying and understanding the causal connections between climate variability and however many cyclical factors the spectral analysis ultimately reveals; and finally by bringing them all together in a complex climate model which would hopefully predict future climate change with far more accuracy than currently achieved by models based purely on levels of carbon dioxide. In fact, if I were a young climate scientist today, I’d be champing at the bit to participate in just such a programme of work.

It is at this point, however, that the real problem begins to reveal itself. For not only would such a programme be very expensive, requiring a multi-disciplinary approach encompassing fields as diverse as oceanography and astrophysics, but being of purely academic interest, with no obvious practical application, it is not easy to see who would fund it. For without the public policy interest which the AGW theory engenders, climatology as a separate field of research, independent from either meteorology or geology, would likely be accorded even less priority today than when it was first given impetus during the cold war, when the rival world powers, eager to stake their claim to various parts of Antarctica, had to find something for their ‘scientific research stations’ to do there, and so set them to drilling ice-core samples, thereby opening up the Pandora’s Box of unacceptable truths which has led us, somewhat ironically, into the morass of lies and deceit in which we currently find ourselves.

I say ‘ironically’ because the initial discovery made by all these scientific research stations was, of course, that the so-called ‘ice age’ – in the singular – which, until the 1970s, the earth was thought to have undergone during much of the last one hundred thousand years but which most people believed had finally and completely ended around ten thousand years ago, was merely the latest in a whole series of glaciations and glacial retreats stretching back 2.58 million years, as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The Pleistocene Quaternary Glaciation

Immediately, there are a number of things you will probably notice about this chart, the first being that it is based on sedimentary data rather than ice core samples. This is because the oldest ice core samples so far extracted – at the Russian Vostok Station in eastern Antarctica – only come from around 3.7km below the surface, which is the equivalent of only going back in time around 800,000 years. Although a truncated graph, covering just this period, would still show a pattern of warming and cooling – which is what was first discovered in the 1970s – it would not therefore show the overall cooling trend that preceded it. And it is to this that I primarily want to draw your attention.

For although it is still almost universally asserted that the Pleistocene Quaternary Glaciation, as this greater ‘ice age’ is now known, came to an end 10,000 years ago, there is absolutely no basis for this assumption in the data as presented, from which it can be clearly seen that the cycles of glaciation and glacial retreat have not only been getting longer over the last 2.58 million years – going from around 41,000 years in duration at the beginning to around 100,00 year in the last dozen or so cycles – but have also been getting considerably colder, the last few cycles reaching up to 9°C below the Vostok mean. Even if this greater ice age has now bottomed out, therefore – and there is no basis for this assumption either – based on this overall trend, the chances are that the earth will still have to go through another 2.58 million years of gradually warming glacial cycles before it gets back to the climate of 2.58 million years ago.

And it was this that naturally made all the headlines back in the mid-1970s when the discovery was first announced: that having just come through what we now know as the Holocene – the brief warm period of around 10,000 years at the top of the current cycle – at some point in the near future – within the next few hundred years or so, perhaps – the earth is almost certain to enter another period of glaciation, the prospect of which seemed all the more imminent during the mid-70s due to the fact that, at that time, before historical temperature data began to be systematically adjusted downwards – something to which I shall return later – the planet appeared to be already cooling, the 1950s, 60s and early 70s having been markedly cooler than the 1930s and 40s. In fact, if one goes back to the unadjusted temperature data from the pre-war period, one finds that the late 1930’s were actually the warmest years of the 20th century, with the US in particular suffering long, hot summers and a period of intense drought known as the ‘dust bowl’, during which thousands of farmers in the Midwest were driven off their land and forced to embark upon the mass migration to California famously commemorated in John Steinbeck’s novel, ‘The Grapes of Wrath’.

With such a devastating drought still very much part of living memory, and the bitterly cold winters of the 1960s and early 70s a simple fact of everyone’s life, the fear which people felt at the prospect of another ‘ice age’, as the newspapers still insisted on calling it, was consequently very real. And yet, still, money for climate research remained in short supply, partly, one suspects, because there simply wasn’t the institutional infrastructure to absorb it, but also because climatologists already had a readily available theory as to why these regular cycles of glaciation and glacial retreat occurred. And it wasn’t what most people wanted to hear.

I say this because although the correlation was by no means exact, these newly discovered large scale cyclic variations in the earth’s climate clearly coincided with the multi-millennial cyclical variations in the earth’s orbit of the sun which had been worked out more than fifty years earlier by the Serbian mathematician and astronomer, Milutin Milankovitch.

The Milankovitch cycles, as they are called, describe three separate aspects of the earth’s solar orbit:
  1. The shape of the orbit, itself, which, being acted upon by the gravitational pull of the other planets in the solar system – particularly Jupiter and Saturn – is not constant, being more acutely elliptical at some times than others. Even more significantly, as a further consequence of these gravitational distortions, the sun itself is rarely at the centre of the ellipse, usually being closer to one end – known as the perihelion – than the other – known as the aphelion – with the result that the distance between the earth and the sun varies by up to five million miles.
  2. The difference between the length of the sidereal year – the time it takes for the earth to orbit the sun once – and the calendar year, as measured from midwinter solstice to midwinter solstice and caused by the earth’s wobble on its axis. It may not seem much, but the sidereal year is twenty minutes longer than the calendar year, which means that every calendar year it slips back another twenty minutes from its starting point: a phenomenon known as precession. What this also means, therefore, is that the northern hemisphere’s winters occur at different places in the elliptical orbit, sometimes – for a few thousand years in a row – occurring in the perihelion, when the winters are consequently quite mild, and sometimes – also for a few thousand years in a row – occurring in the aphelion, when the winters are significantly colder.
  3. The variation in the earth’s axial tilt or obliquity, which ranges from 21.1° to 24.5° and means that during some northern hemisphere winters, the earth is actually pointing further away from the sun than in others. If this happens when the winters are occurring in the aphelion, this therefore makes them even colder.

You will, of course, have noted that I speak here specifically of the northern hemisphere. This is because the land in the northern hemisphere is significantly closer to the polar ice cap than it is in the southern hemisphere. Even though the south pole is actually on land, the Antarctic sea ice would have to leap across hundreds of miles of heat-retaining ocean in order to reach South America, South Africa or Australia. For the Arctic sea ice to claim northern Canada, Siberia and northern Scandinavia, in contrast, it wouldn’t have to move very far south at all. Indeed, it already reaches these northern outposts of the three closest continents each and every winter, blocking any Arctic seaway, and would therefore only require a few cold summers, in which it failed to retreat, for a new period of glaciation to begin.

Despite the undisputed soundness of Milankovitch’s astronomical calculations and the clear if only approximate correlation between the earth’s ever changing solar orbit and the cyclical patterns in its multi-millennial climate history, it is not surprising, therefore, that no government in the world was particularly keen on giving scientists money to study this relationship further and thereby provide a more precise date as to when the next period of glaciation would actually begin. For if, as the Milankovitch cycles suggested, the earth’s climate is driven by gravitational forces far beyond the control of any human being, then there was absolutely nothing any government in the world could do about it. Giving people a more accurate forecast as to when an ice sheet a mile thick was going to descend upon North America and Europe would therefore have achieved nothing other than to foster despondency and a total loss of will to do anything constructive. For make no mistake, another period of glaciation like the last one, with a drop in global average temperatures of 9°C, would mean the death of billions of people, if not the whole of human civilization.

In the early 1980s, when governments would have been agonizing over what, if anything, they should do about this problem, it must have seemed like mana from heaven, therefore, when NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS), under the directorship of James Hanson, revived a long-abandoned theory, first put forward by the Swedish physicist Svante Arrhenius in 1896, which promised a possible solution. For due to the so-called Greenhouse Gas Effect, Arrhenius had posited that the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide which the world had been experiencing ever since the beginning of the industrial revolution, should actually lead to an increase in global temperatures, which Hanson now suggested might be sufficient to counteract the effects of the Milankovitch cycles and hence remove this looming threat.

What Hanson and his colleagues at NASA GISS failed to inform the world, however, is why Arrhenius’ theory had been so long abandoned. Whether or not this was intentional, they entirely neglected to mention the fact that, in 1901, just five years after the theory’s publication, it had been utterly debunked by another Swedish physicist, Knut Ångström, who empirically demonstrated that, due to the limited number of signature wave-lengths at which infra-red radiation is absorbed by carbon dioxide, and the further fact that most of these wave lengths are also absorbed by water vapour, increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide could not have anywhere near the effect upon climate that Arrhenius had claimed. Using an infrared camera, which Ångström himself had developed, what he discovered, in fact, was that:
  1.  at the shorter wavelengths absorbed by carbon dioxide – those which are also absorbed by the thirty times more plentiful water vapour – all of the infra-red radiation re-emitted by the sun-warmed earth is already absorbed by latter, such that adding more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere has no effect on climate whatsoever, while
  2. at the longer wavelengths, at which carbon dioxide uniquely absorbs infra-red radiation, the much lower temperatures of the objects from which the radiation is emitted means that the effect is minimal.
Unfortunately, it seems that to governments in the mid-1980s the actual science was not their primary concern. They were happy merely to be assured that they were no longer facing an end-of-the-world catastrophe over which they had no control. As a consequence, they still didn’t really question the science even when they were told that man-made global warming might not merely counteract the effects of the Milankovitch Cycles, but might, in itself, be a threat to the planet. After all, this was something they could control. They could systematically reduce their nations’ carbon dioxide emissions and even gain popularity as a result of their virtuous actions in ‘saving the planet’.

And so the taps were opened and the money flowed, especially in America and the UK, where climate research very quickly became big business. In the UK, for instance, the two largest centres of the science are the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research at the University of Exeter, which also houses the UK meteorological office, and the Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia, which, between them, employ more than three hundred scientists – along with their associated administrative and auxiliary staff – and jointly produce the highly influential HadCRUT dataset, which is used by the IPCC in its scientific assessment reports, and from which an equally influential version of the GAST or Global Average Surface Temperature is derived.

To those unfamiliar with the way in which climate science is currently conducted, this concept of the GAST, and the fact that it needs to be calculated, will probably require some explanation. After all, most people probably imagine that, these days, the earth’s atmospheric temperature is measured from space. As indeed it is. Since 1978, microwave sounding units (MSUs) on polar orbiting satellites, controlled by America’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), have measured the intensity of microwave radiation emitted by atmospheric oxygen, from which the temperature of  different layers in the atmosphere can be calculated. Not only are these stratified atmospheric temperatures all significantly cooler than the earth’s surface temperature, however, but, as stated, they only go back to 1978. And as with proxy data, one cannot mix and match datasets. If one wants a longer historical record – one dating back to 1850, for instance, as in the case of the HadCRUT dataset – one therefore has to go back to surface temperature records measured in the old-fashioned way, with a thermometer.

The trouble is, of course, that if one’s objective is to obtain is a global average surface temperature, this enforced methodology, in itself, presents a number of almost insurmountable challenges. The first and most obvious is that weather stations are not evenly distributed about the globe, with far more in Europe and North America than in Africa, Asia and South America, and hardly any at all, in fact, in most of the more inhospitable but climatically critical parts of the world, such as northern Siberia and the Sahara Desert. Just as importantly, this is also reflected historically, with less and less records having been kept outside of Europe and North America the further one goes back in time. In fact, during the first four years of the HadCRUT dataset, from 1850 to 1853, there is only one actual data point in the whole of the southern hemisphere, in Indonesia as it happens.

So how do you calculate a global average surface temperature from such a paucity of actual data? Well it’s a bit like playing a game of Sudoku. Firstly, you divide the world up into a grid of equal sized areas. Then you fill in the average temperatures for those areas for which you have actual data. Then you take two areas for which you have data and extrapolate values for the areas in between. How? Unfortunately this is not made public. For just as in the case of Michael Mann’s data and methodology, the institutions which undertake this work, although publicly funded, claim that their algorithms are proprietary and the primary source of their income, which they therefore have a right to protect.

One can, however, make some educated guesses as to the kind of variables these algorithms would have to include. Take, for example, two areas on the grid – call them A and B – which differ in average temperature by 2°C and which are separated by four dataless areas. The simplest way to extrapolate the average temperatures for these transitional areas would therefore be to divide 2°C by four and assume that the temperature increases by 0.5°C in each of the areas one passes through in moving from the colder area A to the warmer area B. Immediately, however, one can see a number of problems with this. Is the difference in the average temperature between A and B caused by a difference in altitude, for instance? And if so, is the gradient constant? Or is the difference between A and B due to the fact that one is in an urban area while the other is in the countryside, urban areas generally being two or three degrees warmer than rural ones? If so, how far does the urban heat island effect (UHIE) radiate into the countryside? And what happens if one combines these two possibilities? Suppose that both A and B are urban areas at different altitudes, with colder countryside in between. How does one calculate these values?

Not, of course, that this particular example is mathematically very difficult. And I certainly don’t mean to say that the people who work on these problems don’t generally get the answers right or that they are not empirically verified wherever possible. There are, however, areas of the world where the factors affecting the local climate are not only far more complex than in the above example, but where that complexity itself not only produces the kind of inhospitable environment where human habitation and hence weather stations are a rarity, but where it is also that much more difficult to verify their assumed effects.

Take the world’s oceans, for instance, which cover 71% of the planet’s surface and which have such a complex thermodynamic interaction with the atmosphere that even after decades of oceanic-atmospheric studies, meteorologists still find it difficult to predict the development and course of hurricanes with any certainty. What’s more, meteorologists do not have to rely on tethered coastal buoys or ships to feed them surface temperature data in the way that climatologists do.

Then there are the world’s deserts which, due to a lack of water vapour in the atmosphere, experience dramatic drops in temperature when not subjected to direct sunlight. Or the world’s tropical rain forests which, due to their extreme humidity, hardly experience any change in temperature at all whether it be day or night. If you look at maps showing the locations of the worlds weather stations, however, deserts and rain forests hardly figure at all, meaning that whatever changes in temperature these regions of the world experience are nearly all extrapolated from somewhere else: somewhere else that almost certainly does not have these same extreme climatic conditions.

Even more worrying is the fact that, just as in a game of Sudoku, extrapolated data points become data points from which other data points are then extrapolated, such that any error in calculating the value for one particular area can spread and even be amplified across the matrix: a fact which, I suspect, would have scientists in many other fields raising a sceptical eyebrow, especially as we are not allowed to see the algorithms by which these calculated values are generated. Indeed, it’s highly likely that there would be a good many scientists in other disciplines who would not only question the scientific soundness of this whole endeavour but would likely wonder at how it could receive so much public founding while being subject to so little public scrutiny.

Indeed, it is a question which, I suspect, a good many more people will have started asking in the last few months, following the publication of the work of an Australian PhD student called John McLean, whom the guardians of the HadCRUT dataset inexplicably allowed to audit HadCRUT4, the fourth and latest version of their dataset.

Presumably, as a humble PhD student, the senior management at the Hadley Centre and the CRU thought that McLean posed no threat. Unfortunately for them, he found a publisher who was not only willing but eager to publish his findings, which detailed over seventy serious errors in the data.
Admittedly, most of these were just simple mistakes. But even as such, they demonstrate a casualness on behalf of the scientists involved which one would not have expected from people processing such supposedly significant information, especially given that many of the mistakes are so glaring.

By way of a few examples, there are two separate months, for instance, when the measured or calculated average temperature for the Caribbean islands of St. Kitts is recorded as being 0°C. For the whole month of September 1953, to take another example, a town in Romania was supposed to have experienced an average temperature of minus 46°C: the usual average temperature for that month being plus 10°C. Then there is the temperature data recorded by ships at sea, the geographical coordinates of which are logged as being up to two hundred miles inland. In fact, reading this catalogue of glaringly obvious errors, it is almost as if none of the data was ever actually checked or subjected to quality control, which in turn quite naturally leads one to question the quality of the systems and processes by which it is amassed.

Bad as these individual errors are, however, they are as nothing compared to the numerous systematic adjustments to which the data is subjected, especially with respect to the Urban Heat Island Effect, which is largely a 20th century phenomenon. This is because modern building materials – bricks, concrete and tarmac – are much better at absorbing and storing heat than those which they replaced – stone, wood and cobbles. With the advent of central heating, buildings also started to be heated to much higher levels, and although this coincided with an improvement in insulation, in accordance with the second law of thermodynamics, all this additional heat always eventually leaks out into the colder surrounding environment, thereby warming it: something which those responsible for weather stations in urban areas, especially at universities and other places of learning, gradually began to recognise as the century progressed.

As a consequence, they therefore slowly began to move these weather stations into more rural areas or any green, open space the school or university happened to own, sports fields being a very popular choice. The result was that average temperatures recorded by these weather stations in the year immediately following their relocation usually and often quite dramatically fell. Instead of assuming that the temperature rise at the previous location had been gradual over a number of years, however, what John McLean discovered was that the compilers of the HadCRUT dataset assumed rather that the older temperatures had always been overstated by the difference recorded in the year of relocation. Instead of adjusting the figures downward on a gradual basis, therefore, they deducted the entire difference from the whole data history of the weather station in question, effectively cooling the past by far more than any reasonable person would regard as warranted.

Nor are the scientists at the Hadley Centre and the CRU alone in this practice. Over the last couple of decades, the same adjustments have been systematically made to the datasets compiled by NASA GISS and the NOAA. Indeed, it is how these institutions, working together, managed to eradicate the warmer years of the 1930s and 40s. Even more importantly, it is also how they have managed to maintain their elevated level of public funding. For in order to keep the money spigots open, the climate science establishment, as a community of institutions, know that they have to keep public concern over climate change at a critical level. For all these institutions, therefore, it is imperative that anything which brings the AGW narrative into question – even the slightest hint that other factors might be involved in climate variability – has to be suppressed.

Shocking as this is, however, the real problem is that the corruption does not stop at the laboratory gates. If it did, it would just be a minor scam. Having embraced the AGW narrative, however, governments around the world have had to make good on their implicit commitment to do something about it, and there have been plenty of other scam artists out there who have been than more than willing to help them: crony capitalists who have no problem accepting public grants and subsidies in return for largely bogus promises of limitless clean energy produced from non-viable technologies which are otherwise so far from being economic that, during their lifetime, they barely recoup the energy expended in their manufacture, installation and maintenance. Worse still, in order to fund these grants and subsidies, both taxes and electricity prices have to be increased for both consumers and businesses alike, thereby suppressing demand in other parts of the economy, while the intermittent nature of the energy produced by wind and solar farms is a constant threat to the stability of any electricity grid which is forced to rely on them, eventually giving rise to power outages which are even more economically damaging.

At the same time, demands that we eliminate the use of fossil fuels for transport have forced an already depressed automotive industry to scrap billions of dollars of cumulative investment in internal combustion technologies while investing even more billions in the development of alternative electric vehicles for which there is currently little to no existing refueling infrastructure and insufficient electricity available to power one even if there were, our generating capacity having already become too degraded by the green energy revolution. And to cap it all, it is now being discovered that, because of their lithium ion batteries, electric cars are not nearly as safe as everyone imagined, having a tendency to suddenly burst into flames should any of their battery casings become compromised, allowing the lithium inside to come into contact with the oxygen in the air and causing them to explode.

But surely, you say, governments employ engineers and economists to advise them on these matters. If the direction in which we are currently headed were as misguided and ill-conceived as I say it is, then surely they would have been told. And you are right, they probably have been. It’s just that no politician hoping to be re-elected could ever repeat any of this advice, let alone base their policies on it, while many of them almost certainly choose to cynically profess a belief in a post-fossil-fuel world in order to appeal to that small but extremely vocal part of the electorate with whom it most resonates: the idealistic but largely directionless graduates of our post-modernist education system for whom the traditional aspirations of getting married, raising a family and owning their own home now seem as anachronistic and ideologically defective as they are economically unattainable. When set beside the yawning chasm of nihilistic emptiness which otherwise beckons, to many of this generation the idea of ‘saving the planet’ has thus become the one thing they can cling to: not just as an indubitably good cause to which they can devote themselves entirely without further need of reason or justification, but as something which, in its very purposefulness, offers them salvation.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the climate change movement has often been compared to a religious cult. For like a religious cult it gives meaning to its followers’ lives. Based on such an abstruse foundation, however – the actual physics of which few of its followers even claim to understand – it also engenders the kind of anxiety which naturally comes with the possibility that this ‘meaning’ could at any time be undermined by some random sceptical thought, and which in turn therefore fosters an almost hysterical hostility towards any dissenting voice. Like heretics in the middle ages, ‘deniers’ must consequently be silenced by any means possible, whether that means de-platforming them and banning them from any form of media, or removing them from any office they may hold, especially if that office involves any form of teaching.

What is most disturbing about this descent into mob rule, however, is not just the rejection of disinterested enquiry and reasoned debate – or even the existential malaise which it clearly signifies – but the fact that, unlike in the middle ages, and the centuries of ever-increasing enlightenment which followed, science may no longer be able to come to our rescue. For by abandoning actual science in favour of whatever narrative would garner public funding, scientists like Michael Mann have not only subverted their own disciple and weakened the status of science in general, but have undermined the entire epistemological foundation upon which the modern world is built: a principled and determined commitment to basing our beliefs solely upon empirical evidence and reasoned argument, which, until now, has kept our feet firmly on the ground and our beliefs tethered to reality, and without which all manner of fantasy, delusion and madness is made possible, including, it seems, the belief that a colourless, odourless gas, which comprises just 0.04% of the atmosphere and is essential to all life on earth, is actually a pollutant born of our nature-despoiling original sin, which, unless we recant and mend our ways, will eventually see us all burning in hell or plunged beneath the waters of a second great flood.

It is thus for his contribution to ushering in this new dark age of ignorance and superstition that Michael Mann is most culpable. And it is for this, therefore, that he cannot be forgiven.